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Abstract
Divide-and-Conquer is a common strategy to manage the complexity of system design
and verification. In the context of System-on-Chip (SoC) design verification, an SoC sys-
tem is decomposed into several modules and every module is separately verified. Usually
an SoC module is reactive: it interacts with its environmental modules. This interaction is
normally modeled by environment constraints, which are applied to verify the SoC mod-
ule. Environment constraints are assumed to be always true when verifying the individual
modules of a system. Therefore the correctness of environment constraints is very impor-
tant for module verification. Environment constraints are also very important for coverage
analysis. Coverage analysis in formal verification measures whether or not the property
set fully describes the functional behavior of the design under verification (DuV). if a set
of properties describes every functional behavior of a DuV, the set of properties is called
complete. To verify the correctness of environment constraints, Assume-Guarantee Rea-
soning rules can be employed. However, the state of the art assume-guarantee reasoning
rules cannot be applied to the environment constraints specified by using an industrial
standard property language such as SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA).
This thesis proposes a new assume-guarantee reasoning rule that can be applied to
environment constraints specified by using a property language such as SVA. In addi-
tion, this thesis proposes two efficient plausibility checks for constraints that can be con-
ducted without a concrete implementation of the considered environment. Furthermore,
this thesis provides a compositional reasoning framework determining that a system is
completely verified if all modules are verified with Complete Interval Property Checking
(C-IPC) under environment constraints.
At present, there is a trend that more of the functionality in SoCs is shifted from the
hardware to the hardware-dependent software (HWDS), which is a crucial component
in an SoC, since other software layers, such as the operating systems are built on it.
Therefore there is an increasing need to apply formal verification to HWDS, especially
for safety-critical systems. The interactions between HW and HWDS are often reactive,
and happen in a temporal order. This requires new property languages to specify the
reactive behavior at the HW and SW interfaces.
This thesis introduces a new property language, called Reactive Software Property
Language (RSPL), to specify the reactive interactions between the HW and the HWDS.
Furthermore, a method for checking the completeness of software properties, which are
specified by using RSPL, is presented in this thesis. This method is motivated by the
approach of checking the completeness of hardware properties.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the past decades, semiconductor technology has evolved to be able to integrate all nec-
essary components required for a computer into a single chip. Such a chip, known as
a System-on-Chip (SoC), consists of complex hardware (HW) and embedded software
(SW). Like other integrated circuits, the SoC hardware must be extremely reliable and
correct, because errors in hardware may require a huge amount of time for re-engineering,
and millions of dollars. Although correcting errors in embedded software is usually only
a matter of re-compiling the software program and re-refreshing the memory of the tar-
geted hardware, SoC embedded software must be extremely reliable and correct as well,
especially for safety-critical systems, because errors in such systems may cost not only
money, but also human lives. However, advances in verification techniques have not been
able to keep pace with the growing complexity of SoC systems. In today’s SoC design and
verification flow, about 30% of the effort is put into chip design, and about 70% into the
verification of the correctness of a chip. Therefore, to guarantee the correctness of SoC
systems and to speed up the verification process, various verification techniques are used,
and any emerging technique is also welcome, if it can raise the quality of SoC systems or
accelerate the verification process.
When verifying an SoC, the most important and most difficult parts to prove are the
interfaces (HW/HW interfaces and HW/SW interfaces). An interface serves as a com-
municator between two components (HW/HW or HW/SW) of a system, and it could be
as simple as a point-to-point connection or as complex as a bus system obeying a com-
munication protocol, where huge amounts of data pass through the bus. In general, the
interactions between two components over an interface are reactive. This leads to a sit-
uation where, in principle, verification of the behavior at the interface must consider the
two components as a whole. If the two components further interact with other compo-
nents, then in the worst case the entire system must be included to prove the interface.
This leads to highly complex verifications that require a huge amount of computation re-
sources and take too much time. Assume-guarantee reasoning in “Divide-and-Conquer”
settings is one of the formal methods for validating the interfaces of a system. Methods
based on assume-guarantee reasoning conduct the interface verification on the individual
components rather than on their sum. In addition, assume-guarantee reasoning needs a
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formal description of the interfaces. Formalizing the interfaces yields many advantages:
For example, when integrating two Intellectual Property (IP) blocks, a formal description,
often provided by IP vendors as a documentation, can eliminate ambiguity about the in-
terface behavior; for design verification, formal interface descriptions can be applied as
assumptions or assertions of the components of a system.
The present dissertation presents a new assume-guarantee rule for validating the in-
terfaces of a SoC system (Chapter 4). Derived from it, a set of compositional criteria is
introduced for guaranteeing that every functionality of a system is covered by the union of
the property sets of the individual components of the system (Chapter 5). Furthermore a
property language is contributed, which is used to formally specify the HW/SW interfaces
and the hardware-dependent software behavior (Chapter 6). The motivation of these con-
tributions is discussed in greater detail in Section 1.2. The following section overviews
the state-of-art approaches applied to verify the functional correctness of SoC systems.
1.1 Design Verification of Systems-on-Chip (SoC)
Due to the high cost of correcting errors in a HW system, a chip must be verified rig-
orously before being shipped to customers. Design verification is a difficult task, par-
ticularly for an SoC, in which many functional units, implemented in HW or in SW, are
integrated. Furthermore these functional units usually interact in a very complex manner.
At the design phase of an SoC system, functional verification verifies whether a design
is implemented as wanted. It includes digital functional verification, analog verification,
static timing analysis, etc. Manufacturing verification, also called test, examines whether
a HW device is manufactured as wanted. This dissertation focuses on digital functional
verification. Approaches to functional verification can be classified into static methods,
such as formal verification, and dynamic methods, such as simulation. This section re-
views their usage for HW verification and SW verification, respectively.
1.1.1 Digital Hardware Verification
Simulation is a common method for verifying a HW design. In general, a (HW) design
under verification (DuV) is composed with an environment called a testbench, and they all
together are synthesized into a simulation model, which is further handled by a simulator.
The testbench is responsible for providing the input sequences (test cases) of the DuV
and to collect the response of the DuV. For an industrial design, it is not realistic to feed
every input sequence into the DuV, therefore how to choose the test cases is especially
important for guaranteeing the correctness of SoC systems. For directed simulation, the
test cases are given by verification engineers manually; every specified test case is meant
to cover one aspect of the overall functionality of the DuV, or to show the absence of some
erroneous behavior. However, for today’s SoC systems it is not feasible to generate every
input sequence manually. Constrained random simulation uses constraints for the input
signals of a DuV. Usually a constraint specifies the interface protocol of the input signals
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of the DuV. Randomized input stimuli are generated by a constraint solver, which only
produces the input sequences satisfying the constraints. The testbench for constrained
random simulation can be reactive. In other words, the response of the design can be used
to guide the constraint solver to generate input sequences toward covering untested behav-
ior. Constrained random simulation can automatically create more test cases than directed
simulation. However, for complex SoC systems, constrained random simulation still can
not examine every input sequence in the limited project time and computation resources.
To overcome this problem, formal verification has been adopted in the design flow either
as a complement to simulation or an alternative to it. In contrast to simulation, formal
verification takes care of every input sequence of the DuV: it is like an exhaustive sim-
ulation, but it is much faster than exhaustive simulation. In the SoC design flow, formal
verification is mainly applied to perform two tasks: equivalence checking and property
checking.
Equivalence Checking
Equivalence checking is applied to verify the equivalence of two models of a design. One
of the models, called the golden design, is thought to be correct. The other model is
called the revised design. Checking the equivalence of two sequential circuits (sequential
equivalence) is not an easy task; theoretically it needs to traverse the state space of the
product machine of two circuits, which has a high computational complexity. In the last
decades many formal equivalence checking techniques for sequential circuits have been
developed [1–5], in order to overcome the complexity problem of sequential equivalence.
For instance, [1] employs the structural similarity of two circuits to reduce the sequential
equivalence checking problem to a combinational equivalence checking problem: if two
circuits have the same encoding of states, by relating the state variables of two circuits,
then it only needs to check the equivalence of the transition function and output function
of two circuits, for example by using methods based on satisfiability solving (SAT) [6] or
Boolean decision diagrams (BDDs) [7]. Relating the state variables of two circuits is also
called state matching. In practice, state matching is conducted either by automatically re-
lating the variables having the same names or by manual inspection. [5] presents a method
to verify the equivalence of two circuits, whose state encoding is not fully identical due to
design optimizations performed by synthesis tools. Examples of such optimizations are
retiming and inverter pushing.
Equivalence checking is already a standard component in today’s industrial design
flows. It is used to verify the functional equivalence between the Register-Transfer-Level
(RTL) design and the synthesized Gate-Level netlist, which may contain bugs introduced
by synthesis tools.
Property Checking
Property checking, often also referred to as model checking, is an automatic proof method
applied to verify whether an implementation of a design satisfies the specification of the
3
Chapter 1. Introduction
design. In order to perform property checking, the DuV is required to be modeled by a
formalism. The known models widely used in model checker are the Kripke model [8] and
the finite state machine (FSM) model, the latter will be explained in detail in Section 2.4.
Another input for a property checker is the specification of the design. Usually the
specification of a design is non-formal, therefore a formal language is needed to formal-
ize the specification in terms of properties. Such a language is called a property specifi-
cation language. In practice, it is not feasible to specify every behavior within a single
property, otherwise this property would become too complex to be handled by a property
checker, and too complex to be managed by verification engineers. Consequently, a prop-
erty specifies only an aspect of the design. In addition, a property may describe the design
behavior ranging over many clock cycles. Such kinds of behavior must be supported by
a temporal property language. The most famous temporal languages are computation tree
logic (CTL) and linear temporal logic (LTL) [8, 9]. Although CTL and LTL have great
expressive power, they are too difficult to use in practice. Hence, standardized languages
such as Property Specification Language (PSL) and SystemVerilog Assertion (SVA) have
been developed [10, 11], which are user-friendly and easily adopted by the industry.
Once the model of a design and the properties of the design are in hand, it is necessary
to have a proof method to verify the properties. Classical model checking [12] and sym-
bolic model checking [13] are based on algorithms that traverse the state space of a de-
sign. Classical model checking explicitly represents the states and the transitions between
states. Therefore, classical model checking suffers from the state explosion problem [14].
Symbolic model checking, in contrast, applies Boolean functions to symbolically repre-
sent the states and the state transitions of a design. In a symbolic model checker, BDDs
are used as the data structures to represent Boolean functions. In some cases the size
of the BDDs grows exponentially with the number of variables, and the process of ma-
nipulating the BDDs requires huge memory as well [15]. This limits the performance
of symbolic model checking. One of the methods to handle larger designs is abstraction-
refinement [16]. Methods using abstraction-refinement start from the most abstract model
of the design to prove a property. In the case of a holding property, it can be concluded
that the property is also valid on the concrete model of the design. If a property fails,
it needs to simulate the counterexample on the concrete design to determine whether the
counterexample is spurious or relates to a real design bug. A spurious counterexample is
applied to refine the abstract model. The property then is verified on the refined model of
the design. This process repeats until a property is proven or a bug in the design/property
is found. Abstract models can also be useful to verify designs by using simulation. For
instance, to speed up a simulation, abstract models such as Transaction Level Modeling
(TLM) [17] and Electronic System Level (ESL) Model [18] are used to prove the design
behavior at a relatively high description level of the design.
Bounded model checking (BMC) [19] and Interval Property Checking (IPC) [20] em-
ploy SAT-solvers as their proof engines. BMC and IPC unroll the DuV into a combina-
tional logic model, then the Boolean formulas of this combinational logic model and the
property to be verified are handled by a SAT-solver. Note that not the property itself, but
its negation is given to the SAT-solver. To put this another way, if the SAT-solver returns
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UNSAT , then the property holds. BMC proves the bounded validity of a property starting
from the initial state of the design. Therefore, for industrial designs, BMC is mostly ap-
plied as a bug hunter, whereas IPC proves the complete validity of a property starting from
arbitrary states of the DuV, which may lead to false negatives. To overcome the problem
of false negatives with IPC, invariants of the design can be applied. Such invariants can be
constructed manually by inspecting the RTL code of the design, or can be generated au-
tomatically as presented in [20] and [21]. Furthermore, unlike IPC, which uses invariants
only as reachability constraints, in the context of the SAT-based verification paradigm,
invariants can also be used to prove a property. Methods like Property Driven Reachabil-
ity (PDR) [22] and interpolant-based verification [23] generate invariants stepwise until
the generated invariants can prove a property.
1.1.2 Software Verification and Hardware/Software Co-Verification
Methods for ensuring software correctness can be classified into dynamic program anal-
ysis and static program analysis.
Dynamic program analysis examines a software program by executing the program
under test on the targeted hardware platform or on a (software/hardware) emulator of it.
Most simulative approaches are dynamic. Similar to hardware simulation, for dynamic
testing an executed program is fed by test cases. The outputs of the program are then
collected and examined. In addition, some code coverage criteria are applied to improve
the quality of the test cases.
Static methods analyze programs without executing them. The simplest static analysis
tools, such as for syntactic analysis, have been integrated into software program compil-
ers already for a long time. They analyze programs at compile time. Unlike the dynamic
methods, which analyze the software program by explicitly enumerating input test cases,
symbolic execution (a static method) takes symbolic input values instead of concrete in-
put values. Then the symbolic values of the program’s output are computed. Formal
verification is a static approach. It is used to find functional errors of a software program,
which could be something simple like “out of boundary access” or something complex
like a wrongly implemented functionality. Since modern software systems are getting
more and more complex, finding errors in software only by using simulative methods is
no longer sufficient: there is an increasing need to involve formal methods to ensure that
the software is free of bugs. There has been a lot of research into software model check-
ing [24–30]. Some of these approaches model software programs as finite-state systems.
Such finite-state systems are either represented explicitly, or symbolically in BDDs. Then
the algorithms from classical model checking or symbolic model checking are applied to
traverse the finite-state systems for the verification of the software programs. SAT-based
methods such as [27–29] aim to transform the software programs to Boolean formulas,
then the resulting formulas, joined with the formula representing properties, are handled
by a SAT-solver. A good summary of software model checking can be found in [31].
However, all the above mentioned research attempts to validate application software
written in a high-level programming language such as C/C++. For embedded software, es-
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pecially for hardware-dependent software (low-level software), the aforementioned meth-
ods are no longer suitable. Hardware-dependent software interacts intensively with its
controlled hardware. It is therefore very important to guarantee the correctness of this
reactive behavior, and this sophisticated reactive behavior is also very difficult to verify.
In industrial embedded design flows, an integration test is responsible for identifying
errors at the interfaces between the hardware and the software. Nevertheless, the method
of integration test is still dominated by the simulative methods in the industry. There is
some research that applies formal methods to co-verify the hardware and the software.
The work of [32] convert the software to a hardware module by storing the program
in a read-only-memory (ROM). Then the joint model of the processor and the ROM is
handled by a symbolic model checker. In contrast, [33] unrolls this joint model to several
instances with respect to the time points identified by the clock ticks of the hardware;
then the unrolled model is analyzed by a BMC tool. The work of [34] also unrolls this
joint model, however, it unrolls the joint hardware model only for a few time points and
proves the properties that specify only local behavior on the unrolled model. Such local
properties can be seen as an abstraction of the unrolled model. Later, the local properties
are used to prove the properties that describe global behavior ranging over hundreds of
clock cycles.
Methods based on symbolic execution, such as [35–39], need to explicitly enumerate
every execution path of a program to prove a safety property. In the present dissertation, a
method similar to symbolic execution is adopted [40]. However, here the symbolic execu-
tion is only applied to create the computation model of a software program called program
netlist. The properties are proven by a SAT-solver, which implicitly enumerates every pos-
sible path of the software. Strictly speaking, the method presented in this dissertation is
not co-verification of hardware and software, because a program netlist is obtained by
using the instruction set architecture (ISA) model of the processor instead of its time-
accurate model. The program netlist, however, contains not only the functional behavior
of a hardware-dependent software program, but also the input/output (I/O) accesses to the
controlled HW peripherals and the correct ordering of these I/O accesses. In this way, it
also takes into account how the software interacts with hardware. A detailed explanation
of the program netlist can be found in Section 6.2.
1.2 Motivation and Overview
During the simulation of a design, people want to know to what extent the behavior of the
DuV is explored. For this purpose, several coverage criteria are introduced that evaluate
the quality of the input patterns. One coverage criterion worth mentioning is functional
coverage, which evaluates how many times a property, such as an SVA assertion, is trig-
gered by test cases. Note that the coverage criteria for simulation are only applied to
evaluate the quality of input test cases. However, formal verification takes care of every
possible input scenario, and so the coverage criteria from simulation are not applica-
ble. For formal verification, a verification engineer may be interested in “When should
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I stop writing properties?” To this end, a functional coverage criterion for property sets
is introduced for formal property checking, which tests whether a property set is com-
plete, in other words, it measures whether a property set covers every functionality of the
DuV [41]. If the property set of a module is proven to be complete, then the module is
said to be proven completely.
On the other hand, even with the growing advances in verification techniques, which
can handle bigger and bigger designs, Divide-and-Conquer is still a popular and intuitive
method to manage the complexity of DuVs, so that the verification engineer can focus
on one of the individual design modules at a time. When verifying individual modules
of a DuV, in order to save verification time and resources, the module’s inputs have to
be constrained by using environment constraints. Environment constraints exist implic-
itly during design simulation, where only valid input traces are fed into the DuV. For
constrained-random simulation and for formal verification, environment constraints are
given as (temporal) formulas that describe the (reactive) behavior between the DuV and
its environment. Similarly, to avoid writing unnecessary properties that cover invalid input
scenarios, environment constraints are also employed in the coverage analysis of property
sets.
Once the environment constraints are applied to verify a design, one needs to ensure
that the constraints are correct. In industry, these constraints are inspected manually,
which is error prone and time consuming. On the other hand, since the individual modules
of an SoC are usually developed simultaneously, it may not be possible to check the
constraints against the environment of a module before integration. Detecting errors in
constraints at that late stage of the design process, however, requires a step back into
module verification and may compromise the project closure. In order to overcome this
bottleneck in the flow of the verification, two efficient plausibility checks for constraints
are introduced in this dissertation. These two checks can be conducted on the constraints
of a module without a concrete implementation of the module’s environment.
Although the presented plausibility checks give verification engineers more confi-
dence in their constraints, it is still necessary to have an automatic method that can
precisely verify constraints. Environmental constraints are formal descriptions of inter-
faces (HW/HW, HW/SW, SW/SW), and most environment constraints are reactive, which
means the correctness of the environment constraints depends on their own correctness.
This leads to a situation in which proving the constraints needs theoretically to consider
the module and its environment as a whole. This violates the intent of applying Divide-
and-Conquer approaches. Methods based on assume-guarantee reasoning overcome this
issue by reasoning only over the constraints/commitments of individual modules, where
the commitment of a module is the interface behavior exposed to the module’s environ-
ment. Since these constraints/commitments are often abstractions of modules and they
are significantly smaller than the modules themselves, assume-guarantee reasoning can
be very efficient.
There has been much research into assume-guarantee reasoning for systems modeled
either as Moore machines or as Mealy machines [42–47]. An important contribution of
this dissertation is that an assume-guarantee reasoning scheme is proposed that allows
7
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for applying one of the standard property specification languages such as SVA or PSL to
specify the interface behaviors (constraints/commitments) of the modules. Using standard
property languages makes it possible for compact and easy-to-read constraints/commit-
ments of modules to be formulated instead of constructing automata for them. In addition,
verification engineers do not need to learn new languages for specifying the interfaces. An
interface description written in, e.g., SVA can be re-used either as an assumption or as a
commitment for module verification, and the same description can also be re-used as an
assertion for chip level verification. Using standard property languages to formulate con-
straints runs the risk of introducing circular reasoning for assume-guarantee-reasoning.
This has not been addressed by research to present, and will be discussed in greater detail
in Chapter 4. To resolve the issue of circular reasoning, this dissertation presents a new
assume-guarantee rule with the aid of the aforementioned plausibility tests. This rule can
guarantee the validity of the environment constraints and the validity of the properties for
individual modules of the entire system, where the constraints and properties are written
in a standard property specification language like SVA or PSL.
Furthermore, since the coverage analysis of the property sets is conducted module by
module, environment constraints are used to avoid writing unnecessary properties. When
every module of a system is completely verified, it is all-important to ensure that the
union of the property sets of the individual modules completely verifies the system. For
this purpose, this dissertation provides a couple of compositional rules derived from the
new assume-guarantee rule presented in Chapter 4.
Interface verification is crucial for software verification as well. The HW/SW inter-
face is particularly difficult to prove, because the reactive temporal behavior dominates
there. This requires new modeling techniques for hardware-dependent software. Aside
from that, it is necessary to have a property language that can specify the reactive tempo-
ral behavior at an HW/SW interface, and can be easily combined with the software model
for efficient model checking. Given the fact that traditional temporal languages such as
LTL and CTL are hard to use and to understand, and run-time assertions like the “assert”
statements in C can only specify non-temporal behavior, this dissertation presents a new
property language for specifying hardware-dependent software, called the reactive soft-
ware property language (RSPL). This dissertation shows that using RSPL it is very con-
venient for specifying an HW/SW interface and the properties of software programs based
on the input sequences and the output sequences of the programs. For software property
checking, it is also interesting to know if a software property set is complete. Because the
RSPL properties describe the input/output sequences of a hardware-dependent software
program, for the sake of checking the completeness of software properties, methods such
as [41, 48] from the hardware domain can be adopted, and these methods verify whether
the property set uniquely describes every input sequence and every output sequence.
Considering the characteristics of hardware-dependent software, for software com-
pleteness checking this dissertation contributes a simpler method than the one used for
hardware properties. This dissertation builds a framework for RSPL, that allows users
to specify the interfaces and their reactive behavior of a software program. With further
syntax extensions, the contributed assume-guarantee rules in Chapter 4 and compositional
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rules in Chapter 5 can be applied to guarantee the results of compositional software model
checking using reactive environment constraints.
This thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces the fundamentals of graph theory including algorithms for travers-
ing graphs. It also gives an overview of propositional logic, which is essential for model-
ing combinational circuits, and of finite state machines, which are essential for modeling
sequential circuits. In addition, predicate logic is briefly explained, which is basic for
property languages.
Chapter 3 gives a summary of state-of-the-art model checking techniques and property
specification languages for hardware designs. Furthermore, it presents a detailed expla-
nation of methods for coverage analysis for simulation-based techniques and for property
checking.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of various state-of-the-art assume-guarantee rules which
are specialized for different models of systems, and specialized for different application
scenarios. In that chapter, a novel assume-guarantee rule is introduced that is more general
than previous ones, and it addresses the circular reasoning issues arising when applying
reactive constraints. To this end, two plausibility checks for environment constraints are
developed. They are parts of the newly presented assume-guarantee rule. However, they
also can be used standalone to aid a verification engineer’s gaining confidence in the
constraints at the early stage of a verification process.
Based on the result of Chapter 4, a set of compositional rules is given in Chapter 5.
By using them, one may conclude that the entire system is completely verified when the
individual modules of the system are completely verified, without performing a coverage
analysis for the entire system. Even though the presented work is explained for the case
of applying environment constraints during verification, the scenario that does not use any
constraint, which is only a special case of this research, is also covered by the presented
compositional rules.
Chapter 6 introduces a novel software property language called RSPL, that allows
users to specify the reactive behavior of hardware-dependent software. In addition, this
chapter contributes a method to create a joint model composed of properties and the soft-
ware computation model. Furthermore, an approach to prove the completeness of a prop-
erty set in RSPL is given.
Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Fundamentals
In this chapter, the basic theoretical background of this dissertation is introduced. Basic
notions of graphs and some graph-based algorithms are introduced in Section 2.1. Propo-
sitional logic, which is essential for digital design and verification, is briefly described in
Section 2.2. Predicate logic extends propositional logic in terms of expressive power and
will be discussed in Section 2.3. Designs with sequential behavior are usually modeled
by Finite State Machines (FSMs), which are defined in Section 2.4.
2.1 Graphs
A graph is a data model that visualizes binary relations between objects. Many techni-
cal problems can be represented by graphs and then be solved by efficient graph-based
algorithms. For instance, a Boolean function can be represented by a graph known as
a Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagram (ROBDD) [49–51]. It is a compact rep-
resentation for Boolean functions and can be found in use in many electronic design
automation tools, especially in formal model checking tools. A control flow graph of a
software program is a graph modeling the control structure of the software program [52].
In this section the fundamentals of graph theory and the algorithms for traversing graphs
are introduced.
2.1.1 Fundamentals of Graph Theory
A graph is composed of a set of vertices or nodes and a set of edges. Some graphs may
include labels, which are attached to the vertices and edges. This section discusses only
graphs without labels.
Definition 1 (Graph). A graph is defined to be an ordered pair G = (V,E), where V is a
non-empty set of vertices and E is a set of edges.
Every edge is defined by the vertices connected by it. Given two arbitrary vertices v1,
v2 ∈ V , a directed edge from v1 to v2 is defined by a relation (v1, v2) ∈ E ⊆ V × V . An
11
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undirected edge is indicated by a set {v1, v2} of vertices. A directed graph only contains
directed edges, whereas an undirected graph only contains undirected edges.
Definition 2 (Direct predecessors and direct successors). Suppose that (v1, v2) is an edge
in a directed graph G = (V,E). The vertex v1 is defined to be a direct predecessor of v2,
and v2 is said to be a direct successor of v1. An edge that departs from and ends at the
same vertex is called a loop.
Definition 3 (Paths). A path from a vertex x to a vertex y in a directed graph G = (V,E)
is a list of vertices (v1, v2, . . . , vk) such that all vertices are distinct from one another and
it is (vi, vi+1) ∈ E, i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 with x = v1, y = vk. The length of this path is
k − 1.
A cycle is a path whose start vertex and end vertex are the same. A directed graph not
containing any cycles is said to be acyclic and is called a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
An example of a DAG is given in Fig. 2.1, which is an ROBDD representing the Boolean
function f(a, b, c) = a ∧ b ∨ c.
c
0 1
b
a
Figure 2.1: An example of a DAG: ROBDD
2.1.2 Algorithms for Traversing Graphs
In this section, two basic algorithms for traversing the vertices in a graph are introduced.
Depth-First Search (DFS)
The depth-first search algorithm is a widely used algorithm. For instance, topological
sorting applies the DFS algorithm to determine the partial order of the vertices in a DAG.
Another example is state space exploration for a state machine in model checking by a
DFS traversal of the state transition graph of the machine.
Fig. 2.2 shows how the DFS algorithm operates to find all reachable nodes from the
root node of a graph. As illustrated in this example, the algorithm tries to find the “far-
thest” node from the root node as soon as possible, this is the reason why the algorithm is
called “depth-first.” Intuitively, the algorithm first finds all nodes along an arbitrary path
of a graph (Fig. 2.2a). Then it moves back to the last visited node that has unvisited direct
12
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successors. Afterwards it searches an arbitrary unvisited path staring from that node until
a terminal node is reached or a visited node is reached (Fig. 2.2b). A terminal node is a
node that does not have any direct successors. The process repeats until every node of the
graph is found (Fig. 2.2c).
a
b
c
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c d
f
e
g
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.2: Depth-First Search
The pseudo-code of Algo. 1 specifies how a DFS is implemented with the help of a
recursive function. In this function, the set visited indicates the traversed nodes of the
graph G and the function G.E(n) computes all direct successors of the current node n.
After the program terminates, the set visited contains all reachable nodes from a specified
starting node passed by the argument n. Note that the graph G is a DAG. However, with
slight modification, this function can be applied to an undirected graph.
Algorithm 1 recursive DFS function
1: visited = ∅
2: function DFS(n, G)
3: visited = visited ∪ {n}
4: for all v ∈ G.E(n) do
5: if v /∈ visited then
6: DFS(v, G)
7: end if
8: end for
9: end function
Breadth-First Search (BFS)
In contrast to depth-first search, breadth-first search searches all nodes at step k from
a starting node s before it continues to step k + 1. It finds its use in many areas, for
example, determining the shortest path between two nodes (s, t), or finding classes of
connected nodes in a graph.
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Fig. 2.3 also illustrates how to find all reachable nodes from the root node of the
graph introduced in Fig. 2.2, but this time the breadth-first search method is applied. The
algorithm firstly looks for every direct successor of the root node a (Fig. 2.3a), then for
every found direct successor j the algorithm seeks every direct successor of j (Fig. 2.3b).
The algorithm terminates when every terminal node is reached.
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Figure 2.3: Breadth-First Search
The BFS procedure is described in pseudo-code in Algo. 2 with the help of a fist-
in-first-out queue Q. The function Enqueue(n) pushes an element n to the first position
of the queue, whereas the function Dequeue pops the element at the first position of the
queue.
Algorithm 2 BFS function
1: function BFS(n, G)
2: Q = ∅
3: visited = {n}
4: Q.Enqueue(n)
5: while Q 6= ∅ do
6: v = Q.Dequeue()
7: for all w ∈ G.E(v) do
8: if w /∈ visited then
9: visited = visited ∪ {w}
10: Q.Enqueue(w)
11: end if
12: end for
13: end while
14: end function
14
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2.2 Propositional Logic
Propositional logic plays a key role in digital design and verification. As its name sug-
gests, it is a language which people can use to make statements about the relations be-
tween propositions. A proposition can have the property that it holds of one of the objects
that the language models, or that it is false about that object.
2.2.1 The Syntax of Propositional Logic
Definition 4 (Alphabet). The alphabet of propositional logic consists of
• an infinite set of atomic variables: Φ = v1, v2, . . .,
• a set of logical connectives (operators): ∧ (and),∨ (or) and ¬ (not),
• a pair of parentheses “(” and “)” .
Definition 5 (Syntax). The syntax of a well-formed formula of propositional logic is in-
ductively defined as follows:
• Every atomic variable ϕ ∈ Φ is a well-formed formula.
• If α is a well-formed formula, then ¬α is a well-formed formula.
• If α and β are well-formed formulas, then so is (α ∨ β).
• If α and β are well-formed formulas, then so is (α ∧ β).
• No other formula is a well-formed formula.
In order to improve the readability of propositional formulas, a precedence of the logic
operators is defined, so that some pairs of parentheses can be removed from a proposi-
tional formula. The operator ¬ has the highest precedence, then comes ∧, then ∨. Some-
times a propositional formula contains also the constants 0 and 1; they can be trivially
defined by a∧¬a and a∨¬a, respectively. The formula α→ β symbolizes that a propo-
sition α implies a proposition β, which is formally defined by ¬α ∨ β. Based on this
description of implication, the equivalence of two propositions α ↔ β can be defined by
(α→ β) ∧ (β → α).
2.2.2 The Semantics of Propositional Logic
Given a set of truth values B = {0, 1}, a valuation V : Φ → B of a well-formed
propositional formula ϕ is a function that assigns to every atomic variable occurring in ϕ
a truth value. The value of the formula ϕ can be determined by repeatedly applying the
following definition:
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Definition 6 (The semantics of propositional logic).
• V(¬α) =
{
0 if V(α) = 1
1 if V(α) = 0
• V(α ∧ β) =
{
1 if V(α) = 1 and V(β) = 1
0 otherwise
• V(α ∨ β) =
{
0 if V(α) = 0 and V(β) = 0
1 otherwise
The semantics of an arbitrary propositional formula can be viewed as a function that
takes the atomic variables as its arguments and computes the truth value of the whole
formula based on the values of arguments. Such a function is also called a Boolean
function. For example, the transition function of a FSM is a Boolean function. The
arguments of a Boolean function are usually called the inputs of the function, and the
return of the function is called the output of the function. A Boolean function can be
canonically represented by a truth table. A truth table for a function f : Bn → B lists the
value of f for all possible 2n combinations of input values. Fig. 2.4 shows the truth table
of the Boolean function f = a ∧ ¬b.
a b a ∧ ¬b
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 0
Figure 2.4: Truth table for a ∧ ¬b
The size of a truth table increases exponentially with the input size of the function.
For a realistic design it is not possible to build a truth table containing all 2n rows. Alter-
natively, a Boolean function can be canonically represented graphically by means of an
ROBDD [49–51], which is more compact than the truth table of the function. This section
does not give details about ROBDDs: the interested reader is referred to the cited papers.
A Boolean function can be implemented by a combinational circuit.
Definition 7 (Combinational circuit). A combinational circuitC is described by a Boolean
network, which is an acyclic directed graph C(V,E). The vertices are called gates, which
are the basic building blocks of a combinational circuit. The edge setE describes the con-
nections (wires) between the gates.
• The gates of I ⊆ V that do not have direct predecessors constitute the set of primary
inputs of the circuit. The edges leaving the gates of I are associated with a set of
input variables ij .
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• The gates of O ⊆ V,O ∩ I = ∅ that do not have direct successors constitute the set
of primary outputs of the circuit.
• Each gate gj ∈ G ⊆ V \ I is associated with a gate type which is one of AND, OR
or NOT; they represent logic functions whose semantics are defined according to
Def. 6 for the respective logical operators ∧, ∨ and ¬. The edges leaving the gates
of G are associated with variables xj . A subset of X , whose elements are related to
the edges going to the gates of O, is the set of output variables oj .
• The variables xj are also called the internal variables or the internal signals of the
circuit. The output variables (signals) are special internal signals, which represent
the circuit’s behavior that is visible from outside of the circuit.
At any given instance in time, the outputs of a combinational circuit are only deter-
mined by the present input value of the circuit.
The following terminology will be of relevance in later chapters of this thesis:
Definition 8 (Driver). Given a vertex v ∈ V in a circuit C, the driver D of v is the set of
all predecessor vertices of v: D(v) = {v′|(v′, v) ∈ E}; D is also called the Fan-in of v.
Definition 9 (Satisfiability). A propositional formula ϕ is satisfiable when there exists a
valuation of ϕ such that ϕ gets the truth value 1.
Definition 10 (Tautology). A propositional formula ϕ is a tautology when ϕ yields the
truth value 1 for every valuation.
In other words, when a formula is a tautology, its value is always 1 regardless of its
valuations.
2.3 Predicate Logic
Propositional logic is one of the simplest logics. It has limited expressive power. For
instance, it is not possible to specify a common property of a set of objects. An object
can be anything in the domain of discourse. Predicate logic, also called first-order logic,
extends propositional logic by means of quantifiers, function and predicate symbols.
2.3.1 The Syntax of Predicate Logic
Unlike propositional logic, which reasons with atomic variables as a whole, predicate
logic fine-grains the atomic variables from propositional logic by means of quantifiers,
functions (with or without arguments) and predicates (with or without arguments). A
function returns an object based on its input objects passed by arguments. A predicate can
be treated as a function that returns a Boolean value. An argument is like a placeholder
that is replaced by a dedicated object whenever the value of a function or a predicate is
computed. A function or a predicate could have zero or more than zero arguments. A
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function without arguments is also called a constant, referring to a specific object. A
predicate with zero arguments has either the Boolean value 0 or 1.
Definition 11 (Alphabet). The alphabet of predicate logic consists of
• an infinite set of function symbols F = {fk|k ∈ N},
• an infinite set of predicate symbols P = {pk|k ∈ N},
• an infinite set of variables V = {vk|k ∈ N},
• the quantifiers ∃ (existential) and ∀ (universal),
• the Boolean connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬,
• auxiliary punctuation marks “(”,“)” and “,”.
Note that any function could have n ≥ 0 arguments, hence a function is also called
an n-ary function. Every function symbol fk can be reused to represent functions with
different arguments, and the function symbol fk representing a function with n arguments
is referred to an n-ary function symbol. Similarly for n-ary predicate symbols.
Derived from Def. 11, the syntax of predicate logic is defined stepwise in the rest of
this section.
Definition 12 (Syntax of predicate logic: Term). In predicate logic, a term refers to ob-
jects reasoned about by the logic. It is defined recursively by:
• every variable vi ∈ V is a term;
• for an n-ary (n ≥ 0) function symbol fi ∈ F , if t0, t1, . . . , tn−1 are terms, so is
fi(t0, t1, . . . , tn−1). Here t0, t1, . . . , tn−1 are the arguments of the function fi;
• no other string is a term.
It is worthwhile to note that Def. 12 includes the case of constants, which are 0-ary
functions.
Definition 13 (Syntax of predicate logic: Well-formed formula). A well-formed formula
of predicate logic is recursively constructed as follows:
• if pi ∈ P is an n-ary (n ≥ 0) predicate symbol and t0, t1, . . . , tn−1 are terms, then
pi(t0, t1, . . . , tn−1) is a well-formed formula;
• if α and β are well-formed formulas, then so is (α ∧ β);
• if α and β are well-formed formulas, then so is (α ∨ β);
• if α is a well-formed formula, then so is ¬α;
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• if vi is a variable and α is a well-formed formula, then ∃viα and ∀viα are well-
formed formulas;
• no other string is a well-formed formula.
Analogously to propositional logic, precedences over logical connectives and quanti-
fiers are introduced to avoid unnecessary parentheses in formulas. ∀ and ∃ have the lowest
precedence of all Boolean connectives and quantifiers. The precedences between logical
connectives follow the rule defined in Section 2.2.1 for propositional formulas.
In predicate logic an atomic formula is a predicate together with its arguments. Given
a formula viα,  ∈ {∀,∃}, α is said to be the scope of the quantifier vi . The variable vi
is bound if it occurs inside of the scope of vi , otherwise it is called free.
2.3.2 The Semantics of Predicate Logic
Unlike propositional logic, in which the value of a formula is determined by the inter-
pretation of the atomic variables and the semantics of the logical operators, the value of
a well-formed formula from predicate logic is dependent not only on the value of the
predicates and the meaning of the logical connectives, but also on the semantics of the
predicate symbols and function symbols. Furthermore, since a formula in predicate logic
may contain existential and universal operators, the universe or the domain of the vari-
ables occurring in the formula influences the value of the formula too.
Definition 14 (Interpretation). An interpretation A (sometimes called a structure) is a
pair (U, I), where the universe U is an arbitrary non-empty set, and I is an interpretation
function defined as follows:
• for every variable vi, I(vi) : V → U ;
• for every n-ary function symbol fi, I(fi) : Un → U ;
• for every n-ary predicate symbol pi, I(pi) : Un → {0, 1}.
Definition 15. Given an interpretation A = (U, I) and a term t, the value of t is recur-
sively computed by applying the following rules:
• if t is a variable vi, then A(t) = I(vi);
• if t is an n-ary function symbol fi with arguments t0, t1, . . . , tn−1, then A(fi) =
I(fi(I(t0), I(t1), . . . , I(tn−1))).
Definition 16. Given an interpretation A = (U, I) and a formula α, α is evaluated re-
peatedly as:
• if α is an n-ary predicate pi with arguments t0, t1, . . . , tn−1,
then A(α) =
{
1 if I(pi(A(t0), A(t1), . . . , A(tn−1))) = 1
0 otherwise
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• if α has the form pi ∧ pj , then A(α) =
{
1 if A(pi) = 1 and A(pj) = 1
0 otherwise
• if α has the form pi ∨ pj , then A(α) =
{
1 if A(pi) = 1 or A(pj) = 1
0 otherwise
• if α has the form ¬pi, then A(α) =
{
1 if A(pi) = 0
0 otherwise
• if α has the form ∀vipj ,
then A(α) =
{
1 if A(pj) = 1 for every u ∈ U and I(vi) = u
0 otherwise
• if α has the form ∃vipj ,
then A(α) =
{
1 if A(pj) = 1 for some u ∈ U and I(vi) = u
0 otherwise
An interpretation A is a model of a formula α when A(α) = 1 is valid.
Definition 17 (Satisfiability). A formula α is satisfiable when there exists a model for α,
otherwise it is unsatisfiable.
Definition 18 (Tautology). A formula α is a tautology when every interpretation is a
model for α.
2.4 Finite State Machines
In today’s design flow, models are used intensively to manage the complexity of the sys-
tem being designed and analyzed. For instance, in a top-down design flow, design engi-
neers usually start from the most abstract model of the system. This model might only
contain structural information of the system, e.g., a block diagram, or an abstract behavior
that for example only reflects the causality of the objects in the system, or a mix of these.
Then, the abstract model is refined in one step or in several steps. At every step, more and
more details are added to the design. When analyzing (verifying) a system, different mod-
els are required depending on the focus of the verification. These models may constitute
different abstraction levels of the system, or be totally irrelevant to each other. But they
have at least one thing in common: every model contains only the necessary information
for the purpose of the verification, and the irrelevant parts are “abstracted” away.
The behavior of a sequential system is not only dependent upon the current inputs to
the system, but also on its past inputs. In other words, a sequential system has a memory
(register). In this section, a model for sequential systems is presented, namely the finite
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state machine (FSM). A state is a snapshot of the system. A value update in the memory
results from how the state of the system changes from the current state s to the next
state s′. FSMs fall into two categories: Moore machines and Mealy machines.
Combinational 
Circuits
δ 
Memeory 
Elements
inputs
outputs
current state next state
Combinational 
Circuits
λ
Figure 2.5: The Moore machine
Definition 19 (Moore machine). A Moore machine M = (I, O, S, S0, δ, λ) consists of
• a set of input values I ,
• a set of output values O,
• a set of states S,
• a set of initial states S0 ⊆ S,
• a transition function δ : I × S → S that delivers the next state with respect to the
current state and input value,
• an output function λ : S → O that computes the output value based on the current
state.
The only difference between a Moore machine and a Mealy machine lies in the output
function. In a Mealy machine, the current input value also influences the current output
value (see Fig. 2.5 and Fig. 2.6). Composing two Mealy machines may lead to a situation
in which combinational loops are created in the composed system. At a certain point in
time, the signal values along a combinational loop may oscillate. This scenario can not
be handled by the design and verification tools that use FSMs to model digital systems.
The problem brought about by combinational loops will be elaborated in Section 4.2.
Composing two Moore machines yields again a Moore machine without combinational
loops between the inputs and outputs of the two designs, since the inputs and the outputs
of a Moore machine are separated by flip-flops.
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Figure 2.6: The Mealy machine
Definition 20 (Mealy machine). A Mealy machine M = (I, O, S, S0, δ, λ) consists of
• a set of input values I ,
• a set of output values O,
• a set of states S,
• a set of initial states S0 ⊆ S,
• a transition function δ : I × S → S that delivers the next state with respect to the
current state and input value,
• an output function λ : I × S → O that computes the output value based on the
current state and the current input value.
Definition 21 (Sequential circuit). A FSM with I ⊆ Bn, O ⊆ Bm, S ⊆ Bk and B =
{0, 1} is called binary encoded, and a FSM like this can be naturally implemented by a
sequential circuit with n inputs,m outputs, and k state variables. Such a sequential circuit
can be represented by a graph C(V,E). The vertices of the graph can be partitioned into
the following groups.
• The gates of X ⊆ V , |X| = n that do not have direct predecessors, represent the
set of primary inputs of the circuit. The edges leaving the gates of X are associated
with the set of input variables xj .
• The gates of Y ⊆ V , |Y | = m, Y ∩ X = ∅ that do not have direct successors,
represent the set of primary outputs of the circuit.
• The gates of Z ⊆ V , |Z| = k, represent the set of storage elements, which keep
a binary value until a clock tick occurs. The edges leaving the gates of Z are
associated with the set of state variables zj . The value of zj represents the current
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state of the FSM. Each gate of Z has only one incoming edge denoted by the next
state variable z′j .
• The gates of T ⊆ V \ (X ∪ Z) are associated with a set of Boolean functions tj :
Bn×Bk → B. This set of Boolean functions implements the transition function δ of
the FSM. The edges leaving the gates of T must be able to be associated to a next
state variable z′j .
• The gates of F ⊆ V \ (X ∪ Z) are associated with a set of Boolean functions fj :
Bn×Bk → B. This set of Boolean functions implements the output function λ of the
FSM. The edges leaving the gates of F must be able to be associated to an output
variable yj .
In Def. 21, each gate of T can be implemented by a combinational circuit. All internal
signals in these combinational circuits joined with all z′j make up the internal signals of
the sequential circuit.
Definition 22 (Combinational loop). A combinational loop is a cycle in a sequential cir-
cuit C(V,E). Along this cycle there is no gate, which represents a storage element.
Intuitively, a combinational loop is built by feeding the outputs of a combinational
circuit back to its inputs. Many modern design and verification tools experience diffi-
culties in handling combinational loops, because their behavior mostly depends on the
relative propagation delays of the gates in the loop. This may lead to issues of stability
and reliability for the circuit.
In the remainder of this dissertation, to avoid formalism, an implementation of a FSM
M(I, O, S, δ, λ) will be denoted by a sequential circuit M(i, o, s), where i is the set of
input variables, o is the set of output variables and s is the set of state variables. The set
of internal signals of this circuit is denoted by x.
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Model Checking
Model checking or formal property checking is an automatic method to verify designs.
Verifying designs means to check if an implementation of the design fulfills the (for-
mal/informal) specification of the design. Theoretically, one can check the equivalence
between the implementation and the specification of a design. However, in reality most
specifications are informal, therefore verifying the equivalence between the implementa-
tion and the specification of a design is almost not possible. Even in the case of formal
specifications, it is not possible , because, for example, the computational complexity of
such a sequential equivalence check is too high. For these reasons, model checking ver-
ifies that the implementation fulfills (satisfies) the specification. The specification of the
design is formalized in properties.
Model checking can be employed to verify various designs across various application
domains, e.g., hardware designs, software designs, embedded systems, hybrid systems.
This dissertation considers only (digital) hardware designs, software designs and embed-
ded systems consisting of hardware and software. To use a model checker, the design
under verification (DuV) must be modeled by an appropriate mathematical formalism.
In addition, since a property usually specifies an aspect of the overall functionality of a
design, there is a need for methods to measure how much functionality is covered by a
property set.
In this chapter, Section 3.1 gives an overview of the state of the art model checking
techniques. The methods based on SAT solvers [53–55] are described in Sec. 3.2, which
are the primary model checking methods used in this dissertation. A summary of property
specification languages and the methods for the analysis of the coverage of property sets
are presented in Section 3.3 and in Section 3.4.
3.1 Introduction to Model Checking
In recent years, formal model checking has been successfully adopted in the semiconduc-
tor industry. It has been integrated into design flows either as a technique complementary
to traditional simulation techniques, where it is used to verify critical parts or corner cases
of a digital circuit, or as a full replacement of simulation techniques.
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In general a model checker operates on the finite state machine of a design written in
a hardware description language like VHDL or Verilog [56, 57]. The properties can be
given as propositional formulas, predicate logic, or temporal logic, the last will be intro-
duced in Section 3.3. The model checker verifies whether a design fulfills the behavior
specified in the properties. In case a property fails, a counterexample is produced by the
model checker that shows a valuation of a trace of signals leading to the error. An error
can be related to a real design bug or a false property. From a practical point of view, sim-
ulation is a black-box technique, meaning that verification engineers only care about the
input and output behavior of the DuV. In contrast, model checking is white-box. Not only
the input and output behavior, but also the internal behavior of a design needs to be con-
sidered. This requires that verification engineers must have a deep understanding of the
design. On the other hand, model checking can help verification engineers to gain knowl-
edge about the design. In recent years, assertion-based verification has become popular
for hardware design verification. An assertion formalizes the behavior of a design. It
is logically equivalent to the “property” in the context of model checking. Therefore an
assertion can be proven with a formal model checker too.
Model checking explores the state space of a design. Therefore the scalability and
efficiency of a model checker are mostly impacted by how states are represented in the
model checker and how effective the algorithm for traversing the state space is. Image
computation has a central role in state space exploration. It computes the images of the
states, meaning the direct successor states of the given states. In contrast to “images,” a
state also has pre-images, which are its direct predecessors. Classical model checking uses
adjacent lists or state transition tables to explicitly represent the states and the transitions
between states [12]. As the state space of a design grows exponentially in the number of
registers of the design, classical model checking faces the problem of state explosion. In
other words, a design with a small number of registers could easily exhaust the memory
of a computer. The inefficiency of classical model checking is not only due to storing the
states, but also due to the computation of the images: at each computation step, only one
successor state of a given state is explored.
Symbolic model checking can handle bigger designs than classical model checking [13,
16, 19, 58–60]. In a symbolic model checker, the states and the transition relations of a
design are represented implicitly through characteristic functions, which identify sets of
states and transitions. For example, in a design with four states {00, 01, 10, 11}, the states
can be encoded with two state variables s0, s1. The characteristic function to represent
the state set {00, 01} is a single Boolean function ξ(s1) = (s1 ↔ 0). Given a design
modeled by the FSM M = (I, O, S, S0, δ, λ), where the transition function δ computes
the values for the n state variables, the characteristic function τ for the transition relation
can be easily obtained by using
τ(s, i, s′) =
n∧
j=1
(s′j ↔ δj(s, i)).
Symbolic model checking can handle designs with more than 1020 states [61]. In
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addition, the image computation is performed directly on the characteristic functions of
the states and transitions, where the images of a set of states are calculated at each step.
Let CS(s) be the characteristic function of a state set S. The symbolic images of the state
set S under the transition relation τ(s, i, s′) can be computed by
Image(S) = ∃s∈S∃i CS(s) ∧ τ(s, i, s′).
In a symbolic model checker, an ROBDD (abbr.. BDD) is used as a data structure to
represent the characteristic functions, which exposes the limitations of symbolic model
checking, namely the size of the BDDs may grow exponentially in the number of states
and input variables. Also symbolic model checking with BDDs often suffers from the
state explosion problem, because the representation of state sets and the process of ma-
nipulating the BDDs can consume a huge amount of memory, not only because of the size
of the DuV [15, 62].
The SAT-based model checking techniques open another door to solve the state ex-
plosion problems of classical model checking and symbolic model checking with BDDs.
SAT-based model checking applies the conjunctive normal form (CNF) to represent char-
acteristic functions, and the overall verification problem is reduced to a SAT problem [54,
55]. Owing to the rapid advances in SAT solvers, a modern SAT solver can handle CNF
formulas with hundreds of thousands of variables [63–65]. Thus a SAT-based model
checker can handle big, even huge, industrial designs [66–68]. In Section 3.2 two SAT-
based model checking methods are explained in detail.
3.2 SAT-Based Model Checking
3.2.1 Bounded Model Checking (BMC)
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) is a SAT-based model checking method proposed by
Biere et al [19]. In contrast to classical model checking and symbolic model checking,
which try to “prove” a property of a design, BMC attempts to falsify a property. Put an-
other way, BMC aims at finding design errors as soon as possible. In general, a bounded
model checker searches for a counterexample along finite paths of length k starting from
the initial states of a design. In case a property holds, the BMC checker increases the
step k, until a counterexample is found, or the resources of the underlying computation
platform are exhausted, or a so called completeness threshold is reached. A completeness
threshold is the lowest bound of k needed by BMC to search the entire state space of the
design. The property is proven only when the BMC checker reaches the completeness
threshold. For industrial designs having large sequential depth, BMC is usually termi-
nated owing to exhaustion of computer resources. In this sense, BMC is not complete,
and is only a complementary tool to quickly find bugs in designs.
BMC works on the iterative circuit model of a design. Given an FSM M = (I, O, S,
S0, δ, λ), the iterative circuit model is constructed by making (unrolling) k copies of com-
binational logic of λ and δ, where every copy computes the output value oj and the next
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state value s′j for the corresponding time instance (Fig. 3.1).
Combinational 
Circuits
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Figure 3.1: Iterative Circuit Model
The characteristic function of the resulting model is represented by
‖M‖k = ξ(s0) ∧
k−1∧
j=0
τ(sj, ijsj+1),
which can be further converted to a CNF formula. Here, ξ(s0) is the characteristic func-
tion of the initial states of the design.
Likewise, the (safety) property p can be unrolled into a formula ‖p‖k too. To falsify
the property, the CNF formula ‖M‖k∧¬‖p‖k is checked for satisfiability by a SAT solver.
A valuation that satisfies this formula is a counterexample to the property p.
3.2.2 Interval Property Checking (IPC)
As stated in Section 3.2.1, BMC is not complete, it can only be applied to find errors in
a design up to certain sequential depths, but not to prove properties. Interval Property
Checking (IPC) is similar to BMC. However, it provides a complete proof of the proper-
ties. A property in IPC describes the design behavior inside of a finite time interval with
length j. As with BMC, the model in IPC is also an iterative model. The combinational
logic of λ and δ are unrolled j times. The starting state of this model is not the initial
state anymore: it starts from an arbitrary state, which might be an unreachable state. This
means that IPC proves a property completely, while the property itself is formulated over
a bounded time window.
Since the model in IPC starts from an arbitrary state, the disadvantage of this over-
approximation is that it may generate false negative counterexamples that result from
unreachable starting states. To overcome this issue, so called reachability constraints
are provided to exclude some or all unreachable states. Reachability constraints can be
formulated manually or can be obtained automatically by applying reachability analysis
algorithms like [20, 21]. The validity of a manually created reachability constraint can be
proven by induction over time.
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3.3 Overview of Property Specification Languages
In Chapter 2, some formalisms for modeling hardware systems were introduced. To verify
the behavior of an implementation of a system using model checking, the legal behavior
of the system must be formalized in properties by applying a (formal) property specifi-
cation language. Usually the behavior of a system, especially of a circuit, is described
over time. In other words, the behavior is temporal and about the sequences of the inputs,
the outputs, and the states of the circuit. This requires that a specification language must
be able to access the elements of a sequence, which again model the time instances. In a
sequential circuit, a time instance is related to one clock cycle in the system. In an embed-
ded software system, the time instance is further abstracted, which is determined by the
causality of two interactions between the software and its environment. Although proposi-
tional logic and predicate logic are theoretically able to describe such temporal behavior,
they are hardly ever used (they are not intuitive to the user), e.g., temporal behavior in
practical cases often has to be expressed with formulas that have huge sizes. These huge
formulas are hardly understood and may mislead the reader of the properties. Hardware
description languages like VHDL or Verilog may be a choice of property specification
languages, however they also lack the ability to compactly and intuitively specify tempo-
ral behavior. For example, an arbiter for a communication bus may be required to have
a property like “A request is granted exactly in two clock cycles.” Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3
list the property specified in Verilog and in a specialized property specification language,
“SystemVerilog Assertions” (SVA), respectively. As illustrated, the property written in
Verilog is cumbersome and might be error-prone, the property in SVA is more intuitive
and compact. Another alternative might be the built-in assert statements in VHDL and
Verilog. However, the assert statements are used to dynamically test the specified be-
havior at the special time point at which a simulation run reaches the assert statement.
Furthermore the assert statement can only specify non-temporal behavior. Given all this,
it is necessary to have a language that is specialized to describe temporal behavior.
Basically, property specification languages can fall into two categories, namely branch-
ing time logic and linear time logic. Computation Tree Logic (CTL) is one kind of branch-
ing time logic, which describes the properties of the computation tree of a design [8]. The
computation tree of a design is constructed by unwinding the design in an infinite tree.
Given a state s in the computation tree, a CTL formula can specify multiple computa-
tional paths leading to different futures of s. Syntactically, CTL extends propositional
logic with path quantifiers and temporal operators. Path quantifiers choose along which
path the property shall be valid: A (always) stands for along every path the property shall
be valid; E (exists) stands for along at least one path the property shall be valid.
Temporal operators indicate on which state along a path the property shall be valid:
G (global) represents the property shall be valid globally on all states of the path; F (future)
states that the property shall be valid somewhere in the future of the path; X (next) de-
notes that from the current state, the property shall be valid in the next state of the path;
φUϕ(until) requires the property φ to be true on all states on the path until the prop-
erty ϕ is fulfilled. This section does not address the detailed definition of the syntax and
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always @( posedge c l k ) begin
i f ( req == 1′b1 )
cnt <= 1;
e l s e i f ( cnt == 1 && cnt < 2)
cnt <= cnt + 1;
e l s e i f ( cnt == 2) begin
i f ( grant == 1′b1 )
$ d i s p l a y ( “request granted” ) ;
e l s e
$ d i s p l a y ( “request not granted” ) ;
end
end
end
Figure 3.2: Property written in Verilog
a s s e r t property (@( posedge c l k ) req |−> ##2 grant )
Figure 3.3: Property written in SVA
semantics of property languages, the interested reader is referred to the cited papers.
In contrast to CTL, Linear Time Logic (LTL) models time in a linear fashion [9].
An LTL property specifies the behavior of a system along a single computational path of
the system. Therefore LTL does not have path quantifiers. Proving an LTL property on
the model of a (hardware/software) system stands implicitly for checking every compu-
tational path of the model. LTL also has temporal operators, as in CTL. CTL requires
that a path quantifier must be followed by a temporal operator, whereas LTL allows arbi-
trary combinations of temporal operators. Hence CTL and LTL have different expressive
power. Some design behaviors can be expressed in CTL but not in LTL, and vice versa.
A summary of the expressive power of these two languages can be found in [69]. CTL∗,
a superset of CTL and LTL, extends not only the syntax of CTL and LTL, but also their
expressive power [70]. It is designed to address the shortcomings of LTL, with which it
is not possible to make statements over paths, and of CTL, which requires that every path
quantifier A ,E must be followed by exactly one of the temporal operators G ,F ,X ,U .
In CTL∗ the path quantifiers and the temporal operators can be combined in any order.
Properties may be classified as safety properties or liveness properties. A safety prop-
erty specifies that “something bad must not happen” . It can be expressed in terms of
the CTL formula AG p. A liveness property indicates that “something good eventually
happens” . It can be expressed in terms of the CTL formula EF p.
Although CTL, LTL and CTL∗ have great expressive power to specify a large range
30
3.3. Overview of Property Specification Languages
of properties, they are too hard to use in practice. Their syntax and semantics are not
intuitive to understand; they don’t support the complex data types that enable properties
to be described at a high abstraction level. It is almost not possible to write reusable code
using these languages. On these grounds, lots of syntax extensions have been invented
to make property specification languages easily adopted by engineers from industry. In
the rest of this section, some syntactic extensions for these temporal languages will be
briefly described. For the detailed syntax and application areas of these syntax extensions
(languages), the interested reader is referred to the cited papers. It should be noticed that
a syntax extension enhances only the syntax of a base language like CTL or LTL: it does
not extend the expressive power, and its statements can always be mapped to statements
following the syntactic rules of the base language.
Open Verification Library (OVL)
Strictly speaking, OVL is not a syntax extension. It is a verification library maintained
by the Accellera System Initiative, which can be used in simulation, emulation, and for-
mal verification [71]. The library can be used to check hardware designs written in one
of VHDL, Verilog, SystemVerilog [10], and SystemC [72]. The library contains a set of
(fixed) assertions that need to be checked by a verification engine. These assertions cover
typical scenarios that arise in designs, such as one-hot encoding of signals, value incre-
ment of signals, toggles of signals, etc. OVL also contains verification IPs for popular
building blocks of hardware designs, a FIFO, for example. Usually an OVL checker is in-
stantiated in the HDL source code of the hardware designs. Depending on the parameters
configured by the users, an OVL checker can be used as a property, as an environment
constraint, or as a coverage measure.
PSL and SVA
PSL stands for Accellera Property Specification Language. It is standardized by the in-
dustry consortium Accellera and aimed at verifying digital hardware designs [11]. To
shorten the learning curve of a new language, it provides different flavors of syntax, which
are similar to one of the standard HDL languages, such as VHDL. PSL formulas can be
categorized into formulas of the foundation language (FL) and formulas of the optional
branching extension (OBE); the former is the syntax extension for LTL, the latter has
the same syntax as CTL. To manage the structural complexity of the formulas, an FL is
usually composed of four layers. The Boolean layer is the building block of a formula,
atomic formulas and Boolean operations over them belong to this layer. The next layer is
the temporal layer, which specifies the temporal relations of formulas from the Boolean
layer. Its powerful feature of regular expressions allows specifying a set of sequential
behaviors (sequences) at once. The verification layer contains directives instructing ver-
ification tools to check a formula (property) or to test if a property is covered by test
patterns in simulation. The modeling layer makes it possible to construct a helpful auxil-
iary logic for verification, e.g., environment constraints for the inputs of the design under
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verification. In this way, FL retains all the syntax of LTL: this indicates that both safety-
and liveness properties are possible to be expressed with PSL.
SystemVerilog Assertion (SVA) is a part of the SystemVerilog standard. It is tightly
coupled with other SystemVerilog structures [10]. This means it brings all their strengths
into play when it is used in the context of a SystemVerilog design. SVA is derived from
PSL, however, it throws away the OBE part of PSL and does not contain any syntax
from LTL. Structurally, SVA also has four layers, similar to PSL, especially the feature
of regular expressions in PSL is denoted by sequences in SVA. In contrast to PSL, SVA
is more user-friendly, and provides more built-in functions to make the verification code
compact. The user can also use the SystemVeriog function feature to create their own
functions, so that the readability and re-usability of verification code is improved. In
particular, only safety properties are possible to be expressed with SVA. This is however
enough for simulation-based techniques. Anyhow, SVA was originally designed for the
purpose of simulation.
3.4 Coverage Analysis of Property Sets
Coverage analysis is a necessary component in design verification environments. It an-
swers questions such as “is the DuV simulated enough?” in simulation, and “are the
written properties enough?” in property checking. Section 3.4.1 summarizes the state-
of-the-art approaches to coverage analysis in hardware design verification. Section 3.4.2
describes a coverage analysis method (complete interval property checking (C-IPC)) for
property sets in assertion-based verification and in property checking.
3.4.1 Introduction to Coverage Analysis in Hardware Design Verifi-
cation
In simulation-based verification, coverage analysis measures “how good are the test pat-
terns” fed into the design. Furthermore, the result of the coverage analysis can be used to
guide test benches in generating test patterns to achieve full coverage. Different coverage
metrics are provided for this measurement. Generally speaking, every coverage metric
has its advantages and disadvantages compared to other criteria regarding the types of
bugs found, its computation complexity, and the degree to which it can be automated.
It is hard to judge which one is better. Coverage analysis for hardware design verifica-
tion borrows some ideas from software testing. The coverage metrics can fall into three
categories: code coverage, structural coverage, and functional coverage [73].
Code coverage evaluates whether every statement of the HDL code for a design is exe-
cuted by the simulator under the specified test patterns. The particularly interesting metric
here is branch coverage, which measures whether every branch destination is covered by
test patterns. Code coverage is easy to compute: it is based on the control flow graph
of the design’s HDL code. However, due to the concurrent execution of the hardware, it
is usually not sufficient. The typical structural coverages are toggle coverage and FSM
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coverage. Toggle coverage measures whether every signal in a design is triggered from
0 to 1 or vice versa. FSM coverage is a little more complex: it evaluates whether every
transition of the FSM of a DuV is covered by test patterns. An FSM can be automatically
extracted from HDL code, where some special coding styles, e.g., the application of the
“case” statement, must be used to implement designs. An FSM can also be constructed
manually. Usually a manually created FSM is more abstract than the one automatically
generated by a tool.
The most complex metrics are those for functional coverage. Some aspects of the
functionality of a design are formulated in, e.g., SVA coverage properties, and a simulator
evaluates how many times they are triggered by test patterns. Here the properties could be
of any kind, for instance, temporal behavior ranging over many clock cycles, invariants of
the DuV or one-hot encoding of FSMs. Obviously the quality and the quantity of property
sets have an influence on the quality of the functional metrics.
The coverage metrics for simulation-based verification are not suitable for formal
property checking or assertion-based verification with formal techniques since these cov-
erage metrics evaluate the quality of the test patterns of DUVs, whereas formal techniques
exhaust all the input patterns. The coverage metrics for formal property checking should
answer verification engineer’s questions like “Have I written enough properties?” [74] .
In other words, the coverage metrics measure how much of the functionality of a DuV
is covered by a property set. Note that this kind of functional coverage metrics is inter-
preted differently than the one in simulation. If a property set covers every behavior of
the design, then it is complete.
Mutation testing is a common technique to help verification engineers gain confidence
in the completeness of a property set [75]. In general, small changes, called mutations, are
made in the source code of the design. The mutated design is called a mutant. Conven-
tional property checking is performed on the mutated design to determine whether these
changes are covered by the property set. [76] requires that every signal at every reachable
state must be covered by at least one property. In other words, a signal of the mutated
design must fail at least one property at some reachable state. This set of “failing” states
is recorded for every signal and then it is checked whether this set is a superset of the
reachable states of the design. The state exploration of this approach is based on BDDs,
which may blow up for industrial designs. Additionally, mutation test cannot prove the
completeness of a property set: its quality depends heavily on the type of mutants and the
density of the inserted mutants. Unfortunately, none of the literature, such as [74–78],
addresses how densely should mutants be inserted and what kinds of mutants may poten-
tially prove the completeness of a property set.
The research work presented in [48, 79–81] proves the completeness of a property set
by checking to what extent the property set determines the input and output sequences of
a DuV. The approach from [79] is a design-dependent method in a BMC verification envi-
ronment and is performed on a concrete implementation of a design. However, since the
implementation process is usually iterative in a design flow, the completeness checking
has to be run for every change of implementation.
The approaches of [48, 80, 81] are design independent and based on the following
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definition of completeness:
Definition 23. A set of properties P is complete if every two circuits M ,M ′ satisfying the
properties in P are sequentially equivalent.
The work of [48] implements Def. 23 in a straightforward manner as presented in
Fig. 3.4, where the inputs, outputs and states of the design are denoted as i, o and s,
respectively. A copy of these signals is written as i′, o′ and s′. The two designs M , M ′
are empty models only containing signal names and copied signal names. The behavior
of the signals is restricted by the property set P and a copy of the property set P ′, which
describes the behavior of the copied signals. Under this prerequisite the output signals
of M and M ′ are checked for equivalence. Obviously this approach takes the whole
functionality of the design(as described by the property set) into account at once, which
may lead to a high proof complexity.
∧p( i’ ,s’,o’)
p∈P
M
M’
i
∧p( i ,s,o)
p∈P
1!
1!
1?
Figure 3.4: Implementation of Checking Completeness of Property Sets
The method of [80, 81], called complete interval property checking, overcomes this
bottleneck by splitting the overall check into certain subchecks. This method is the start-
ing point for this dissertation, and will be discussed in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.2 Complete Interval Property Checking (C-IPC)
Preliminaries
Before proceeding to explain how to prove the completeness of property sets, this section
introduces the formalism to model the properties considered in this dissertation.
A sequence predicate describes sets of traces of signal values. As the name sug-
gests, the arguments of a sequence predicate are sequences of signal values, and the pred-
icate itself specifies the finite sequential design behavior constituting the properties. It is
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straightforward to apply sequence predicates to formalize timing diagrams in an informal
specification.
Given an FSM M = (I, O, S, S0, δ, λ) consisting of a set of input values I , a set of
output values O, a state set S with a subset S0 ⊆ S of initial states, and two functions
δ : I × S → S and λ : I × S → O, called the state transition function and the output
function, respectively, a state predicate η(s) characterizes a set of states, a state sequence
predicate σl(s0, . . . , sl) of length l characterizes a set of state sequences pil = (s0, . . . , sl).
If the length l of the sequence predicate matters it is also called an l-sequence predicate.
State predicates η(s) can be considered as 0-sequence predicates. It is allowed that every
l-sequence predicate pil can be applied to m-sequences pim = (s0, . . . , sm) with m ≥ l. In
this case the predicate is evaluated on the l-prefix pil := (s0, . . . , sl) of pim, and the trail-
ing sequence (sl+1, . . . , sm) remains unrestricted. This guarantees that the usual Boolean
operators ∨, ∧, and ¬ are also applicable to sequence predicates that may possibly have
different lengths. The maximum length lmax of the operands to these operators then de-
termines the length of the resulting predicate. Sequence predicates can also be shifted in
time using the next operator:
next(σl, n)((s0, s1, . . . , sn−1, sn, sn+1, . . . , sn+l))
:= σl((sn, sn+1, . . . , sn+l)).
Using this operator one can define a concatenation operation  for l-sequence predi-
cates:
σlσk := σl ∧ next(σk, l)
The predicate σlσk characterizes (l + k)-sequences pil+k = (s0, . . . , sl, . . . , sl+k)
where sl is the ending state of σl and the starting state of σk. Non-overlapping concate-
nation can be expressed using the special l-sequence predicate anyl(pil) that evaluates to
true for every sequence pil:
σl⊕σk := σl anylσk
If vˆ and v˜ are state variables then σl[vˆ ← v˜] is the sequence predicate derived from σl
by substitution of every occurrence of vˆ by v˜. Substitution only performed for a particular
state sk of the sequence results in the sequence predicate σl[vˆ(sk)← v˜(sk)]. Substitution
with constants yields the co-factors σl(pil)|vˆ(sk) := σl[vˆ(sk) ← 1] and σl(pil)|¬vˆ(sk) :=
σl[vˆ(sk) ← 0]. This allows quantifying out particular state variables vˆ at a particular
timepoint k ∈ {0 . . . l} from a sequence predicate σl. ∀vˆ(sk) : σl denotes the sequence
predicate
(∀vˆ(sk) : σl)(pil) := σl(pil)|vˆ(sk) ∧ σl(pil)|¬vˆ(sk).
A short notation for quantifying out the state variable vˆ at every timepoint k ∈ {0 . . . l}
is described as follows:
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(∀vˆ(pil) : σl)(pil) := (∀vˆ(s0) . . . ∀vˆ(sl) : σl)(pil).
Similarly, the existential quantifiers ∃vˆ(sk) : σl and ∃vˆ(pil) : σl can be defined.
Note that the Boolean operations, the operation of substitution, and the quantification
operations defined above are not only applicable to the state sequence predicate, but also
to any kind of sequence predicates. Similarly for an l-input sequence predicate ιl(ξl)
and an l-output sequence predicate ςl(ζl) characterizing a set of input sequences ξl =
(i0, i1, . . . , il−1) and a set of output sequences ζl = (o0, o1, . . . , il−1), respectively.
With the aid of the transition function δ of an FSM, the state sequences that correspond
to valid paths in the FSM can be determined. Such paths are characterized by the l-
sequence predicate ispath:
ispathl(pil, ξl) :=
l∧
j=1
(δ(sj−1, ij−1) = sj).
The set of output sequences generated by the FSM can be characterized by an l-
sequence predicate isoutput:
isoutputl(pil, ξl, ζl) :=
l−1∧
j=0
(λ(sj, ij) = oj).
Note that a sequence predicate can be defined by using the input, state, and output
variables of an FSM. Sometimes it is convenient to use M(i, s, o) to denote a design
(FSM) M containing the set of input variables i = {i0, i1, . . . , in}, the set of state vari-
ables s = {s0, s1, . . . , sj}, and the set of output variables o = {o0, o1, . . . , om}. Here the
index of the variable names is abused, it shall not be confused with an element for a time
instance in a sequence. Similarly, the l-sequence predicate σ(i, s, o) expresses that σ is
defined in terms of the variables i, s and o. In the rest of this dissertation, this notation
will be used when the length of the sequences can be an arbitrary finite number and the
discussion merely focuses on the variables rather than individual elements of sequences.
Operational Properties
An operational property Pl viewed as an l-sequence predicate has a cause-effect structure,
represented by a pair (Al, Cl), where Al(pil, ξl) is the assumption of Pl, and Cl(pil, ζl) is
the commitment of Pl. The unbounded validity of the property Pl is proven when
(ispathl(pil, ξl) ∧ isoutputl(pil, ξl, ζl))⇒ (Al(pil, ξl)⇒ Cl(pil, ζl)) (3.1)
is a tautology. This check for tautology can be conducted effectively using IPC as de-
scribed in Section3.2.2. Note that the starting state s0 of an l-sequence satisfying the
ispath and isoutput predicates is not restricted to the initial states of the FSM. In case a
property does not hold, the property checker generates a counterexample, which shows
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that a state sequence pil and an input sequence ξl falsify Formula 3.1. A counterexample
is false negative when s0 of pil is not reachable from the initial states of the FSM.
In practice, in order to rule out false negative counterexamples, invariants representing
over-approximations of the reachable state space are added manually or automatically [20,
21] to strengthen the property, resulting in
(ispathl(pil, ξl) ∧ isoutputl(pil, ξl, ζl))⇒ (Φ(s0) ∧ Al(pil, ξl)⇒ Cl(pil, ζl)), (3.2)
where the state sequence Φ(s0) characterizes such an invariant. The validity of an invari-
ant can be proven by using induction over time.
An operational property Pl can be formulated by using a standard property specifi-
cation language, such as SVA or PSL. It can then be further converted to formulas in a
temporal logic like CTL or LTL. The expressive power of the sequence predicates that
model the operational properties is a subset of LTL’s expressive power. An operational
property Pl corresponds to an LTL safety property GPl.
Definition 24 (Conceptual states). A conceptual state sc is an important control state
in a design, which may be related to many concrete states in the design. Given a set
of conceptual states SC , a concrete state s can be mapped to a conceptual state sc by
using a surjective function w : S → SC . The set of conceptual states in a design can be
characterized by a predicate Ψ(s).
Usually the conceptual states are identified by verification engineers. Every pair of
conceptual states is connected by so called operations that can be specified by opera-
tional properties, i.e., every operational property starts from a conceptual state and ends
at a conceptual state. As a verification engineer is able to concentrate on one aspect (op-
eration) of the overall design behavior at every time, such an operational property can
be constructed systematically. The assumption part of an operational property regarding
conceptual states has the form:
Al(pil, ξl) = Ψ(s0) ∧ ιl(ξl)
in which Ψ(s0) characterizes the starting conceptual state of the operation along the state
sequence pil = (s0, s1, . . . , sl), and ιl(ξl) is the characteristic function for the input trigger
ξl = (i0, i1, . . . , il−1) of the operation.
The commitment part of an operational property has the form:
Cl(pil, ζl) = Ψ(sl) ∧ ςl(ζl)
in which Ψ(sl) characterizes the ending conceptual state of the operation, and the outputs
produced by the operation are characterized by the sequence predicate ςl(ζl).
Definition 25 (Conceptual state machine (CSM)). A conceptual state machine of a de-
sign can be represented by an edge-labeled graph G(V, E, P), where the vertices V are
the conceptual states of the design, the edges E are labeled with P , which represent the
operations between the conceptual states. Such operations can be formulated by opera-
tional properties.
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Fig. 3.5 depicts the FSM and the conceptual state machine of a slave interface for a
handshake protocol. (Only the control part is described.) The slave interface may perform
two operations read and write in response to the commands given by a master interface.
It writes/reads two consecutive bytes of data to/from a memory location. During the
operation, the busy flag is set, indicating that the slave interface is processing data. As
illustrated in the figure, there is only one conceptual state idle, and every operation (read
or write) starts and ends at this state. Note that a design may have different conceptual
state machines, depending on the views of the verification engineers. In a well structured
implementation of a design, the conceptual state machine is described explicitly, so that
an EDA tool, e.g., Xilinx ISE [82] can extract it automatically. However, in most cases,
verification engineers have to manually extract it from a design.
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Figure 3.5: FSM and Conceptual state
Completeness of Property Sets
Complete Interval Property Checking is a SAT-based property checking technique [41,81,
83] with the ability to analyze the completeness of property sets. Similar to methods such
as those of [48, 84], it checks whether a given property set P = {p1, . . . , pn} uniquely
determines the input and output behavior of the particular device under verification, where
a property pi is an operational property describing the temporal behavior of the signals
(input, output and state variables) v1, v2, . . . , vj of a device.
Definition 26 (Determination). A property pi determines a signal s if the signal is uniquely
defined by pi as a function of other determined signals, such as inputs or state variables.
In other words, along every sequence of the design, the property pi specifies exactly one
value for the signal s at every time point of the sequence.
The determination of a signal s is checked by considering two instances of the prop-
erty, pi and p′i, and two sets, {v} and {v′}, of the variables appearing in the property. The
behavior of {v} is defined by pi, and that of {v′}, by p′i. Then it is checked whether in all
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considered input scenarios the signal s necessarily has the same value in both instances,
i.e., whether the formula pi ∧ p′i ⇒ (s = s′) is a tautology. If so, then s is said to be
uniquely determined by the property pi. (Note that the design is not considered in this
check.)
In addition, a module also carries so called determination conditions that specify under
which circumstances a particular signal in the module has to be uniquely determined. A
determination guard ds for a signal s is a formula that evaluates to true whenever the
signal s needs to be determined. For example, a data signal on a bus may be guarded
by a valid flag and only needs to be determined if this flag is set. With respect to the
determination guard ds of a signal s, the determination condition for s is defined by the
logical formula Ds := (ds ∨ ds′) ⇒ (s = s′), which is a sequence predicate, i.e., the
determination guard may specify a condition spanning over many clock cycles, and may
include temporal operators like next.
The work of [41] considers determination conditions for inputs and outputs, and refers
to them as determination assumptions and determination requirements of the DUV, re-
spectively. (Note that [48] only defines the determination conditions for outputs.) It is
assumed that determination assumptions Di and determination requirements Do are to
be specified for each input i and each output o. The formula di = do = true defines
the default determination guards for all ports i, o of the device, i.e., it is assumed that all
inputs are determined at every point in time, and likewise for the outputs. However, the
verification engineer may overwrite these default values with weaker conditions.
The definition of completeness considering determination conditions is modified as
follows:
Definition 3.1 (Completeness (with determination conditions)). A set of properties P
completely specifies a module M with respect to determination assumptions Di1 , . . . , Din
and determination requirements Do1 , . . . , Dom iff the following property is a tautology:
n∧
j=1
Dij ∧
∧
pl∈P
pl
∧
p′l∈P ′
p′l ⇒
m∧
k=1
Dok . (3.3)
Note that for the default determination guards di = do = true , this definition is
equivalent to Def. 23.
As stated in Section 3.4.1, it is highly complex to prove the completeness of a realistic
design by directly implementing Formula 3.3. In [41], this check is partitioned into four
subchecks. Every subcheck concentrates only on a pair of (operational) properties. The
user is required to specify the determination assumption for every input signal and the
determination requirement for every output signal. Furthermore, the user needs to extract
the conceptual states from the DuV, i.e., identify the key functionality of the design from
a high-level abstraction view. With the aid of conceptual states, the user writes properties
having the form described in Section 3.4.2. In addition, the user is required to specify
a property graph G = (V,E), which is tightly coupled with the conceptual state machine
of a design. The vertices V of G are a set of properties {pj}. Each pj is a sequence
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predicate that has a length lpj defined by the length of its assumption part A and its com-
mitment part C. An edge (pj, pk) ∈ E indicates that after the operation specified by pj
finishes, the operation specified by pk may take place immediately. Note that the time
point where pk starts to execute from a conceptual state sc is defined by the time point at
which the previous pj reaches the conceptual state sc.
Given a property graph G = (V,E) and the respective property set P , every pair of
predecessor/successor in P is denoted by (pp, ps) ∈ E. Let (Ap, Cp) and (As, Cs) be the
assumption parts and the commitment parts of pp and ps, respectively. For ease of expla-
nation, the determination assumptions of all input signals are denoted by Di =
∧n
j=1Dij
and the determination requirements of all output signals by Do =
∧m
j=1Doj . During the
completeness check, the determination assumptionsDi are assumed by every pair of prop-
erties and the determination requirements Do must be fulfilled by every pair of properties.
In addition, every property may have its local determination requirements, which only
need to be fulfilled by the property containing them. Local determination requirements
are of interest to apply on the states that are not related to conceptual states, but they are
important to trigger a following operation. For instance, the state of an instruction reg-
ister in a pipelined processor defines what instruction (operation) is to be executed next,
but the operation starts from a conceptual state controlling the pipeline stages. Local de-
termination requirements have the form of the determination conditions stated above. Dp
denotes the local determination requirements of pp andDs denotes the local determination
requirements of ps. As previously discussed, to check the completeness of a property set,
two instances of a property set are considered. Let A′p, C
′
p, A
′
s and C
′
s be the assumptions
and commitments of a copy of each of the properties, pp and ps, respectively.
There are four checks performed by the completeness checker on a property graph G:
the determination test, successor test, case split test and reset test. The validity of these
four tests guarantees the completeness of the property set of a design, as formally proven
in [41].
1) Successor Test: For every pair (pp, ps) of properties, the successor test checks
whether the ending states of the predecessor pp completely determine the starting
states of the successor ps. In other words, it checks whether the assumption As of
the successor ps contains only the input signals and the signals determined by the
predecessor pp. This is equivalent to the following tautology proof:
Di ∧ Ap ∧ A′p ∧ Cp ∧ C ′p ∧Dp ∧ next(As, lp)⇒ next(A′s, lp)
Here lp is the length of the property pp.
2) Determination Test: The determination test checks whether the outputs of the de-
sign under verification are completely and uniquely described (determined) by the
property set with regard to the determination requirements stated above. The test is
conducted on the pair of predecessor/successor properties as follows:
(Di ∧ Ap ∧ A′p ∧ Cp ∧ C ′p ∧ next(As, lp) ∧ next(Cs, lp)∧
next(A′s, lp) ∧ next(C ′s, lp) ∧Dp)⇒ next(Do, lp) ∧ next(Ds, lp)
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3) Case Split Test: So far it has only been confirmed there exists a unique sequence
of operations for some inputs of the design. Obviously it should be shown that this
is the case for every input. The case split test checks whether for every important
state all input scenarios are covered. Note that the set of important states are given
in the assumption parts and the commitment parts of the properties. The complexity
of this check is reduced when only pairs of predecessor/successor are considered.
In this case, it checks whether every operation starting from the subset of impor-
tant states given by Cp is covered by at least one of the assumptions {Asi} of all
successors {psi} of pp. This can be expressed in the following manner:
Cp ⇒ next((As1 ∨ As2 ∨ . . . ), lp)
4) Reset Test: The reset test is similar to the three tests described above. However the
reset test is only applied to the reset property, which does not have any predecessors.
It checks whether the reset sequence of a design is specified, and the behavior right
after reset is determined.
41
Chapter 3. Model Checking
42
Chapter 4
Assume-Guarantee Reasoning
Divide-and-Conquer is a common strategy to manage the complexity of system design
and verification. In the context of SoC design verification, an SoC system is decomposed
into several modules and every module is separately verified. Usually an SoC module is
reactive: it interacts with its environmental modules. This interaction is normally mod-
eled by environment constraints, which are applied to verify the SoC module. In order
to guarantee that an SoC module that has been proven to work correctly under envi-
ronment constraints also works correctly in the SoC system, several Assume-Guarantee
Reasoning rules can be used instead of constructing a system model. Section 4.1 gives an
overview of state-of-the-art assume-guarantee reasoning rules developed to be applied to
various models of systems. This dissertation discusses the problems caused by reactive
constraints which are formulated in a standard property specification language. Two plau-
sibility checks for overcoming this problem are described in Section 4.2. Experimental
results showing the efficiency of these plausibility checks are presented in Section 4.3.
A new assume-guarantee reasoning rule considering the problem introduced by reactive
constraints is introduced in Section 4.4. This rule is more general than the rules presented
in Section 4.1: it is the fundamental theorem for proving compositional completeness
under reactive constraints in Chapter 5.
4.1 Introduction to Assume-Guarantee-Reasoning
In today’s industrial work flows, the individual modules of an SoC design are usually de-
veloped and verified simultaneously. In practice, it almost never happens that the modules
of a system are designed for an unconstrained environment. Instead, designers usually
rely on certain assumptions about the behavior of the environment. For example, a com-
munication interface to a bus expects that the other participants of the communication
also adhere to the protocol of the bus. In such scenarios, the behavior of a module Mi
is only guaranteed if the environment satisfies a particular environment constraint Ci. If
the environment does not comply with the constraint Ci, then the behavior of the module
Mi may be undetermined. In other words, the module operates correctly only when its
environment works correctly. Therefore, the environment constraints have to be selected
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carefully, because any error or overconstraining in an environment constraint may cause
bugs to remain undetected by property checking. The situation is similar in constrained
random simulation.
Hence, the validity of environment constraints is a critical problem needing to be
solved for SoC design verification. Furthermore, the correctness of the environment con-
straints of an SoC module guarantees that the module also works properly in the entire
system. Theoretically, to validate the environment constraints, especially reactive envi-
ronment constraints, one needs to reason over the entire system. This requires that the
entire system be modeled appropriately, which is not feasible for industrial sizes of SoC
systems. For this reason, instead of reasoning over the entire system at once, assume-
guarantee rules that are composed of several smaller proof problems are developed and
applied.
Assume-guarantee rules are not only useful to guarantee the correctness of environ-
ment constraints. They and their derivatives can also be used to guarantee that the proper-
ties which are valid for individual SoC modules are also valid for the composed system. In
the context of the completeness analysis of property sets, assume-guarantee rules can be
used to deduce that the entire system is completely verified when the individual modules
have been completely specified. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
In a bottom-up verification flow, to manage the complexity of an SoC system, the
system is usually decomposed into several modules. This can be done by exploiting a cut
operation described in Def. 27.
Definition 27 (Model Decomposition). Let X be a set of internal signals of a sequential
circuit M with n inputs and m outputs. For each signal x ∈ X , a cut operation is
performed, introducing a new input xˆ and a new output x˜. The resulting circuit model M ′
has n+ |X| inputs and m+ |X| outputs. Wherever the signal x is used in M to define the
values of other signals, the free input xˆ is used to define the corresponding signal in M ′.
The model M ′ is called the result of the cut X in M and is denoted by M ′ = M/X .
Using the appropriate cuts, an SoC S can be decomposed into disjoint sub-circuitsMi.
These sub-circuits are called the modules of the system. In practice, the boundaries
of the modules, e.g., the port definitions of entity descriptions in VHDL, are mostly a
good choice for a cut. In contrast, one may build a system by composing submodules.
Given a set of modules {Mi}, the composition of a set of modules Mi into a system S is
called well-formed if in the composition no combinational feedback loops are created.
SoC systems can be categorized in the following way: the sequential systems, whose
modules are simply chained together and there are no interactions between modules; and
the reactive systems, whose modules interact with each other. Usually most SoC systems
are reactive. Similarly, the assume-guarantee rules can be categorized with regard to the
systems they are applied to. Furthermore, with respect to the models of reactive systems,
some assume-guarantee rules can only be applied to Moore machines, and some of them
can be applied to Mealy machines.
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Assume-Guarantee rules for sequential systems
M1 M2
𝑥 
𝑥  𝑥  
𝑖1 𝑜1  𝑖2 𝑜2  
Figure 4.1: Composition Scheme of Sequential Systems
Let M(i, s, o) be a system composed of two modules M1(i1, s1, o1, x˜) and
M2(i2, s2, o2, xˆ) that are sequentially chained together (i.e., no interaction happens be-
tween them) by internal signals x, as depicted in Fig. 4.1. Here, i1 ∪ i2 ⊆ i, o1 ∪ o2 ⊆ o
and s1 ∩ s2 = ∅. As defined above, x˜ and xˆ are created by the cut operation. They rep-
resent the outputs of the module M1 and the inputs of the module M2, respectively. Let
p(i2, s2, o2, x) be a property that is to be proven on the system M . Note that the property
p depends only on the sequences of the signals in M2 and the cut signals x. If the system
is too complex for verifying the property p, M can be divided into M1 and M2. As the
next step, one needs to find an assumption (constraint) for the module M2: this assump-
tion α(xˆ) restricts the behavior of the signals xˆ. Then, the overall proof of the property p
can be split into two subproofs, which guarantee the validity of p in system M due to the
following assume-guarantee rule:
〈true 〉M1 〈α(x˜)〉 ,
〈α(xˆ)〉M2 〈p(i2, s2, o2, xˆ)〉
〈true 〉M 〈p(i2, s2, o2, x)〉 (4.1)
This notation for assume-guarantee rules was firstly introduced by Pnueli [85], and
this rule can be interpreted as follows: if M1 guarantees the predicate α(x˜) in an un-
constrained manner, and M2 guarantees the property p under the environment constraint
α(xˆ), then the system M fulfills the property p. The complexity of every subproof is
lower than the complexity of the original proof problem. For proving the property p on
M2, an environment constraint α(xˆ) is applied: it is an abstraction of M2’s environment,
M1 in this case, and it is much smaller than M1.
The validity of Rule 4.1 can be proven straightforwardly as follows:
Proof. It is assumed that all the preconditions of this assume-guarantee rule are fulfilled.
In order to prove the validity of this rule, one needs to show that every input sequence of
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M determines a sequence of internal signals in M , and in particular, for the signals of cut
X , so that the property p holds for M .
Because there is no feedback path from M2 to M1, the circuit M2 consumes every
sequence of x˜ generated from M1, i.e., x˜ = xˆ = x. Due to the second precondition,
for each input sequence of i2 and each sequence of xˆ = x that satisfies the assumption
α(xˆ), the circuit M2 determines a sequence of internal signals and outputs that fulfills
the property p. For other sequences of x, the circuit M2 might not satisfy the property.
Therefore, one needs to show that all sequences of x that are generated by the circuit M
or M1 satisfy the assumption α. This is guaranteed by the first precondition. On this
account, the property p holds for M .
The assumption α can be given manually or can be found automatically as presented
in [45]. It is straightforward to extend the assume-guarantee Rule 4.1, so that it can be
applied to systems with more than two modules, as long as every two modules are se-
quentially chained. This rule is similar to the Hoare rules/triple [86] in software analysis.
For example, in a Hoare triple {P}S{Q}, P denotes the precondition of a run/execution
of the software S, and Q specifies the postcondition of the execution, e.g., which state the
system should reach when S finishes its run under the precondition P . The Hoare rules
guarantee the soundness of composing several sequentially executed programs that are
specified by Hoare triples.
Usually, individual modules M1 and M2 are designed and verified by different teams
of engineers. The predicates describing the interfaces between M1 and M2 might be
different too. This results in the following more general assume-guarantee rule:
〈true 〉M1 〈α(x˜)〉 ,
〈β(xˆ)〉M2 〈p(i2, s2, o2, xˆ)〉 ,
α[x˜← xˆ]→ β(xˆ)
M 〈p(i2, s2, o2, x) ∧ α[x˜← x] ∧ β[xˆ← x]〉 (4.2)
Here, the guarantee provided by the module M1 is α and the constraint (assumption)
consumed by the module M2 is β. It should be noted that in the third precondition of
Rule 4.2, each occurrence of x˜ in α has to be replaced by the corresponding signal in xˆ.
The by-product of Rule 4.2 is that the predicates α and β are valid inM as well. The proof
of the validity of Rule 4.2 is straightforward and similar to the proof of that of Rule 4.1.
Assume-Guarantee rules for reactive systems (Moore machines)
The assume-guarantee rules 4.1 and 4.2 are rarely found in use for today’s System-on-
Chip designs, since the modules of an SoC usually interact in more complex ways and
the environment constraints are often reactive. Put another way, the correctness of the
environment of a module depends on the module itself. This leads to a situation where
the circular reasoning at assume-guarantee-reasoning needs to be broken and where the
task of detecting errors in constraints becomes much harder.
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Definition 28 (Reactive environment constraints). A reactive environment constraint mod-
els the interaction behavior between the design under verification and its environment.
M1 M2
𝑥 
𝑥  𝑥  
𝑖1 𝑜1  𝑖2 𝑜2  
𝑦 
𝑦  𝑦  
Figure 4.2: Composition Scheme of Reactive Systems
Consider a systemM with modulesM1 andM2 as in Fig. 4.2. The interaction between
M1 and M2 happens via two groups of signals x and y. After applying a cut operation
to signals x and y, the system M is decomposed into submodules M1 and M2. The new
signals xˆ and yˆ are inputs to the modules M2 and M1, respectively, and the new signals
x˜ and y˜ become the outputs of M1 and M2, respectively. Suppose that the sequence
predicate αˆ(xˆ, y˜) needs to be assumed by M2 to verify the sequence predicate β˜(xˆ, y˜).
Oppositely, the moduleM1 needs to guarantee the sequence predicate α˜ = αˆ[xˆ← x˜, y˜ ←
yˆ] under the assumption βˆ = β˜[xˆ ← x˜, y˜ ← yˆ]. To validate the property α = αˆ[xˆ ←
x, y˜ ← y] and the property β = β˜[xˆ ← x, y˜ ← y] in the system M , one may use a
preliminary assume-guarantee rule as follows:
〈βˆ〉M1〈α˜〉,
〈αˆ〉M2〈β˜〉
M〈α ∧ β〉 (4.3)
At first glance, the assume-guarantee rule 4.3 is circular and not sound, because the
correctness of M1 is assumed to prove the correctness of M2, and symmetrically, the
module M1 is proven under the assumption that M2 behaves correctly. However, this rule
is not always circular if the temporal behavior of the two modules is considered. In other
words, the circular reasoning might be broken with respect to the chosen model of the
system.
If every module of a system is modeled as a Moore machine, then the system model
turns out to be the product machine of the models of modules. The assume-guarantee
rule 4.3 can be viewed as
〈βˆt〉M1〈α˜t+1〉,
〈αˆt〉M2〈β˜t+1〉
M〈α ∧ β〉 (4.4)
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The two preconditions of the rule 4.4 can be understood as follows. If the assumption
βˆ holds for any timepoint t (or it holds until any timepoint t), the module M1 guarantees
the commitment α˜ at the next time point t + 1 (or until the time point t + 1); and if the
assumption αˆ holds for any timepoint t, the commitment β˜ is valid in M2. The circularity
of the rule 4.4 is then broken inductively over time points, because there is a delay of one
time point between the inputs and outputs of a Moore machine. The validity of this rule
can be proven by contradiction as follows:
Proof. It needs to be proven that the composite system M fulfills the properties α and β
when the two preconditions are valid. In other words, it needs to be shown that the system
M behaves correctly when the module M1 of M behaves correctly under the assumption
that the module M2 of M behaves correctly, and vice versa. Suppose that the system
works correctly until a time point t. At time point t + 1 an error occurs at module M1,
so that the time point t + 1 is the earliest time point at which the system does not behave
correctly. However, the module M1 behaves incorrectly only when its environment M2
does not work well. The error in M2 should be happening at time point t. This contradicts
the assumption that the earliest time point for the occurrence of an error is t+1. Therefore,
the rule 4.4 is correct for Moore machines.
The assume-guarantee rule 4.4 for Moore machines has been presented in many places
in the literature ( [42–45], to name a few). In [42], the assume-guarantee rules similar to
the rule 4.4 are introduced for compositional symbolic model checking. There, to cope
with the complexity of the systems, a large system is decomposed into submodules. Ev-
ery module is verified separately in a constrained manner. The constraint (assumption)
of every module is implemented by a “process” which can be seen as a Moore automa-
ton. However, modeling constraints by using automata is sometimes tedious and error
prone, especially for constraints whose behavior ranges over many clock cycles. [43] in-
troduces a set of compositional rules based on assume-guarantee-reasoning, to conjoin
the specifications of the modules. In [43], every module is specified by a specification
in an assume-guarantee style. By using a set of compositional rules it can be deduced
that the system level specification (assume-guarantee style) is fulfilled by the composite
system. The compositional rules in [43] are similar to the checks presented in Chapter 5
of this dissertation. They can, however, only be used on Moore machines. Their work
does not address the problem of the completeness of the specifications and the problem
of potential circular reasoning due to using reactive constraints specified in a standard
property specification language.
The research presented in [46] and [47] extends the assume-guarantee rule 4.3 to
Mealy machines and requires that there are no combinational loops in the composed sys-
tem. In this dissertation, systems are also modeled as Mealy machines and are required
to be combinationally loop-free. Furthermore, this dissertation provides a check in Sec-
tion 4.2 to avoid combinational loops existing in the final composite system. This check
can be conducted on every module of the system, and it does not need to involve the
composite system.
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So far, the above presented assume-guarantee rules are applicable to assumptions and
commitments that are both safety properties. An assume-guarantee rule for liveness prop-
erties is presented by [87], which is outside of the scope of this dissertation.
In fact, the above stated assume-guarantee rule 4.4 for Moore machines and the rules
presented by [46] and [47] for Mealy machines are only sound when the constraints of the
modules are implementable. A constraint is implementable if there exists a circuit imple-
menting the constraint. An example that shows assume-guarantee rules not being sound
due to using non-implementable constraints can be found in Section 5.1. Unfortunately,
none of [42–47] states explicitly that the constraints must be implementable. Even the
argumentation for proving Eq. 4.4 neglects the fact that α and β must be implementable.
In [42], the constraints are represented by processes which are already implementations
of constraints. The assume-guarantee rules presented by [46] are applied to (hardware/-
software) models and their refinements, which are always implementable. In other words,
the language used for describing such models can only create implementable models.
Similarly, [43–45, 47] are implicitly based on this fact too.
However, in this dissertation, reactive constraints, which are used as assumptions
for verification, are described by using a standard property specification language like
SVA or PSL. This may lead to a situation where the described constraint can be non-
implementable. An extreme case of a non-implementable constraint is that a constraint
is always false. Using this constraint for property checking causes every property to be
trivially true. On the other hand, describing constraints that are safety properties by us-
ing a property specification languages such as SVA has huge advantages. As explained
at the beginning of Section 3.3, the constraints specified in SVA are more compact and
easy to understand. Furthermore, constraints in SVA can be reused for simulation-based
tools, because it is a standard language. For these reasons, the method presented in this
dissertation can be easily adopted and integrated into existing design verification flows
for SoC systems. Therefore, in this application domain, it is crucial to break circular
reasoning due to non-implementable constraints. For this purpose, a plausibility test to
check the implementability of a constraint is introduced in Section 4.2. And a new and
more general assume-guarantee rule for Mealy machines considering all kinds of con-
straints (reactive or nonreactive, implementable or non-implementable) is presented in
Section 4.4. In addition, another plausibility test is also described in Section 4.2, which
identifies combinational loops in the system. These two plausibility tests can be used at
the early stage of the design process, before integrating the submodules of the system.
4.2 Plausibility Checks for Reactive Environment Con-
straints
Environment constraints are of major importance for the functional verification of System-
On-Chip modules. Regardless of whether a design is verified using formal techniques or
whether a classical simulation-based verification approach is chosen, a verification engi-
neer in either case needs to model the environment of the DuV as well.
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Classical directed testbenches constrain the behavior of the environment in a rather
implicit manner by the set of stimuli generated during the simulation. More advanced
techniques such as constrained random simulation or formal assertion-based verification
require an explicit specification of the environment constraints [88, 89]. The holy grail
of formal verification is its promise to completely exercise the entire input, output and
state space of a design in order to prove that there are no bugs. It has been demonstrated
that formal property checking, if complemented with a coverage analysis for the property
set [41, 48, 75, 81, 84] reaches this goal with reasonable verification effort. The coverage
analysis identifies specification gaps in cases where particular input scenarios are not
covered by any of the specified properties. Again, environment constraints are used to
restrict the analysis to relevant scenarios.
Verifying a design with respect to a constrained environment always runs the risk
of masking bugs. Moreover, such overconstraining is more difficult to detect than other
specification mistakes, as it does not show up in a counterexample for a failing property.
In industrial practice, the review of constraints is thus taken very seriously. However,
sometimes a collection of environment constraints may imply subtle consequences that
may not be immediately obvious to the verification engineer. In particular, it may be the
case that a collection of fairly simple constraints, where each individual constraint has a
very reasonable intention, turns out to be problematic when the constraints are applied in
their entirety.
Vacuity checking may guarantee that at least one input scenario exists such that the
constraint is satisfied. However, it may only identify a case where a constraint cannot be
satisfied at all, and leaves many other constraint issues undetected.
This section presents plausibility tests for environment constraints in a SAT-based
property checking environment [20,83,90,91]. The vacuity check is a special case covered
by the tests presented in this section. It will demonstrate that these checks can identify
critical constraint issues and may guide the user to specify consistent constraints. The
presented techniques are useful not only in the setting of formal verification, but also in
a constrained random simulation environment. The reason to call these tests “plausible”
is that these tests do not check whether a constraint specifies an environment exactly
as expected by the design engineer. In other words, these tests do not check whether
the environment of a module can fulfill the constraint of the module. (Such a test will
be provided in Chapter 5.) The plausibility checks presented in this section are mainly
intended to find inconspicuous errors in constraints as early as possible, so that verification
engineers gain more confidence in the environment constraints used.
In particular, the notions of implementability and of loop-free composability of con-
straints are introduced. This formalizes the reasonable requirements that there should
exist at least one environment that is able to fulfill the constraints in such a way that the
composition of the environment and the design is a valid circuit, i.e., the composition does
not contain any combinational loops in its logic.
The effectiveness of the presented plausibility tests is shown with a case study con-
ducted in an industrial setting, where the constraints for a verification IP are analyzed
with the plausibility tests introduced in this section. The verification IP specifies the pro-
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tocol compliance of an Infineon device for the Flexible Peripheral Interface (FPI) bus.
The formal property checker OneSpin 360 DV [83] is used to check the properties against
the device and to prove the completeness of the verification IP. The entire verification is
conducted under the assumption of a set of environment constraints. These constraints
describe, for example, the protocol-compliant behavior of the bus signals that are inputs
to the DuV. This experimental result is presented in Section 4.3.
Obviously sequence predicates are suitable formalisms for reactive constraints that
model the sequential behavior of the interfaces of the DuV. In other words, a reactive
constraint only depends on the interface signals of the DuV, and it is a safety property
assumed to be true for the DuV. Certainly this safety property needs to be validated by the
environment of the DuV. (This problem will be addressed in Chapter 5.) Reactive con-
straints need to be selected carefully in order to ensure that they can actually be fulfilled
by the environment and that they do not overconstrain the design. This is of particular
interest when different portions of a design have been developed by different IP providers
and the final environment for the design is not known prior to the integration phase. At
that stage of the project it is often too late if inconsistent environment constraints for the
individual modules are detected and the required changes may cause a project to fail or
miss its deadline. Two plausibility checks for reactive constraints of a module will be
proposed, that can be checked without a concrete environment at hand.
4.2.1 Implementable Constraints
It is a reasonable requirement for a sequence predicate αl for it to be used as environment
constraint for a circuit model M that at least one environment must exist that can fulfill
the constraint. In other words, it needs to be ensured that a modelME (modeling the envi-
ronment) exists that satisfies αl. This environment model computes the inputs to the DuV
using the DuV’s outputs and possibly also internal signals from the DuV that are used to
specify αl. In addition, it may use additional free inputs to model some non-determinism
in the constraint. If such a model ME exists, the constraint αl is called implementable.
For implementable constraints, one may generate a most-general implementation that can
exhibit every behavior that is not explicitly forbidden by the constraint. In the literature,
such an implementation is also known as a can-do object [92]. Another way to derive
such an implementation is to apply the synthesis techniques of [93].
However, here it is more interesting to focus on the existence of an implementation
of an environment constraint rather than the actual implementation itself. For the typical
constraints encountered in practice, this question can be decided without a full-blown
synthesis of can-do objects. Such a test is developed in the sequel.
As an example of a non-implementable environment constraint, consider the sequence
predicate i = next(o) for an input i and an output o of M . For the environment ME ,
i is an output and o is an input. Unless the output is constant, the constraint models a
precognitive, i.e., non-causal, environment that obviously does not exist.
Checking that an arbitrary sequence predicate is implementable is a non-trivial task.
To simplify this task, the syntax of the language used to specify the environment con-
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straints αl is restricted in such a way that only causal constraints can be formulated. Fur-
thermore, the constraints used in the context of assume-guarantee reasoning must solely
model the interface behavior between modules. More specifically, the constraints can
only contain the interface signals of the DuV, i.e., the input signals and the output signals.
The reason for this restriction is that if a reactive constraint α of the module M1 involves
M1’s internal behavior, it needs to consider the composite system as a whole to validate
α. This violates the intention of the divide-and-conquer approach.
The input value il at the current time point l may be restricted by a basic constraint of
the form
ck(ξl, ζl) := il / 
k(ξl−1, ζl), / ∈ {→,←},
where ξl = (i0, i1, . . . , il) is the set of input sequences and ζl = (o0, o1, . . . , ol) is the
set of output sequences. The form of the basic constraints guarantees that the current
input il is determined by the historic input value and the output value up to the current
time point, and it does not depend on their future values. In addition, the current input
may be restricted by multiple basic constraints, which constitute the overall constraint
αl(ξl, ζl) =
∧
k c
k(ξl, ζl) of the module under verification.
The individual constraints ck are, obviously, implementable and thus causal. However,
this does not guarantee that αl is also implementable. To see this, consider the state
predicate o1 → i ∧ o2 → ¬i, which places two constraints on the input i depending on
two current outputs o1, o2 of the module. This restricts o1, o2 in such a way that they can
not take the value 1 at the same time. However, the outputs of the module are inputs to
its environment and cannot be controlled by any circuit implementing the environment.
Thus, the constraint is not implementable.
In order to guarantee implementability, it needs to be checked whether the constraint αl
can be fulfilled regardless of the output sequence generated by the module and regardless
of the previous inputs that have been asserted. This yields the following QBF formula:
∀oj ,j=0,...,l∀ih,h=0,...,l−1∃il : αl(ξl, ζl).
The constraint αl is implementable if the above QBF formula is a tautology. The
intuition behind this formula is the following. In order for the environment constraint αl to
be implementable, it is necessary that the outputs of the environment (i.e., the inputs of the
DuV) are in a causal functional relationship with the inputs of the environment (i.e., the
outputs of the DuV). This is the case if for every combination of DuV output l-sequence
and DuV input l− 1-sequence (“history”) there exists a (“current”) DuV input complying
with the constraint. (No future time references are allowed in the constraint.) To disprove
implementability, it is thus sufficient to check the following formula for satisfiability.
∃oj ,j=0,...,l∃ih,h=0,...,l−1∀il : ¬αl(ξl, ζl).
This formula can be solved by explicit elimination of the inner universal quantifier
and a propositional SAT solver. In practice, this is feasible because most often αl is
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merely a conjunction of basic constraints where any input at time point l only depends
on a very limited number of other inputs. The negation, ¬αl, is thus a disjunction of the
negated basic constraints. Furthermore it is possible to group the inputs with respect to the
dependency relation induced by the basic constraints in such a way that no dependency
between inputs of different groups exists. The overall check for the implementability of
the constraint αl thus can be split into subchecks, in which the inputs for each group are
individually quantified. The constraint αl is implementable if every group can pass the
implementability check.
4.2.2 Loop-free Composability
A design under verification and its environment are modeled as finite state machines.
Properties describe the behavior of a system only at discrete synchronous time points (usu-
ally with reference to a clock signal) and in steady-state conditions. A property checker
for this kind of property cannot verify asynchronous behavior that results from combina-
tional loops. In other words, the oscillating behavior due to combinational loops is not
supported by a property checker. In this case, the property checker tries to stabilize the
values of the signals inside the combinational loops. The value causing the oscillating
behavior is implicitly assumed to not occur in the design. If a constraint builds a combi-
national loop with its DuV, this may lead to a problem that the constraint unexpectedly
overconstrains the DuV. With regard to the proof of assume guarantee rules for a Mealy
machine, the oscillating behavior causes the assume-guarantee rules to be unsound, be-
cause the proof needs the values of the signals to be stable at every time point. Further-
more, combinational loops also make difficulties for the timing analysis and automatic
synthesis of a design. By all accounts, combinational loops between the environment and
the DuV need to be excluded. Therefore, the second plausibility test for environment con-
straints considers the composition of the module with a hypothetical implementation of
the constraint and makes sure that no combinational loops are created by this composition.
(It is obviously only applicable to implementable constraints.)
At first glance, it seems appealing to require that every implementation of an environ-
ment constraint could be safely composed with the DuV. However, it turns out that this
requirement is too strict. Consider a module with inputs i1, i2 and an output o. Assume
a combinational dependency between o and i2 but not between o and i1. Suppose the
environment constraint i1 = o. Every environment connecting i1 with o implements the
constraint. Under all such environments only those are composable that do not connect i2
and o. Obviously this is not an issue for the constraint that is not talking about i2 at all.
Instead of considering all implementations of the constraint, one may resort to an
existential requirement. In this case, one would require that at least one environment
for the module exists such that it implements the constraint and does not produce any
combinational loops in the composition with the module M . However, this may cause
problems as well. To see this, consider the constraint x1 = y for a 2-input AND gate with
inputs x1, x2 and output y. In this case, the constraint can be implemented by connecting
the output y with the input x1. This leads to a combinational loop in the composition.
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Certainly this implementation in some sense is the most reasonable implementation of
the constraint and we would like to forbid this type of constraint to prevent the resulting
combinational loops. However, there are alternative implementations. For example the
circuit producing a constant zero output for x1 also turns out to be a valid implementation
of the constraint. Additionally, this implementation does not produce a combinational
loop with the AND gate.
The requirement that only a single implementation of a constraint be composable
with the module M without combinational loops is, therefore, too weak. To rule out
over-constraining implementations like the constant-zero implementation for the above
mentioned constraint, the most-general implementation of a constraint is considered in
this dissertation.
Definition 29. A most-general implementation of a constraint, also referred to as can-do
object [92], is a circuit that can produce every behavior that is not explicitly forbidden by
the constraint.
Note that neither the constant-zero implementation of the previous example nor the
implementation connecting o and i2 in the earlier example are most-general implementa-
tions, because they restrict behavior that is definitely allowed by the respective constraints.
It turns out that most-general implementations are well suited for the definition of loop-
free composable constraints:
Definition 30. An implementable constraint α is called loop-free composable with a mod-
ule M if a most-general implementation Mα of α exists that can be composed with M
without introducing combinational loops.
A naive way of checking loop-free composability as defined above would explicitly
generate the most-general implementation. (Note that this would be possible with the
synthesis techniques of [92].) However, here, the combinational dependencies are more
interesting than the exact functionality of these implementations. Therefore, only a much
simpler structural analysis is needed, which is conducted on the original constraints. In
this analysis, the combinational dependencies are extracted from the basic constraints ck
of the constraint α. Every pair of inputs and outputs that occurs with the same temporal
offset of the next operator is considered as a potential combinational dependency. (Due to
the causality of the basic constraints, there cannot be any other such dependencies.) The
dependencies derived from the constraint in this way are added to the signal dependency
graph for the inputs and outputs of the circuit model M of the DuV. The resulting depen-
dency graph for the system is then analyzed for loops. Note that in cases where the model
of the DuV is not yet available because formal specification and design are developed in
parallel, one may refer to the properties of the design and conduct a similar analysis as for
the constraint to generate a signal dependency graph. In either case, an acyclic extended
dependency graph guarantees the existence of a safe environment.
Note that the presented method is based on the syntax analysis of the code of con-
straints. It provides an overapproximated result. Therefore, false negative counterexam-
ples due to “false” loops may occur. A false loop is a loop that looks like a combinational
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Figure 4.3: An example of false loops
loop (syntactically), but this loop (path) is never closed during a design run. An example
of false loops is given in Fig. 4.3. In this example, the suspected combinational loop in-
volving signals o1 and o2 can never be logically closed. To overcome the problem of false
negatives, one has to synthesize the most general implementations of constraints Mα and
rigorously analyze combinational loops in the composite circuit built from Mα and M .
However this increases the complexity of the plausibility test for combinational loops.
4.3 Experimental Results
The plausibility checks for environment constraints developed in this dissertation have
been successfully evaluated in an industrial setting. A formal specification of a master
interface for Infineon’s Flexible Peripheral Interconnect (FPI) bus [94] is considered as a
case study. The specification ensures compliance of a particular implementation with the
FPI bus protocol. This protocol is quite similar to the industry’s standard AMBA bus pro-
tocol [95]. It includes features like pipelining of transactions to improve the throughput
of the bus.
The main task of the considered master interface is to adapt a particular processor
interface for reading and writing information from/to peripherals to the particular FPI bus
protocol. Each interface transaction of the processor is mapped onto a respective protocol
transaction on the bus. Due to the pipelining features of the protocol, the interface is able
to handle two concurrent requests from the processor.
An industrial design of such an FPI bus master interface has been completely verified
by applying the OneSpin 360 DV interval property checker [83] with its extended features
for completeness checking. The completeness of the specification was derived under an
environment constraint composed of 72 basic constraints involving 36 signals.
The inputs and outputs of the considered design can be grouped into two categories.
The first category is used in the communication with the processor while the other cate-
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gory forms the actual interface to the bus.
After thorough review of the environment constraint for the DuV by the verification
and design teams the verification engineer was convinced that the constraint precisely
captures the required environment behavior under which the DuV was supposed to meet
its specification.
However, the plausibility checks developed in this dissertation revealed two serious
issues that may easily have masked a bug if they had remained undetected. For the check,
the dependency relation between signals referred to by the constraint was used to decom-
pose it into nine groups of basic constraints referring to pairwise disjoint sets of signals.
The plausibility checks were individually applied to each group. In one of the groups two
bugs were detected. This group still has a source code size of about 30 lines.
This explains why under these circumstances the subtle interdependencies detected
by the plausibility checks were overlooked by the verification team. In contrast, the fully
automatic plausibility checks presented in this dissertation analyzed each group within
190 ms, using less than 95 MB of memory on an Intel Core i7 CPU 860 at 2.8 GHz with
8 GB of RAM.
In the case of the above-mentioned issues, the code fragments that caused the plau-
sibility tests to fail stem from distant locations within the constraint specification. This
is true even though the verification engineer put significant effort into ordering the basic
constraints in such a way that expressions referring to similar sets of signals would be
located close to each other.
In what follows, a pseudo-code notation is used to illustrate the nature of the identified
issues within the constraints of the master interface of FPI bus. For reasons of space, only
the relevant subexpressions that actually form the bug are presented here.
The first issue identified by the plausibility checks is related to the ready i signal in
the FPI bus. Fig. 4.4 illustrates two subexpressions of the corresponding constraint that
introduce an issue regarding implementability. Within these code snippets, the suffix ‘i’
indicates that a signal is an input of the DuV, whereas the suffix ‘o’ identifies outputs.
i f b u s i s i d l e i then
next ( r eady i ) = ’ 1 ’ ;
end i f and
i f next ( t h i s ma s t e r i s d r i v i n g b u s o ) then
next ( r eady i ) = next ( ready o ) ;
end i f ;
Figure 4.4: Pseudo-code related to the first bug
The code fragment states that whenever the FPI bus is in the idle state, at the next time
point the ready signal of the bus should have the Boolean value ‘1’. The latter indicates
that there must be a master or a slave in the system selected to drive the bus signals. The
second part of the code fragment considers the case that the DuV itself is selected to drive
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the bus. In this case, the ready i signal should actually correspond to the value of ready o
provided by the DuV.
It turns out that this constraint fails within the implementability check. A counterex-
ample shows that for the present time point, whenever the previous value of bus is idle i
is logical ‘1’, and the DuV is driving the bus, and the value of ready o is logical ‘0’, no
value for the signal ready i is available to satisfy the constraint. Actually, this constraint
has the subtle consequence that if at a previous time point the bus is in the idle state and
at present the DuV is selected to drive the bus, the ready o must be ‘1’.
Note that this implication of the constraint is actually one of the verification goals for
the DuV, i.e., the constraint would have masked cases where this requirement is not ful-
filled. To resolve this problem, one may use a cascaded if-then-else structure to formulate
i f next ( t h i s ma s t e r i s d r i v i n g b u s o ) then
next ( r eady i ) = next ( ready o ) ;
e l s e i f b u s i s i d l e i then
next ( r eady i ) = ’ 1 ’ ;
end i f ;
Figure 4.5: Possible solution to the first bug
the constraint, as listed in Fig. 4.5.
The second issue of the constraints of the master interface was discovered by the
loop-free composability check specified in 4.2.2. The pseudo-code in Fig. 4.6 illustrates
a constraint on the input grant i . It states that whenever the DuV is active and locks the
request line, the arbiter should grant this request immediately. The output active o is not a
part of the protocol. With this signal the DuV may indicate whether it still needs the bus or
whether the bus could be put into a power saving mode. It should be connected to a power
management unit in the environment of the DuV. This unit may then determine whether
the bus is in use by some other system components and otherwise assert additional signals
to set the bus in sleep mode as well.
i f l o ck r eq o = ’1 ’ and a c t i v e o = ’1 ’ then
g r an t i = ’ 1 ’ ;
end i f ;
Figure 4.6: Pseudo-code related to the second bug
Obviously, the above constraint introduces a combinational dependency between
active o and grant i . Unfortunately, these two signals are also in a combinational rela-
tionship in the circuit model of the DuV. Hence, the constraint causes a combinational
loop with the DuV. This combinational loop may overconstrain the design, because the
verification tool can only consider the steady-state behavior caused by this loop. The
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consequence of this combinational loop is illustrated in Fig. 4.7. Since the signals along
the combinational loop (green part of the figure) may oscillate, in order to keep the loop
stable (steady state), some signals in the fan-in of active o must be restricted to a subset
of the values they should have. This makes the fan-out of these overconstrained signals to
be constrained unexpectedly (red part of the figure).
     if lock_req_o = '1' and active_o = '1' then 
grant_i = '1';
     end if;  
DUV
Combi. Circuit
I
O
grant_i
active_o
lock_req_o
Constrained 
Circuit
Figure 4.7: Consequence of combinational loops
Further investigation of the constraint reveals that the signal active o is not necessary
to formulate the constraint. The request line of the design can only be locked if the design
is active at the same time. This relationship between the outputs should be checked by
the verification IP of the module and not be implied from the environment constraint.
Removing the active o signal from the constraint is therefore a possible solution in this
case.
4.4 Assume-Guarantee Reasoning over Cuts
Within the scope of this dissertation, standard property languages, such as SVA or PSL,
are used to specify the constraints of a module. The problem with using these languages
in the context of plausibility tests for constraints is that the user may unintentionally create
non-implementable constraints or constraints that produce combinational loops with the
DuV. This may lead to overconstrained designs during verification.
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If a non-implementable constraint is used as the assumption for one of the precondi-
tions of an assume-guarantee rule, e.g., Rule 4.4, then the validity of this precondition is
no longer trustable. This invalidates the soundness of the assume-guarantee rule.
In this section, a new and more general assume-guarantee rule is presented, which
explicitly addresses the above stated problems of constraints, in order to allow using a
standard property language, such as SVA, to specify the constraints. Furthermore this
assume-guarantee rule is used as the fundamental theory for the compositional complete-
ness of property sets presented in Chapter 5.
Consider a circuit model M with a set of internal signals X . By applying a cut oper-
ation on X according to Def. 27, the circuit model is transformed to M ′ = M/X . The
cut operation introduces a set of pseudo-inputs xˆ of M ′ and a set of pseudo-outputs x˜
of M ′. A constraint αˆ(xˆ, x˜) is used to restrict the pseudo-inputs xˆ in terms of the pseudo-
outputs x˜. An assertion α˜ is constructed from the constraint αˆ by using α˜(x˜, xˆ) = αˆ[xˆ↔
x˜ : x ∈ X]. In other words, the assertion α˜ is created by replacing the signals x˜ in αˆ with
the signals xˆ, and vice versa. Furthermore, it is assumed that the assertion α˜ is valid for
the modified model M ′ under the constraint αˆ. Note that this assumption is not circular
reasoning, because two sets of variables xˆ and x˜ are used to distinguish the roles of the
signals as inputs or outputs. In addition, the pseudo-inputs and pseudo-outputs change
their role when one considersM ′ as its environment (constraint restricting pseudo-inputs)
to prove the assertion about the pseudo-outputs. From these given conditions, the asser-
tion α(x) = αˆ[xˆ← x, x˜← x : x ∈ X] is proven in model M using the assume-guarantee
rule as follows:
〈αˆ〉M ′〈α˜〉,
αˆ is implementable,
αˆ is loop-free composable with M’
M〈α〉 (4.5)
This rule can be explained with a simple example. Consider a circuit M that consists
of a single D-flipflop that reads its own state value s as the next state input, as illustrated
in the left part of Fig. 4.8. Further assume that the D-flipflop is initialized with 0 on reset.
Consider the cut {s} inM . The modelM ′ that results from this cut has an input sˆ and and
output s˜ and is depicted in the right half of the figure. In this model the property s˜ = 0
holds under the constraint sˆ = 0. The constraint sˆ = 0 is obviously implementable by the
constant signal sˆ = 0. This is the most general implementation of the constraint. Thus
the constraint is loop-free composable with M ′. With the assume-guarantee rule 4.5, one
may now conclude that s = 0 holds in M (which is really true in design M ).
The validity of the preconditions of the presented assume-guarantee rule can be proven
by the plausibility tests introduced in 4.2 and a property checker. The validity of this
assume-guarantee rule is proven in the remainder of this section.
Proof. It is assumed that the preconditions of the assume-guarantee rule are fulfilled. In
particular, the property α˜ holds for M ′ under the constraint αˆ.
In order to prove the validity of the assume-guarantee rule, it needs to be shown that
every input trace for the circuit M determines a trace for the internal signals of M and in
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Figure 4.8: Example: D-flipflop
particular for the signals of the cut X such that the propertyGα is fulfilled. Furthermore,
the most general implementation of the constraint αˆ is assumed to be composed with M ′
as illustrated in Fig. 4.10. The existence of the most general implementation of the con-
straint is guaranteed by the precondition “αˆ is implementable.” This implementation may
depend on a finite number of free inputs F = {f1, . . . , fs} with s ≤ |X|. These free
inputs model the indeterministic description of a constraint that will be explained in terms
of an example in Fig. 4.9. In this example, the value of the input rdy i is constrained to
“1” only when the output req o of the DuV at the previous time point has the value “1”.
In other cases, the input rdy i may have an arbitrary value, i.e., the value of rdy i is un-
determined. Note that this differs from the semantics of an HDL language like VHDL or
Verilog, where a signal is determined to keep its value unless it is explicitly altered by an
assignment statement.
i f req o = ’1 ’ then
next ( rdy i ) = ’ 1 ’ ;
end i f ;
Figure 4.9: Example for indeterministic constraints
Due to the implementability and loop-free composability of the constraint, the com-
position with M ′ is a well-formed composition. By the precondition of the assume-
guarantee rule this circuit generates traces for the signals xˆ, x˜ : x ∈ X that globally
fulfill the constraint αˆ and the assertion α˜. However, depending on the choice of the input
traces for the signals in F , the traces for the pseudo-inputs xˆ may differ from the traces
of the corresponding pseudo-outputs x˜.
As the next step, it needs to be shown that the traces for the signals F can be chosen in
such a way that this is not the case. Suppose given an arbitrary trace for the signals fk ∈ F ,
and consider the first time point t where xˆ 6= x˜ for any x ∈ X . There must exist a signal xˆ
within Xdiff = {x : xˆ 6= x˜} that does not have a combinatorial dependency on the other
signals with this property. Otherwise, a combinational loop could be constructed in the
composed circuit of Fig. 4.10. This signal thus only depends on the previous values of
the pseudo-inputs that, by the selection of the timepoint, correspond to their respective
pseudo-outputs. Moreover, M ′ produces an output that satisfies α˜. The output value
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Figure 4.10: Circuit model for generating the initial trace
of x˜ at time t is thus a valid output with respect to α˜. Therefore, this value is a valid
output xˆ of αˆ as well. In addition, since the most general implementation of αˆ exposes
every permitted behavior of αˆ, there must be a modified input trace for F ′ for αˆ with the
following properties:
1. The output trace up to time t− 1 remains unchanged.
2. The output for the other signals x′ /∈ Xdiff and the identity xˆ′ = x˜′ at time t remain
unchanged.
3. The difference between x˜ and xˆ at time t is fixed.
With the remaining signals differing at time t under F ′, the corresponding F ′ is modified
in the same manner. By induction over t, a trace F ∗ is constructed such that the traces
for the pseudo-inputs and pseudo-outputs of M ′ are identical. Under this trace, F ∗, the
model of Fig. 4.10 produces traces xˆ = x˜, i.e., the signals xˆ can be simply connected
with the corresponding signals x˜ and the composition is equivalent to original model M
with x = xˆ = x˜. At the same time, the signals xˆ = x˜ satisfy the constraint αˆ and the
assertion α˜. Hence, x satisfies α, i.e., the model M satisfies α.
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Chapter 5
Coverage of Compositional Property
Sets
In order to overcome the complexity of the designs and the limitations of verification
methodologies, Divide-and-Conquer approaches are also exploited for the coverage anal-
ysis of property sets. For instance, the verification methodology suggested by [83] can
only show its efficiency if the overall SoC can be decomposed into several groups, each
group containing only one conceptual state machine. In this case, the completeness of the
property sets for the groups (modules) is checked module by module. If every module
is verified in an unconstrained manner, and the property set of a module is proven to be
complete under this circumstance, then no further efforts are needed to guarantee that the
module works correctly in the system, and the completeness of the property sets of the
modules implies that the overall system is completely verified. However, since usually
modules are not standalone, they often operate in an interactive way. To verify every
module and to check the completeness of the property sets for every module with the
minimum necessary effort, reactive constraints have to be applied, which saves writing
redundant and unnecessary properties. In this situation, the properties are valid and com-
plete with respect to the applied reactive constraints. This chapter addresses questions
like “How to ensure that the properties, which hold in every module, are also valid in the
system?”, “How to guarantee that the complete property sets of all modules cover every
behavior of the overall system?”.
This chapter presents a compositional reasoning framework for complete property sets
under reactive environment constraints. The framework includes the necessary criteria for
the constraints of the individual modules and, also, sanity checks of their interplay, so that
one can conclude that the property sets of the modules are also valid in the entire system.
Moreover, the union of the property sets of the modules completely verifies the entire
system. This approach, although presented in the context of C-IPC (see Section3.4.2),
can be used with other verification techniques as well.
The contribution in this chapter can be used in practice as follows. A system of RTL
modules is verified by property checking as usual, module by module. Every module Mi
is independently verified by C-IPC, based only on assumptions about the behavior of its
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environment (which includes the other modules in the system). Not only the properties
themselves, but also the completeness of the property set relies on the validity of these
assumptions. Instead of checking the correctness of the assumptions manually, the soft-
ware framework implementing the compositional criteria in Section 5.1 is used to check
whether the guarantees given by the environment justify the assumptions used in the ver-
ification of Mi. The guarantees can be seen as the counterparts of the assumptions. They
follow from the properties of the modules that make up the environment of Mi. The soft-
ware framework only requires the assumptions and guarantees of the modules as input
(the design itself is not considered), to check the compositional criteria. If this automatic
check succeeds, then the correctness and completeness of the property sets are certified
for the entire system. If the check fails, then a counterexample is generated to guide ver-
ification engineers in debugging errors or gaps in the assumptions and guarantees. This
may lead to modifications of the designs or properties.
This chapter is organized as follows. The design-independent compositional rules are
introduced in Section 5.1. These rules are directly implemented in a software tool within
a SAT-based verification environment and evaluated on two SoC designs, with the results
being presented in Section 5.2.
5.1 Compositional Rules for Property Sets
Before introducing the compositional rules for the compositional completeness of prop-
erty sets, the definition of the completeness of the property set of a single module needs
to be adapted to the situation where reactive constraints are exploited to check the com-
pleteness of property sets. Usually, the reactive constraints evaluate the previous and the
current outputs of the module to determine the ranges of valid values for the inputs to
the module. The guarantees provided by a module for its environment can be modeled
in a similar manner, by properties that restrict the outputs of the device in terms of its
previous and current inputs. Together with the determination conditions introduced in
Section 3.4.2, the environment constraints and the guarantees of a module form the so
called integration conditions. For ease of explanation, the determination assumptions are
grouped with the environment constraints into the integration assumptions of a module.
Likewise, the determination requirements are grouped with the module’s guarantees to
form the integration commitments of the module. The integration assumptions and com-
mitments together constitute the integration conditions.
By replacing Formula 3.3 in Def. 3.1 with Formula 5.1, the completeness of the prop-
erty set for a module with respect to its integration conditions can be checked as follows:
c ∧ c′ ∧
n∧
j=1
Dij ∧
∧
pl∈P
pl ∧
∧
p′l∈P ′
p′l ⇒
m∧
k=1
Dok ∧ g ∧ g′. (5.1)
Here, c denotes the conjunction of all environment constraints, and g denotes the
conjunction of all module guarantees, that describe the interface behavior between the
module and its environment. They are usually very small in comparison to the module
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itself. It is necessary to use the predicates c′ and g′ to restrict and define the interface
behavior of the copied set of variables {v′} appearing in the property set P ′. Based on
Formula 5.1, the integration assumption of the module is defined by the logical formula
c ∧ c′ ∧ ∧nj=1Dij , and the logical formula ∧mk=1Dok ∧ g ∧ g′ indicates the integration
commitments of the module.
The complete verification of the system modules with respect to integration condi-
tions can lead to a situation of mutual dependencies between two or more modules of
the system. As long as every module is verified completely with respect to the default
determination conditions, i.e., all inputs and outputs are determined at all times, and no
constraints are applied, this is not an issue. Recall that in this case the completeness re-
sults for the modules guarantee the sequential equivalence of alternative implementations.
However, as soon as the integration conditions for the modules are weakened, things turn
out to be more complicated. This will be illustrated by means of an example.
D Q
M1
M2
xˆ
x~ yˆ
y~
Figure 5.1: D-Flipflop composed with an inverter
Fig. 5.1 depicts a system composed of an inverter M1 and a D-flipflop M2, where the
inverter M1 has the input variable yˆ and the output variable x˜ and the flipflop M2 has the
input variable xˆ and the output variable y˜. The property p1 := (x˜ = ¬yˆ) completely
verifies the unconstrained module M1 under the default determination assumption. Then
the module guarantee g1 := p1 of M1 is used as an environment constraint to verify
module M2, i.e., the constraint c2 := (¬xˆ = y˜) is applied. With this constraint, the
outputs of M2 are uniquely determined even for the property p2 := G (true ), which does
not restrict the behavior of M2 at all. This suggests that p2 is sufficient to completely
specify M2 under the constraint c2. Obviously P = {p1, p2} is not a complete property
set for the entire system M , as the behavior of the flipflop remains uncovered. If the
assume-guarantee rules presented in [46, 47] are applied to this example, one can deduce
that the set P = {p1, p2} is the complete set for M . Section 5.1.1 shows what is the
reason for this false conclusion.
In the remainder of this section, necessary conditions for the integration conditions
will be successively introduced, in such a way that the complete verification of the indi-
vidual modules implies the complete verification of the system. Assume a system has a
structure as illustrated in Fig. 5.2, which is general enough to cover every possible sce-
nario of design verification using a divide-and-conquer approach. The system may be
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decomposed into several modules Mi by cutting a set of internal signals X , resulting in
a set of local inputs xˆi and a set of local outputs x˜i. Note that the cut is also applied to
the global inputs I , reflecting the fact that some of the ports Iˆ of a module Mi are driven
by the input ports I˜ of the system. The connections of the modules with the output O
indicate that each of the modules computes a particular subvector of the global output
vector. Some of the outputs yi drive the interconnections xi between the modules. A cir-
cuit block called renamed is responsible for building the relationship between the outputs
yi and the respective signals x˜i created by the cut. In contrast, the system can be built
by a well-formed composition, i.e., when closing the cut indicated by the dashed lines in
Fig. 5.2 by connecting the local inputs xˆi with their corresponding local outputs x˜i, the
resulting circuit does not contain combinational loops.
M1
...
rename signals
M2
M3
Mn
O
......
𝐼  
𝑥 2 
𝑥 3 
𝑥 𝑛  
𝑥 1 
𝐼  
𝑥 1 
𝑥 2 
𝑥 3 
𝑥 𝑛  
𝑦1 
𝑦2 
𝑦3 
𝑦𝑛  
Figure 5.2: General composition scheme for modules
For the system in Fig. 5.2, the global integration assumptions about the interfaces
of the system are denoted by aM(I˜ , I˜ ′, O,O′), and the local integration assumptions of
every module are denoted by ai(Iˆ , Iˆ ′, xˆi, xˆ′i, yi, y
′
i, O,O
′). Similarly the global integration
commitments and the local integration commitments are defined by rM(I˜ , I˜ ′, O,O′) and
ri(Iˆ , Iˆ
′, xˆi, xˆ′i, yi, y
′
i, O,O
′), respectively. The primed signals are the copied variables of
the respective signals. Recall that the integration conditions are predicates over two sets
of variables (original and copied) of the design, and are used in the context of checking
the completeness of property sets.
Note that the bits x˜′i of the pseudo-outputs generated by the cut correspond to one of
the output bits yj of one of the modules. In order to indicate this relationship (illustrated
by the renamed circuit block in Fig. 5.2), the above defined local integration conditions
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are rewritten as ai(Iˆ , Iˆ ′, xˆ, xˆ′, x˜, x˜′, O,O′) and ri(Iˆ , Iˆ ′, xˆ, xˆ′, x˜, x˜′, O,O′), neglecting that
both conditions only refer to a subset of the signals. To lighten the burden of the notation
of the signals (original and copied), in the rest of this section the original signal names Iˆ ,
I˜ , xˆ, x˜, O are reused to represent the unions of the signals Iˆ ∪ Iˆ ′, I˜ ∪ I˜ ′, xˆ∪ xˆ′, x˜∪ x˜′ and
O ∪ O′, respectively, if the meaning is clear from the context.
In the sequel, it is assumed that the modules Mi are completely verified modulo the
local integration conditions ai and ri. Note that the local integration assumptions are
responsible for restricting the local inputs (created by the cut) as well as the global inputs
by taking the global outputs and the local outputs as their inputs. In contrast, the global
integration assumptions are only responsible for restricting the global inputs in terms of
the global outputs.
In the remainder of this section, a set of compositional rules, which can be seen as
the derivatives of the assume-guarantee rule presented in Section 4.4, will be introduced,
which allows concluding that the entire system is completely verified when the individual
modules of a system are completely verified with regard to the reactive constraints. At
the same time, the presented method also guarantees that the properties of the individ-
ual modules are also valid in the system, and the constraints/commitments used for the
module verification are valid in the system as well.
5.1.1 Implementability
For the first requirement to be derived for the integration assumption ai and aM , the notion
of implementability, as introduced in Section 4.2.1, is used. This criterion requires that at
least one circuit fulfilling a particular integration assumption ai exists. This circuit may
continuously observe the outputs of the module and generate valid inputs. Implementabil-
ity as defined in Section 4.2.1 only focuses on environment constraints. However, in the
context of completeness analysis, it is necessary to extend the notion of implementability
to include consideration of the determination assumptions.
To see this, the example illustrated in Fig. 5.1 will be reconsidered. Obviously the
constraint c2 := G (¬xˆ = y˜) is implementable, e.g., by the inverter. However, together
with the implicitly taken determination guard dxˆ = true of module M2, which implies
that the input of M2 is assumed to be determined at every time, this constraint already
determines the output y˜ of the module under verification, M2. The integration assumption
is a conjunction of the environment constraint c2 and the determination assumption Dxˆ =
(xˆ = xˆ′). As can be easily seen, the formula c′2 ∧ c2 ∧ (xˆ = xˆ′) implies that y˜ = y˜′ is
valid, i.e., the integration assumption necessarily requires determining y˜. In other words,
it requires that an implementation of an environment determines the signal y˜. Clearly
such an implementation does not exist, because y˜ is a pure input to the environment over
which the environment has no control.
This problem can be detected by an extension to the implementability test for envi-
ronment constraints of Section 4.2.1. The test of Section 4.2.1 solves a QBF satisfiability
problem that ensures the existence of a current input for every history of the inputs and
every history of the output including the current value. Integration conditions can be han-
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dled in the same manner except that two versions of the signals need to be considered.
In the integration assumption of the aforementioned example, this would require that for
every value of y˜ and every value of y˜′, corresponding values of xˆ and xˆ′ need to be found
such that the integration assumption
c2(xˆ, y˜) ∧ c′2(xˆ′, y˜′) ∧ xˆ = xˆ′ (5.2)
is fulfilled. For y˜ 6= y˜′, this is obviously unsatisfiable. Therefore, the integration assump-
tion for the flipflop is not implementable. A reasonable way to resolve this issue would be
to remove the assumption that the input is determined, i.e., to allow for using the flipflop
in an undetermined environment. In this case, the integration assumption would consist
of the two versions of only the constraint c2 and obviously would be implementable. Note
that under this corrected integration assumption, the completeness checker would detect
that the trivial property p2 leaves the output undetermined.
5.1.2 Structural Compatibility of the Integration Assumptions
Composition of circuits that implement Mealy-type state machines, if not carefully con-
ducted, may introduce combinational loops into the overall circuit. It is common practice
to avoid such loops when integrating such circuits into a larger system, by conducting a
topological analysis that detects combinational loops.
This is because the oscillating behavior caused by a combinational loop can not be
handled by a property checker, which models a DuV as a finite state machine. When
composing the results of the completeness analysis of the property sets, the combinational
dependencies also need to be considered, because the soundness of the compositional
rules presented in this chapter needs every value of signals to be stable at every time
instance (See Section 4.4).
In addition to the combinational dependencies present in the circuit under verifica-
tion, it is necessary to consider the additional dependencies that are introduced by the
integration assumptions. Combinational loops introduced by these additional dependen-
cies must be avoided because if a reactive integration assumption of a module builds a
combinational loop with the DuV, this may lead to the overconstraining of the DuV (see
Fig. 4.7 in Section 4.3). Under this circumstance, the verification results are no longer
trustable (viz., the declaration of the completeness of the property sets and the validity of
the property sets). This kind of problem of overconstraining can not be detected by just
checking that the environment’s commitments imply the assumptions of the DuV, since
the environment is assumed to work properly only when the DuV works correctly: in spite
of the trustworthiness of the property sets, the DuV may function wrongly.
In the following, let K(M) denote the set of pairwise combinational dependencies
between the signals in the circuit M . Likewise, let K(a) be the set of pairwise combina-
tional dependencies between signals induced by the integration assumption a.
For integration assumptions, unlike general constraints, it may be unclear what pre-
cisely a combinational dependency should be, as they describe relations between signals
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rather than functional dependencies, i.e., one signal is a function of another one. How-
ever, as only implementable integration assumptions are considered here, one may resort
to a most general implementation of the conditions and take the dependencies from there.
In the ideal case, the true semantic dependencies would be considered, i.e., one would
synthesize the most general implementation of the integration assumptions and combine
it with the DuV to analyze the combinational loops. However, this might be hard to com-
pute for large circuits. In practice, this can be done as shown in Section 4.2.2 by struc-
turally extracting syntactic dependencies that over-approximate the semantic dependency
relation.
With the above notation, the structural compatibility of the integration assumptions
with a DUV M is defined as follows:
Definition 5.1. A system M with modules M1, . . . ,Mn is structurally compatible with
integration assumptions aM , a1, . . . , an if the signal dependency graph representing the
combinational dependencies K(M), K(aM), K(a1), . . . , K(an) is acyclic.
Structural compatibility is a necessary condition to obtain a well-formed composition
during system integration. Moreover, it is a prerequisite that the system itself can be
integrated with its environment in the same manner.
5.1.3 Conditions for Local Integration Assumptions
The next necessary condition for the integration of the modules states the following: given
that the global integration assumption is valid, it must be possible to find values for these
local signals such that all the local integration assumptions are simultaneously satisfied.
Definition 5.2. The local integration assumptions ai weaken the global assumption aM if
every sequence of values for the global input/output signals Iˆ , O that satisfies aM(I˜ ←
Iˆ , O) can be extended by suitable values xˆ, x˜ for the local inputs/outputs of the modules
such that all the local assumptions ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O) are simultaneously satisfied.
In the global integration assumption aM , the replacement of the signals I˜ by the corre-
sponding signals Iˆ is necessary, because they are two separate variable sets and a design-
independent analysis does not know their relationships without their connectivity infor-
mation. The intuition of Def. 5.2 is that the local integration assumptions of the individual
modules will allow every sequence of values for the global inputs that is generated by the
global integration assumptions.
The next criterion to be developed is to ensure that extensions of the input sequences
of Iˆ , O with local values xˆ, x˜ that do not fulfill the local integration assumptions of a mod-
ule may not occur in a verified system. For this purpose, the integration commitments of
other modules are used. In general, these commitments depend on the corresponding lo-
cal assumptions. This circular reasoning must be broken, which is not a trivial task for
reactive systems with circular dependencies between modules. To break circular reason-
ing, one must make sure that the commitments of the other modules that are used to verify
an integration assumption of a given module, do not require themselves in their proof. At
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this point, the cut in the verification model of Fig. 5.2 comes into play. The cut operation
breaks the circular dependencies of the modules and the signals, by introducing two inde-
pendent sets of variables xˆ and x˜ for the internal signals x of the system as well as Iˆ and
I˜ for the global inputs I .
In order to deduce the local integration assumptions from the global assumptions, one
must assume the validity of these global assumptions for both Iˆ and I˜ under the same
output behavior. In addition to the global assumptions, it is supposed that every local
commitment of the modules restricts some of the local outputs x˜i and some of the global
outputs O depending on the local inputs xˆi and the global inputs Iˆ . Under these circum-
stances, it must be analyzed whether the local assumptions are satisfied by the independent
global inputs I˜ together with the local signals xˆi and x˜i and the global outputs O.
Definition 5.3. The local integration assumptions ai are justified by the global assump-
tion aM and the local commitments ri if the following implication holds:
aM(Iˆ , O) ∧ aM(I˜ , O) ∧
n∧
i=1
ri(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)⇒
n∧
i=1
ai(I˜ , x˜, xˆ, O).
Note that in Def. 5.3 every occurrence of the signals Iˆ , xˆ and x˜ in the local integration
assumptions ai is replaced by the corresponding counterpart signals I˜ , x˜ and xˆ that are
created by the cut operation. In brief, Def. 5.3 states that the integration assumptions of
every module must be guaranteed by the module’s environment.
The last criterion for compositional completeness considers the global integration
commitments. These commitments should follow from the global integration assump-
tions together with the local integration commitments, so that the global integration com-
mitments need to be sure that they specify every behavior that the modules of the system
can produce.
Definition 5.4. The local integration commitments ri imply the global integration com-
mitments rM under the global integration assumptions aM if the following implication
holds:
aM(I, O) ∧
n∧
i=1
ri(I, x, x,O)⇒ rM(I, O).
Note that in Def. 5.4 every occurrence of signals I˜ , xˆ and x˜ in aM , ri and rM is
substituted by the corresponding signals I and x, respectively.
So far, a set of criteria has been presented that allows determining whether the collec-
tion of property sets for all the modules form a complete property set for the composed
system.
Theorem 1. Let M be a system that is configured in a well-formed composition
from M1,M2, . . . ,Mn as indicated in Fig. 5.2 and that fulfills the following requirements:
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1. Every module Mi is completely verified by a property set Pi with respect to lo-
cal integration assumptions ai and local integration commitments ri on the system
model Mˆ that is obtained by performing the cut in Fig. 5.2.
2. The local integration assumptions ai as well as the global integration assump-
tions aM are implementable (Section 5.1.1).
3. The integration assumptions are structurally compatible with the system (Def. 5.1).
4. The local assumptions ai weaken the global assumptions aM (Def. 5.2).
5. The local assumptions ai are justified by aM and the local integration commit-
ments ri (Def. 5.3).
6. The global integration commitments rM follow from aM and the ri (Def. 5.4).
Then, the property set P =
⋃
i Pi completely verifies the system M with respect to the
integration assumptions aM and commitments rM .
Proof. In order to prove the completeness of the union of property sets, P , it is necessary
to show that
aM(I, O) ∧
∧
p∈P
p(I, x, x,O)⇒ rM(I, O)
is a tautology. For each module Mi it holds due to precondition 1 of Theorem 1:
ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O) ∧
∧
p∈Pi
p(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)⇒ ri(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O).
It follows that
∧
i
ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O) ∧
∧
p∈P
p(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)⇒
∧
i
ri(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)
and further
(aM(Iˆ , O) ∧ aM(I˜ , O) ∧
∧
i
ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O) ∧
∧
p∈P
p(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O))⇒
(aM(Iˆ , O) ∧ aM(I˜ , O) ∧
∧
i
ri(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)).
With condition 5, this implies
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(aM(Iˆ , O) ∧ aM(I˜ , O) ∧
∧
i
ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O) ∧
∧
p∈P
p(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O))⇒
aM(I˜ , O) ∧
∧
i
ai(I˜ , x˜, xˆ, O)). (5.3)
To close the dashed line created by the cut operation(see Fig. 5.2), the assume-guarantee
rule presented in Section 4.4 is applied. At the first glance, this assume-guarantee rule can
not be used directly here, because this rule is developed for systems without global reac-
tive constraints (“integration assumptions” in the context of completeness analysis) for
the inputs of the systems. In order to apply this rule, the model of the system can be
extended by the most general implementation of the global reactive constraints, i.e., as
circuit model the composition M ′ (represented by pi) together with the most general im-
plementation of aM(I˜ , O) is considered. In this circuit model, Formula 5.3 guarantees
that the assertions (aM(I˜ , O) ∧
∧
i ai(I˜ , x˜, xˆ, O)) are valid under the reactive constraints
(aM(Iˆ , O) ∧
∧
i ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)).
Another precondition for applying the assume-guarantee rule is that the constraints
(aM(Iˆ , O) ∧
∧
i ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)) must be implementable. Although the constraints aM and
ai are implementable individually (condition 2), it can not conclude that the constraints
aM ∧
∧
i ai are also implementable. For instance, Suppose aM := (i = o1) and ai := (i =
o2), every constraint can be trivially implemented by a wire, however, the constraints
aM ∧ ai are not implementable because they require their implementation’s inputs must
be equal for any environment, which is actually impossible for a circuit.
Therefore, as the next step, it needs to be shown that (aM(Iˆ , O) ∧
∧
i ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O))
is implementable. Here the implementability test presented in Section 4.2 can be ap-
plied. This test checks whether for every sequence of the signals x˜ and O, the constraint
(aM(Iˆ , O)∧
∧
i ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)) can generate an sequence of the signals xˆ and Iˆ . Obviously
this is the case for the local inputs xˆ, since every ai is implementable and every ai restricts
different sets of the local input variables. For the global inputs Iˆ , since aM and ai both
generate values for Iˆ , it needs to ensure that every of them can generate a set of input
value for every O and x˜, this is valid due to the implementability of aM and ai. It also
requires that for every O and x˜, the set of value {IaM} for Iˆ generated by aM and the sets
of value {Iai} generated by every ai fulfill the condition {IaM} ⊆
⋃
i{Iai}, and it is valid
due to precondition 2, which guarantees that every input sequence generated by the global
integration assumptions must be allowed by every local input integration commitment. In
summary, the constraints (aM(Iˆ , O) ∧
∧
i ai(Iˆ , xˆ, x˜, O)) are implementable.
The structural compatibility of the assumptions with the circuit model stated above is
assured by the precondition 3. Given all that, the assume-guarantee rule can be applied
to Formula 5.3, which proves the unbounded validity of the assertion
∧
i ai(I, x, x,O)
in every such system model M ′ without cut, and in particular in M with the reactive
constraint aM(I, O).
Due to condition 1, also every ri(I, x, x,O) is valid inM and with condition 6, rM(I, O)
follows.
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5.2 Experimental Results
In order to evaluate the usefulness of the completeness criteria developed in this research,
a software tool has been implemented within a SAT-based verification environment. This
tool has been successfully evaluated on two designs. The first is a system composed
of industrial IP blocks and based on Infineon’s Flexible Peripheral Interconnect (FPI)
bus. The second example is the “Minimal OpenRISC System on Chip (MinSoC)” from
www.opencores.org. Every criterion presented in the previous section has been fully
checked automatically and within 300 ms using less than 95 MB of memory on an In-
tel Core i7 CPU 860 at 2.8 GHz with 8 GB of RAM. The computational complexity is
small because only sets of integration conditions are checked against each other. The
design is not considered in these proofs. However, the conceptual complexity of these
sets of constraints can be quite daunting for a verification engineer and bugs in these con-
straints may be easily missed by manual review, as will be demonstrated below. Since
the computational resources required by the presented approach are low, the following
focuses only on examples of environment constraints and what problems can possibly be
detected by the approach.
5.2.1 The FPI Bus System
The FPI bus protocol is quite similar to the industry’s standard AMBA AHB bus protocol.
It also supports pipelined transactions to increase the throughput of the bus. The FPI bus
system considered here is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. It is composed of a master, a slave agent
and a master agent. The master is a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). Its bus interface
is not compatible with the FPI bus protocol, therefore it requires using a master agent to
adapt the GPU’s interface for reading and writing information from/to peripherals to the
particular FPI bus protocol. Each interface transaction of the GPU is translated into the
corresponding protocol transaction on the bus. Due to the pipelining features of the pro-
tocol, the master agent may handle two requests from the GPU simultaneously. The slave
agent operates similarly to the master agent, however, it does not initiate bus transactions.
GPU
master 
agent
slave 
agent
F
P
I 
b
u
s
Environment of the system
Figure 5.3: Example: FPI bus
The environment of this system is modeled by global integration assumptions. The
guarantees provided by the system are modeled by the global integration commitments.
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It is worth noting that the errors in the constraints of the master agent that were found by
the plausibility checks presented in Section 4.3, have been corrected for this experiment.
All modules have been completely verified by applying the OneSpin 360 DV property
checker [83] with its completeness analyzer under the global integration conditions and
the respective local integration conditions. As a rule of thumb, the effort of applying C-
IPC to an SoC module such as the ones considered here is about 2000 lines of code per
person month. The modules used in this case study were verified before the compositional
technique proposed here was available. Therefore, all integration conditions were initially
only inspected manually.
It was therefore interesting to apply the here presented automated checks to these
property suites, which were considered finished. In fact, it turned out that one local in-
tegration assumption of the integration conditions failed with respect to criterion 5 of
Theorem 1 in Section 5.1. The problematic integration assumption is related to the mas-
ter agent module and has about 400 lines of code. Therefore, due to space limitations,
by using a pseudo-code notation, only the relevant subexpressions that turned out to form
the bug are presented. It must be mentioned that these relevant subexpressions stem from
distant locations in the original source code. This explains why under these circumstances
the issue detected by these new automatic checks had been overlooked by the verification
team.
i f read = ’1 ’ or wr i t e = ’1 ’ then
opcode /= NOP;
end i f and
i f reques t = ’1 ’ then
opcode /= NOP;
e l s e
opcode = NOP;
end i f ;
Figure 5.4: Pseudo code related to the bug about opcode
The code snippet in Fig. 5.4 shows a fragment of the environment constraint for the
input opcode of the master agent. All variables in this code fragment of the constraint are
inputs to the DUV. The GPU asserts the request signal to issue a transaction. The read
and write inputs indicate a read or write transaction. The input signal opcode specifies the
transfer mode of a transaction. The constant value NOP for the signal opcode indicates
that the interface does not execute any transaction on the bus. At first glance, the above-
listed constraint assumes two restrictions for the opcode. First, it states that whenever the
processor asserts a request , the opcode must not be NOP , i.e., a read or write transaction
has to be started. Second, whenever the processor asserts the read or the write line to
indicate a read or a write transaction, the opcode must not be a NOP either. Note that this
constraint implies that (read ∨ write) ⇒ request is valid. This integration assumption of
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the master agent violates the condition 5 of Theorem 1, because the guarantee given by
the GPU allows for both, request to be asserted or not asserted when the read or write line
is set. In other words, the property set of the master agent covers fewer input sequences
than the GPU can provide to it, hence, in the composed system, the property sets do not
cover every behavior of the system. Assuming that the behavior of the GPU is reasonable,
since read and write signals are only evaluated when request = 1, if request = 0, then read
and write can be chosen to be either 0 or 1, whichever is suitable for circuit optimization.
i f read = ’1 ’ or wr i t e = ’1 ’ then
opcode /= NOP;
end i f and
i f reques t = ’1 ’ then
opcode /= NOP;
end i f ;
Figure 5.5: Possible fix for the bug related to opcode
This problem can be resolved by releasing the constraint a bit. A possible solution is
listed in Fig. 5.5. With this set of constraints, all the properties of the master agent can be
verified, and all the completeness criteria are fulfilled.
5.2.2 MinSoC
The technique presented in this dissertation was also evaluated on a MinSoC system from
www.opencores.org. The MinSoC system has a CPU core (or1200) and several periph-
erals, including SPI, JTAG, UART and ETH [96]. Here, a subset of this system is con-
sidered that is composed of the or1200 core, SPI, UART, RAM, ROM, and a startup
module which provides the initialization sequence for CPU after power-on. The or1200
core communicates with the rest of the modules via a Wishbone [96] bus.
Every module has been completely verified under global/local integration conditions.
The bugs found during the property checking process have been corrected and reported
back to the designers. The global/local integration conditions used fulfill all the criteria
of Theorem 1 in Section 5.1. Therefore, one can conclude that the system is completely
verified based on the verification results of each module.
Due to space limitations, only one example of an integration assumption of the SPI
module is shown here. The integration assumption is related to the behavior of the Wish-
bone interfaces.
In the reactive constraint illustrated in Fig. 5.7, the suffix i denotes the inputs to
the SPI module and the suffix o denotes the outputs. This constraint states that if a
request from the CPU is not yet acknowledged by the SPI module, then the CPU must
keep requesting. The determination conditions to the signals in this constraint are the de-
fault determination conditions introduced in Section 3.4.2. As mentioned above, the SPI
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CPU core
(or1200)
wishbone interface
SPI UART Startup ROM RAM
Figure 5.6: Example: MinSoC
i f wb cyc i = 1 and wb s tb i = 1 and
wb ack o = 0 then
next ( wb cyc i ) = 1 and
next ( wb s tb i ) = 1 ;
end i f ;
Figure 5.7: Pseudo code for wishbone protocol constraints
is completely verified under this integration assumption. The same behavior specified in
this integration assumption is also employed as an integration assumption for the other
modules, except for the CPU. In terms of Section 5.1.1, the integration assumption ob-
viously is implementable. It can be implemented using a few multiplexers and registers.
Clearly, this integration assumption is also structurally compatible with the SPI module
because all the outputs of the most general implementation of this integration assump-
tion are fed to registers, i.e., there are no combinational loops when composing the most
general implementation with the SPI module. The integration commitments of the SPI
module’s environment, namely the CPU, imply this integration assumption as well, since
syntactically it has the same structure as illustrated in Fig. 5.7, except that the input sig-
nals are replaced by the output signals of the CPU, and the output signals are replaced by
the input signals of the CPU. Therefore, it can be concluded that the system is completely
verified (considering a closed system composed of only the CPU and the SPI).
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Software Property Language
At present, there is a trend that more of the functionality in SoCs is shifted from the HW to
the SW, also to the hardware-dependent software. Hardware-dependent software, directly
interacting with its hardware environment, is a crucial component in an SoC that needs
to be tested rigorously, since other software layers, such as the operating systems and the
application software are built on it. Therefore there is an increasing need to apply formal
verification to hardware-dependent software, especially for safety-critical systems. The
interactions between HW and hardware-dependent software are often reactive, and hap-
pen in a temporal order. This requires new techniques to model the hardware-dependent
software, and it requires new property languages to specify the reactive behavior at the
HW and SW interfaces. In more detail, the computational model for hardware-dependent
software must not only include the functional behavior in terms of instruction computa-
tions, but also the addresses and data of all input/output (I/O) accesses and the ordering of
the I/O accesses for all program executions. At the same time, the property language for
such a computation model must support specifying the functional behavior of a software
program, and the temporal behavior at the HW and SW interface as well.
This chapter introduces a new property language to specify the reactive interactions
between the HW and the hardware-dependent software based on the software model pre-
sented in Section 6.2. The presented sequence-based property language makes it possible
to apply the method of checking the completeness of hardware properties, explained in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, to check the completeness of the software properties. The soft-
ware property language is introduced in Section 6.3. The criteria for checking the com-
pleteness of the software properties are given in Section 6.4. A case study to illustrate the
usage of the presented property language is shown in Section 6.5.
6.1 Introduction
Unlike the wide adoption of formal model checking for industrial hardware designs, func-
tional verification for software designs by formal methods is still mostly restricted to the
academic world. There, a lot of of research effort has been put into formal verification of
software designs, and many model checking tools have been developed. Like many model
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checkers for hardware, these tools usually model the software program by using (finite)
state transition systems. Some tools [24,97] are based on the explicit representation of the
states and the transitions between states, and suffer from the well-known state explosion
problem. In contrast, approaches like [60,98] represent the states and state transitions of a
software design implicitly by using BDDs. Then, model checking is conducted by apply-
ing the state exploration algorithms often used in hardware verification tools. SAT-based
approaches like [27–29] represent software programs in Boolean formulas and transform
the verification problems to SAT problems. All these approaches are aimed at verifying
software programs written in a high level programming language like C, which is inde-
pendent of the target hardware platforms. A good survey about the standard approaches
to software model checking tools can be found in [31].
However, the present dissertation focuses on the verification of hardware-dependent
software, which is the part of the software in an embedded system that interacts directly
with the surrounding hardware. Examples of such software are, e.g., drivers of peripher-
als, firmware to bring up a system, etc. This kind of software is a critical component in
embedded systems since all the other software layers (e.g., the operating system, the ap-
plication software, etc.) are built on top of it. Additionally, hardware-dependent software
in embedded systems performs control-intensive tasks with complex interactions with the
hardware and with other software layers, making its development error prone and its sys-
tems difficult to test. Therefore, it is particularly important to guarantee the correctness
of hardware-dependent software.
Because of the reactive behavior of HW/SW interactions, the specification languages
and validation methods, as they have been developed for application-level software, are
in many cases not suitable for hardware-dependent software. In [32] a joint model of
hardware-dependent software and the underlying microcontroller is created, then the states
and state transitions are represented and explored explicitly, which is not feasible for
microcontroller and software programs with industrial sizes. In [33, 34] a hardware-
dependent software program is unrolled by representing every execution step of the pro-
gram by an instance of the processor hardware, and then the properties are proved by
using SAT-based bounded model checking. The advantages of these approaches are that
full details both of the hardware and software are modeled, at the same time. Since the
software is represented as binary code stored in read-only memory (ROM), the interac-
tions between the processor and the ROM are modeled, and can be verified too. However,
these approaches create a copy of the whole system for every HW clock cycle of a soft-
ware program. A small program may easily exhaust the memory of a computer. In [40]
a combinational Boolean computational model, called program netlist, is also created by
unrolling the program. Instead of representing every step of the program execution by a
detailed copy of the hardware, the program netlist applies an abstracted hardware, which
is relevant to the instructions being executed. This significantly reduces the size of the
software model.
This chapter introduces a new property specification language for describing the be-
havior of hardware-dependent software programs, and it presents how the proposed verifi-
cation language can be used to perform formal verification based on the program netlist of
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a program. For generating a program netlist, path-oriented techniques related to symbolic
execution [99] are used. There has been much research on software testing/simulation
based on symbolic execution [35–39]. The idea is to apply symbolic values, e.g., the
variables’s names, to compute the outputs of a program. In this case, the output of a pro-
gram is a Boolean function of symbolic input values. Software testing (simulation) tools
based on symbolic execution do not need a complete model of a software program: they
generate and analyze the execution path of the software program one by one. In contrast,
model checking needs a model that fully captures the behavior of the design. The work
of [40] introduces a way to generate such a model, and Section 6.2 gives details on what
this model, i.e., program netlist, looks like.
Furthermore, this dissertation will present how the language presented in Section 6.3
can be used in conjunction with the program netlist in order to perform formal prop-
erty checking. Unlike methods based on symbolic execution, in which the properties are
proven by explicitly traversing the possible execution paths of a given program, this dis-
sertation adopts the approach of [40], which employs a SAT solver in order to perform
this traversal. A SAT proof benefits from the control logic in the program netlist by being
able to focus on the execution paths that are important for the particular problem instance
and to prune at once entire execution paths that are not relevant. The effectiveness of this
approach has been shown in [40]. In order to use a SAT solver for path traversal, it is nec-
essary to create a combined model containing the logic for the property and the program
netlist, so that the SAT solver has “a global view of the verification problem” (instead of
having only a view of the problem for individual execution paths). For a global view, a
model of the input/output sequences of the software is synthesized and integrated to the
model (see Section 6.3).
State of the art software property languages
Besides continuous advances in methods and algorithms for formal property checking of
hardware designs, an important role in the adoption of formal verification techniques in
industry in the last few years has also been played by the languages for formulating prop-
erties. For instance, SVA and PSL allow concisely specifying the behavior of the hard-
ware, which is typically described at the RTL. While being founded in a strictly defined
mathematical framework, these property languages include various syntactic enhance-
ments offering a natural and easy way to capture the temporal behavior of the design.
Current commercial technology allows checking assertions using simulation or formal
verification engines.
There are currently a number of different approaches to formalizing the properties of
embedded software. In the most simple case, static analysis tools [100,101] automatically
check that the software is free of common errors such as null pointer dereference, memory
leaks, out of boundary access to arrays, etc. In these proofs no functional properties of the
software are proved and therefore the verification engineer isn’t required to specify any
properties. Because of the reactive behavior of embedded software, it is not sufficient to
only specify the pre/post conditions [86] for a program: the interaction between the hard-
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ware and software must also be specified. This interaction is often a temporal behavior,
which requires a property specification language that can support formulating it.
Run-time assertions are being used widely for the testing [102] and formal verifica-
tion [27, 28] of embedded software. For example, high-level programming languages
like C provide the assert() statement for specifying predicates over the values of the pro-
gram variables. The main use of run-time assertions is to describe properties that are
valid locally. More specifically, this kind of property is evaluated only when a program
run reaches the location where the involved assert() statement has been placed. While
run-time assertions have the advantage that the user is not required to learn a new lan-
guage in order to specify the properties, their main limitation is in what can be expressed.
For the case of application software or for simple transformational code, run-time asser-
tions may be sufficient. However, for hardware-dependent software, it is necessary to be
able to describe reactive behavior relating to the inputs, outputs and states of the soft-
ware and hardware at different points in time. For specifying temporal behavior, temporal
logics such as CTL and LTL can be used. There exist verification tools such as [24, 32]
that accept temporal formulas directly as a property specification language. However, al-
though CTL and LTL are powerful in formulating temporal relationships, they are hard to
understand and use in practice.
Other tools, such as [103, 104], in a similar way, employ automata in order to specify
temporal properties. The use of automata can be convenient in many cases since they are
easier to understand by a designer or verification engineer than the temporal formulas in
CTL or LTL. However, except for simple cases, the process of modeling a property using
an automaton is cumbersome and error prone.
Unlike the approaches mentioned previously, this dissertation presents a new verifica-
tion language for hardware-dependent embedded software, which allows specifying the
temporal behavior of the interactions between the software and hardware. The proposed
language is intuitive and easy for the verification engineer to use. It allows referring to
the interfaces of the software and explicitly describing the sequences of the input/output
operations at these interfaces. It adopts many syntactic elements from the C language,
which makes learning the new language easy for software engineers. The language facil-
itates the re-use of verification code by providing features like macros and functions. To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first research on a property language for hardware-
dependent embedded software with the characteristics mentioned above. The property
language proposed here can be employed for simulation or verification purposes.
Since formal verification examines every possible input scenario, the usual coverage
criteria evaluating the quality of the test cases for software are not suitable for formal
property checking. In the case of software property checking, verification engineers face
the same problem as engineers in hardware verification: “Does my property set cover ev-
ery aspect of the design?”. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 a number of methods for coverage
analysis attempting to prove that a hardware property set is “complete” were introduced.
In these approaches, a set of safety properties is called a complete specification or sim-
ply complete if it uniquely describes the behavior of a design. More precisely, these
methods prove the completeness of a property set by means of checking to what extent
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the property set uniquely specifies the input and output behavior of a hardware design.
Based on these results, Section 6.4 will present a method for proving the completeness of
software properties specified in the software property language presented in Section 6.3.
Such a completeness check is of particular importance for software property sets, because
a complete set of properties can, at least in principle, fully replace classical software tests.
A typical source of error when writing software is that the programmer simply forgets
to treat certain input sequences in the program, causing undefined behavior when these
inputs occur at runtime. Also, a verification engineer may forget to specify tests (or,
in our case, properties) for such missing input sequences, so that the bug can escape
verification. The completeness check presented in this chapter removes such gaps in
the verification. Because of the similarity between hardware and hardware-dependent
software, the presented method for proving the completeness of software property sets
checks whether every input/output sequence is specified by a property in the set. The
checking algorithm leverages the property language presented in this dissertation, which
allows referring to the interfaces of the software program in order to describe its reactive
and sequential behavior.
6.2 Hardware-Dependent Software Model
In this section, the basic characteristics of the HW-dependent software model underly-
ing the proposed language is briefly reviewed. The model is called program netlist. A
complete description of it and how it is generated can be found in [40].
A program netlist is a combinational circuit that compactly represents the software
that is executed on the underlying hardware. In order to generate a program netlist, the
control flow graph (CFG) is extracted from a low-level description of the software pro-
gram, such as assembly or machine code. Every node in the CFG represents an instruc-
tion of the program and the associated program state (PS). The PS includes the contents
of data memory associated with the variables used in the program, and the architecture
state (AS), defining the state of the processor’s registers that are visible to the program-
mer. An edge between two CFG nodes indicates a possible execution from one instruction
to another one.
An additional Boolean signal, called active, is attached to PS in order to model the
control flow of the program. This signal is propagated alongside the nodes in the program
netlist and helps the SAT solver to efficiently explore the possible execution paths of the
program. The active signal, when set to 1, indicates that a given node (instruction) belongs
to the active execution path. In the case that a node has more than one successor (e.g.,
nodes related to jump/branch instructions), exactly one branch is active at any time.
The CFG is fully unrolled into an execution graph (EXG). An EXG is a directed
acyclic graph containing all possible execution paths of the program. An execution path
always begins at a start state of the program and ends at an end state. The CFG is unrolled
by unwinding the loops of the program. Figure 6.1 illustrates an example of unrolling.
In order to reduce the complexity of the model, only branches that are part of at least
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Figure 6.1: Generating the Program Netlist (PN)
one possible execution path are processed. A SAT solver can be used to identify such
branches. Alternatively, this process of identifying branches can be accelerated by using
the simulation technique presented in [105]. The unrolling ends when all active branches
have been processed and the end of the program has been reached. In addition, in order
to minimize the size of the model, nodes belonging to identical program locations are
merged. In this manner, an EXG is obtained, in which a single node may be shared
by different execution paths. Merging is only allowed if it does not insert loops into
the EXG. A program netlist is then obtained from the EXG by replacing every node
by its corresponding instruction cell. An instruction cell is a piece of combinational
logic circuitry describing the functional behavior of an ISA instruction according to the
specific CPU architecture at hand. Consecutive instruction cells are connected by buses
representing the program state. It is worth mentioning that instruction cells need to be
defined for every kind of processor. However, this should not burden the verification
engineers when they verify the processor (hardware) by writing properties with the format
introduced in [106]. As described in [106], every property applied to verify the processor
is an instruction cell, which can be reused for generating the program netlist.
A kind of instruction that is especially relevant to this work are load/store instructions
which are used to communicate with the program’s environment, e.g., the hardware pe-
riphery or other software layers. Instruction cells corresponding to such instructions are
equipped with additional input and output ports, as shown in Fig. 6.2. These ports are
called pdata, ploc and pact and represent respectively the data value, the accessed loca-
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tion and the active flag indicating the activeness of the related instruction cell. Depending
on whether the instruction cell reads or writes, pdata is an input or output signal. These
three signals of an instruction cell constitute an access port for I/O memory locations.
In the sequel, the term program location indicates a memory location storing an in-
struction, and the term memory location is used to indicate an address corresponding to a
location of the hardware periphery or a memory variable.
In the program netlist, instructions that access data memory require additional con-
straints so that the behavior of the data memory is also modeled [107]. Therefore, for
each instruction cell that reads from data memory, there is a multiplexer structure that
selects the last valid value written to the memory location being read by the instruction.
In the case that a program depends on external events, e.g., by means of shared vari-
ables/channels, additional access ports of the respective instruction cell are left open or
unconstrained as shown in Fig. 6.2. These access ports serve as the interfaces of the
program, as will be further explained in the next section.
PS
PS’
Instruction
logic
pdata
ploc
pact
I/O Instruction cell program
’s environm
ent
Figure 6.2: Instruction cell with ports for accessing the environment
6.3 Software Property Language
This section presents how to describe the interaction between the hardware and software
in terms of I/O sequences, and how the model of the sequences can be synthesized and
combined with the underlying model of the software in order to perform formal property
checking. As explained earlier, this is necessary in order to capture the reactive behavior
exhibited by hardware-dependent software. An additional advantage is that a model of the
sequences allows mapping the elements of the language to the elements of the underlying
software model in a straightforward way. Subsequently, in terms of such sequences, a
property language can be developed. The current working name for this language is
RSPL (Reactive Software Property Language).
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In the following, the main syntactic elements of RSPL are introduced. Since the pro-
gramming language C is widely used for embedded software, the presented property lan-
guage adopts many operators and syntax elements from C. For example, RSPL inherits
from C the standard arithmetic, Boolean and comparison operators, which are summa-
rized in Fig. 6.3.
/ / comparators
== ( equal ) , ! = ( not equal )
>= ( g r e a t e r than or equal )
<= ( l e s s than or equal )
> ( g r e a t e r than ) , < ( l e s s than )
/ / Boolean o p e r a t o r s
&& ( l o g i c a l and ) , | | ( l o g i c a l or )
! ( l o g i c a l not )
/ / a r i t h m e t i c o p e r a t o r s
+ ( a d d i t i o n ) , - ( s u b s t r a c t i o n )
* ( m u l t i p l i c a t i o n ) , / ( d i v i s i o n )
% ( modulo )
/ / b i t w i s e o p e r a t o r s
& ( b i t w i s e and ) , | ( b i t w i s e or )
ˆ ( b i t w i s e xor ) , ˜ ( ones complement )
<< ( s h i f t l e f t ) , >> ( s h i f t r i g h t )
Figure 6.3: Comparators and Operators
6.3.1 The Interfaces of a Hardware-Dependent Program
A property language for hardware-dependent software needs to provide a means for refer-
ring to the interfaces of a given program. In contrast to hardware description languages,
software programs in high-level languages such as C do not explicitly capture their inter-
faces in a separate entity. For hardware-dependent software, the elements of the interface
correspond to a set of addresses identifying, for example, registers inside hardware pe-
ripherals or shared memory locations used for communication with the operating system
or with the application code. In view of the program netlist, such interface elements
are modeled by means of access ports belonging to input/output instruction cells as ex-
plained in Section 6.2. In RSPL each of these addresses is assigned a name. In the case
of compiled machine code, these names can be automatically obtained from the symbol
table dumped by a cross-compiler. Otherwise, variable names can be defined manually
by the user to enhance the readability of the verification code. In order to distinguish the
action of reading a variable (as input) from the action of writing a variable (as output),
two variable attributes are introduced to the property language, namely read and write,
as depicted in Fig. 6.4. This is the basis for referring to all input/output operations. Note
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〈Name of v a r i a b l e 〉’read
〈Name of v a r i a b l e 〉’ w r i t e
Figure 6.4: read/write attributes
that an address can be read and written several times. How this can be handled by the
property language and how the verification engineer can refer to the different read and
write instances is described below in Section 6.3.2.
There are also cases in which it is necessary to refer to the programmer-visible reg-
isters, for example when separately verifying a subroutine of a software driver. In such
cases the content of a register can be expressed using the following syntax.
$〈Name of register〉’ start
$〈Name of register〉’end
The attributes “start” and “end” indicate the start and the end of the program, respec-
tively.
6.3.2 Sequences of Variables
The sequence is the key concept of RSPL; it is inspired by sequences in hardware property
languages like SVA [89]. A sequence in SVA is constructed using the delay operator #,
which specifies the relative clock cycles (delay) between two events. However, the se-
mantics of sequences from SVA can not be directly imported to RSPL, since a sequence
in SVA is defined over cycles which are relative to a global time reference such as a
hardware clock. Models used for software (and in particular the program netlist) are not
accurate with respect to hardware clock cycles, but rather instruction-accurate. Therefore,
sequences are defined relative to the ordering of instruction executions. As illustrated in
Fig. 6.5, RSPL provides users with a way to define the individual elements of a sequence.
Several such elements may be combined using Boolean operators in order to form se-
quences. The symbol # is defined as the element accessor for sequences and the natural
number n represents the n-th element of a sequence. Since not every instruction accesses
the interface of the program, the element n is the n-th occurrence of the associated in-
terface variable along an execution path of a program (as opposed to the n-th instruction
along that path). A software tool evaluating properties written in RSPL needs to map the
〈Name of v a r i a b l e 〉’read #〈n〉
〈Name of v a r i a b l e 〉’ w r i t e #〈n〉
Figure 6.5: Element Accessor
elements of a sequence to the respective access ports in the program netlist. Because of
the merging mechanism used to generate a program netlist, an input/output instruction cell
can belong to several different execution paths. In other words, along an execution path
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an access port might be the i-th sequence element of a variable, whereas along another
path, it might correspond to the j-th (j 6= i) sequence element of the same variable.
In the following, an algorithm is presented to map elements of sequences to the corre-
sponding access ports in the program netlist. This algorithm is the basis for building the
property logic for a SAT-based proof engine. To simplify the presentation, in the sequel,
only the memory locations of the input/output variables are considered, not their symbol
names, since this relationship can be established easily through the symbol table. The
term memory location is used to refer to both an input or output variable, as defined in
Section 6.3.1, if the use is clear from the context.
The first step in the algorithm is a topological sorting of the nodes in the execution
graph. Every node is assigned a unique index m, with m ∈ N, such that along every
execution path the (instruction) node indexed with i is executed earlier than the node
indexed with j, if i < j. In the sequel, for ease of explanation, a node is referred to by
its index in the topological order. Each memory location Lock is associated with a set of
nodes accessing this location, i.e., W = {i1, i2, . . . , i|W |} with ij < ij+1 and 1 ≤ j <
|W |. The access port APij for a node ij is composed of pdataij , pactij , and plocij = Lock,
corresponding to the signal names in Fig. 6.2.
Algorithm 3 compute index of the node associated with n-th sequence element
1: function COMP INDEX(n)
2: if n = 1 then
3: if pacti1 = true then
4: return i1
5: else if pacti2 = true then
6: return i2
7: . . .
8: else if pacti|W | = true then
9: return i|W |
10: else
11: return 0
12: end if
13: else
14: if pactin = true ∧ comp index(n− 1) < in then
15: return in
16: else if pactin+1 = true ∧ comp index(n− 1) < in+1 then
17: return in+1
18: . . .
19: else if pacti|W | = true ∧ comp index(n− 1) < i|W | then
20: return i|W |
21: else
22: return 0
23: end if
24: end if
25: end function
Given a memory location Lock, to map the n-th element (1 ≤ n ≤ |W |) of Lock’s
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sequence to an access port APij , the challenging task is to find the index ij of the node
related to this element. The function comp index(n), depicted in pseudo-code notation in
Algo. 3, performs this task. It is generated for every memory location Lock. The function
port mapping() of Algo. 4 is based on comp index(). It connects the n-th element of the
sequence to an access port in the program netlist.
The formulation of comp index() is based on the fact that at any time, exactly one
execution path of a program is active. An active path is characterized by the nodes in
the program netlist whose active flags are asserted. In summary, comp index() works as
follows: To determine the n-th element of a sequence along any execution path, it first
checks the active flag of the node with index in: this is the very first node that could be the
n-th element of a sequence. It also examines whether the (n − 1)-th element along that
path exists already, by checking whether the index of the node associated with (n− 1)-th
element is smaller than the index of the current node. If both conditions are met, then
the n-th element of the sequence is known to exist and the corresponding index can be
returned. Otherwise the function moves on to the next candidate until a node related to the
being searched element is found or does not exist. The comp index function can be used
to test whether an element of a sequence exists on a given path (by testing whether the
result of comp index is zero). This function is also used for verifying the execution order
(cf. Section 6.3.3) of the sequence elements that are related to different memory locations
(variables).
With the ability to obtain the index ij of the node related to the n-th element of a
sequence, it is straightforward to map the n-th element of the sequence to the access port
APij . The function port mapping depicted in Algo. 4 performs this task.
Algorithm 4 Map sequence to access port
1: function PORT MAPPING(n)
2: if comp index(n) = i1 then
3: return pdatai1
4: else if comp index(n) = i2 then
5: return pdatai2
6: . . .
7: else if comp index(n) = i|W | then
8: return pdatai|W |
9: else
10: return UNDEFINED
11: end if
12: end function
In the remainder of this dissertation, for simplicity, the term variable is used for both
an element of an input/output sequence and for the state of a register at the start node/end
node of the program.
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6.3.3 Execution Order
Besides being able to relate software accesses to the same location at different points in
time, in many cases it is also important to specify a temporal order of accesses to different
memory locations. For instance, in order to issue a new transaction, a peripheral device
may require that its driver first write the configuration/data register of the device at mem-
ory location Loc1, and then set the start flag at memory location Loc2; not maintaining
this order could result in undefined behavior of the device. Obviously, the property spec-
ification ”Loc 1’write#1 == Config Data && Loc 2’write#1 == Start” is insufficient for this re-
quirement, since this statement does not define which of the two accesses, ”Loc 1’write#1”
and ”Loc 2’write#1”, is to be executed first by the software driver.
In RSPL, the temporal ordering of accesses to different locations can be specified
using the execution order section in a property. A user may specify an execution order
between an input and an output, two inputs related to two different memory locations
and two outputs related to two different memory locations. Checking the execution order
is implemented by comparing the results of the functions comp index for the respective
sequence elements. Taking the example from above, if the returned value of the func-
tion comp index for ”Loc 1’write#1” is smaller than the returned value of this function for
”Loc 2’write#1”, then ”Loc 1’write#1” is executed first. The syntax definition and an exam-
ple of an execution order specification are given in Fig. 6.6.
/ / e x e c u t i o n order d e f i n i t i o n
e x e c u t i o n o r d e r :
〈sequence element〉 > 〈sequence element〉 ;
/ / examples
e x e c u t i o n o r d e r :
c o n f i g ’ w r i t e #1 > S t a r t ’ w r i t e # 1 ;
c o n f i g ’ w r i t e #2 > S t a r t ’ w r i t e # 1 ;
c o n f i g ’read #1 > c o n f i g ’ w r i t e # 1 ;
Figure 6.6: Execution Order
6.3.4 Safety and Liveness Properties
So far, the basic concepts and building blocks of the property language have been intro-
duced. This section will present how to use them to build a property, and it will show
what kinds of properties a verification engineer can specify with RSPL.
A property begins with the keyword property, followed by a valid identifier. The
general structure of the property body follows an assumption/guarantee style. The body
consists of two optional sections, execution order and assume, and one mandatory sec-
tion, prove. The assume part specifies the circumstances under which the assertion as
specified in the execution order and prove parts is to be checked. If the assumption part
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is denoted by a predicate a, the prove part by c and the execution order part by o, then a
property p is translated to the Boolean formula p := a→ (c ∧ o).
Given a property p, a verification engineer can instruct the property checker to check
it as a safety property or as a liveness property. As illustrated in Fig. 6.7, a safety property
is indicated by the keyword “always”, and a liveness property is indicated by the keyword
“eventually” .
/ / Example o f property
property example1 ;
/ / assumption part
assume :
$R5’ s t a r t == 2;
/ / prove part
prove :
d a t a o u t ’ w r i t e #1 == d a t a i n ’read #1 + 4;
$R4’end == 0;
/ / e x e c u t i o n order part
e x e c u t i o n o r d e r :
d a t a o u t ’ w r i t e #1 > d a t a i n ’read # 1;
endproperty
/ / s a f e t y property
i n s t 1 : always example1 ;
/ / l i v e n e s s property
i n s t 2 : e v e n t u a l l y example1 ;
Figure 6.7: Safety- /Liveness- Property
The semantics of “safety/liveness” is defined by evaluating the execution paths of a
program. In contrast to the Kripke models used in LTL or CTL model checking, the
program netlist contains a finite number of paths of finite length. This greatly simplifies
the evaluation of safety and liveness properties. A safety property “always p” means that
on every execution path (from a start state to an end state of the program), the property p
holds. This is similar to the LTL property G p, however, applied to a finite-length path.
A liveness property “eventually p” means that there exists at least one execution path on
which the property p holds. This is similar to the meaning of the CTL property EG p. It
is straightforward to check the safety property using an SAT solver. In order to check a
liveness property, one only needs to check the safety property “always ¬p”. In case this
property holds, one may conclude that the corresponding liveness property fails.
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6.3.5 Syntax Extensions
With the language elements presented so far, a user of RSPL is able to capture the reactive
behavior of the software programs considered in this dissertation. In this section, a num-
ber of extensions to the syntax are introduced that do not increase its expressive power
but make the property notation easier and more compact.
In the following, a variable var represents either an input (with attribute read) or an
output (with attribute write). The symbol ./ represents an arbitrary comparison operator,
and expr represents any valid expression at either side of a comparison operator. The
accessors depicted in Fig. 6.8 can be used to access a range of sequence elements related
to a variable var. Every element is compared with the expression expr. If all comparison
operations evaluate to true, then the result of this statement is true, otherwise it evaluates
to false.
var # [m: n ] ./ expr :=
( var #m ./ expr ) && ( var # (m+ 1) ./ expr ) && . . . && ( var # n ./ expr )
with m ≤ n and m,n ∈ N
Figure 6.8: Access a range of elements (Universal)
The dual case is handled by the accessor depicted in Fig. 6.9: it evaluates to true if the
comparison operations return true at least N times in sequence.
var # EN[m: n ] ./ expr :=
( var #m ./ expr ) | | ( var # (m+ 1) ./ expr ) | | . . . | | ( var # n ./ expr )
with m ≤ n, 0 < N < m− n, K ≥ N , and m,n,N ∈ N ,
where K represents the number of terms evaluated true
Figure 6.9: Access a range of elements (Existential)
The function exists tests whether a sequence element exists on an execution path.
In a safety property exists (var#1) checks whether var#1 exists for every execution path,
whereas in a liveness property it checks whether this element can be generated/consumed
at least once during the execution of the program. This function can also be used to
check whether the assume part of a property always evaluates to false due to non-existing
sequence elements. Again, a SAT-based property checker can implement these checks
using comp index().
An If-Then-Else statement is applicable to Boolean expressions. It specifies a condi-
tional requirement for a program. Its semantics is defined by Boolean implication p→ q,
which is equivalent to the Boolean expression ¬p ∨ q. The “else” part is optional.
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i f ( blexpr1 )
blexpr2 ;
e l s e
blexpr3 ;
e n d i f ;
Its semantics is equivalent to
(blexpr1 → blexpr2) ∧ (¬blexpr1→ blexpr3)
6.4 Completeness of Property Sets
The completeness of a set of properties for a hardware design can be proven by using
design-independent approaches such as [48, 80]. The presented approach here is closely
related to [80], which is explained in more detail in Section 3.4.2. This method proves
that two models of a design satisfying a set of properties {pi} are sequentially equivalent
in terms of input/output sequences. What input and output values are considered and at
what time points (clock cycles) is specified by the user in terms of so-called determination
conditions. For example, a “data” signal needs to be uniquely determined by the design
whenever a corresponding “valid” signal is asserted. A complete property set fulfills
this determination condition if every property specifies the expected “data” value at the
time points when the “valid” signal becomes asserted. Note that a property set can be
checked for completeness independently of any design implementation for which this
set of properties holds, because only the relationships between the signal names in the
properties are checked. This idea can also be transferred to software properties written
in RSPL and results in the following definition for the completeness of a set of properties:
Definition 31. A set of RSPL properties is called complete, iff
1. there exists a property with a matching assume part for every possible input se-
quence applied to the program, and
2. every property uniquely specifies every output sequence produced by the program
under the input sequences specified in the assume part.
Testing the two conditions of Def. 31 can be directly implemented in two checks,
called the Determination Test and the Case Split Test.
6.4.1 Determination Test
Unlike hardware that generates output sequences for every time point (clock cycle),
hardware-dependent software may produce output sequences of varying length, depend-
ing on the input sequences applied to the program. For instance, depending on the con-
figuration data given by the program’s environment, a software driver may perform burst
write operations with 2 or 4 beats of data transfer, causing sequences with 2 or 4 elements,
respectively. If design-independent methods are used, the completeness checker needs to
know how many elements of sequences should every property at least specify. Denoting
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these values for every output in every property is tedious and error-prone. Therefore, for
checking the completeness of RSPL property sets, one has to give up on the design inde-
pendence of a completeness criterion. Instead, the method presented here makes use of
the software model to determine how long the checked sequences are on each program
execution.
In order to ensure that every output signal is uniquely determined by the property set,
two steps are performed. The first step ensures that every property describes every element
of all the output sequences that are produced under all matching input sequences specified
in the assumption part of the property. This problem is resolved with the help of the design
under verification,M , and the comp index function. For simplicity, in the following it will
be assumed that the properties are written in a causal form, expressed as an implication
between a cause (property assumption) and an effect (property commitment). This causal
form is given if the input sequences are specified in the assume part of the property and
the expected output behavior is specified in the prove and execution order parts. Given
a property p := a → (c ∧ o), by syntactic analysis, it must be trivial to identify the
maximum sequence length k of any output sequence specified in the property. Then it has
to be checked whether k is the maximum element generated by the software model M
under the assumption a. For this purpose, the comp index(k+1) function with respect to
the assumption a is applied: if this function returns a non-zero value, this means that
the program can output a sequence with at least k + 1 elements. The property under
consideration does not specify this output sequence element, hence, a verification gap
has been detected. Similarly, if a property does not mention at all some output produced
by the program, this kind of gap can be detected by checking for a non-zero return of
comp index(1) for that output. A list of all possible outputs of a program can be easily
obtained when synthesizing the model of the program.
Once it is certified that every property describes every possible element of all output
sequences, the next step checks whether these output sequences are determined uniquely,
i.e., whether, along any execution path, the property specifies exactly one value for every
element of the output sequence. This can be done for every property, independently of
the software model. Let p be a property containing a set of signals {vi} (composed of
a set of inputs {xj : j ∈ N, j ≤ m} and a set of outputs {on : n ∈ N, n ≤ l}) and
the corresponding sequence elements {vkvii : kvi ∈ N6=0, kvi ≤ tvi}. A copy p′ of p
is created by considering a copied set {v′i} of the variables appearing in the property
and imposing the property on the copied variable set. The property p determines the
outputs {on} uniquely iff the following formula is a tautology
(p ∧ p′ ∧
m∧
j=0
txj∧
kxj=1
(x
kxj
j = x
′
j
kxj ))→
l∧
n=0
ton∧
kon=1
(okonn = o
′
n
kon )
Note that in this formula, every element of each input sequence of the software pro-
gram is assumed to be determined, and every element of each output sequence needs to
be proven for determination. It is straightforward to adapt this formula to weaker deter-
mination conditions that allow some of the sequence elements to not be determined.
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6.4.2 Case Split Test
The case split test checks whether the property set covers every possible input sequence.
Given a set of properties pi with their respective assumption parts ai, the case split test is
conducted by proving that the formula
∨
i ai is a tautology.
6.4.3 The Completeness Criterion
Theorem 2. If and only if a set of RSPL properties {pi} passes both the Determination
Test and the Case Split Test, then the property set is complete according to Def. 31.
Proof: The theorem is true by Def. 31 because the Case Split Test checks for the fulfill-
ment of condition 1 of Def. 31 and the Determination Test checks for the fulfillment of
condition 2. 2
6.5 Case Study
The property language developed in this dissertation has been successfully applied to
specifying properties for an industrial software driver for a Local Interconnect Network
(LIN) master node [108]. The software was developed by Infineon Technology AG. Note
that the focus of this chapter is on the challenges of specifying complete sets of properties
for this type of software, not on the proving techniques.
The properties shown in this case study have already been proven earlier [40], based
on a manual construction of checker automata which were added to a program netlist
model of the software. This section presents the formulation of these properties in RSPL.
The hardware peripheral controlled by the software driver is a UART (Universal Asyn-
chronous Receiver/Transmitter), connected to physical LIN bus lines. A LIN bus is com-
posed of one master node and several slave nodes. Data is transmitted on the LIN bus
in so-called frames. A frame is composed of several fields: a header, up to 8 bytes of
data, and a checksum. The master node is responsible for sending the header field, which
is composed of a break field indicating the start of a new frame, a sync byte field used
for synchronization, and an identifier (ID) field. Slave nodes evaluate the identifier field
and, if there is a match, then the corresponding slave node either sends or receives the
data. The LIN driver code under consideration implements a master node. It supports six
fixed-valued IDs. It can send or receive 2, 4 or 8 bytes of data for each of the six IDs.
Data is communicated with the application software through shared memory locations,
which serve as the interface of the LIN driver.
The first example of the property in Fig. 6.10 specifies the transmission of a frame,
according to the protocol specification for the LIN bus. For reasons of space, only the case
for data length of 2 bytes is shown. Furthermore, for readability, the names of variables
and constants are used, instead of their memory addresses. The variables data1 and data2
store the payload data provided by the application software. The s id are shared variables,
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property l i n m a s t e r t r a n s m i t s 2 b y t e s ;
assume :
s i d ’read #1 == C ID0 ;
prove :
/ / master ta sk
uart ’ w r i t e #1 == C BREAK;
uart ’ w r i t e #2 == C SYNC;
uart ’ w r i t e #3 == C ID0 ;
/ / s l a v e task
/ / an example for undetermined uart’write#4 would be
/ / uart’write#4 == 1 || uart’write#4 == 0;
uart ’ w r i t e #4 == data1’read # 1;
uart ’ w r i t e #5 == data2’read # 1;
uart ’ w r i t e #6 == CHECKSUM;
e x e c u t i o n o r d e r :
data1’read #1 > uart ’ w r i t e # 4 ;
data2’read #1 > uart ’ w r i t e # 5 ;
endproperty ;
/ / s a f e t y property
i n s t 1 : always l i n m a s t e r t r a n s m i t s 2 b y t e s ;
Figure 6.10: LIN TX Frame 2 Bytes
storing the ID that needs to be transferred to the slave task. The symbol uart refers to the
Tx/Rx buffer of the UART.
In the following, the prefix “C ” indicates a constant value. C ID0 identifies a 2-byte
transmission. CHECKSUM abstracts the “checksum” computation.
It is also necessary to define an execution order section in the property in order to
specify that the data must be available before it is transmitted.
Note that a program that does not support C ID0 at all may nevertheless fulfill the
property in Fig. 6.10. Therefore it needs to check the liveness property in Fig. 6.11 in
order to make sure that at some point in time a C ID = frame is indeed sent to the UART.
Fig.6.12 shows the use of the exists function in a property that checks whether the
driver is capable of transmitting 8-byte data frames.
Obviously, the safety property in Fig. 6.10 does not completely specify the entire
program. It specifies only the case that the LIN master transmits 2 bytes of data to a
slave. The case split test presented in Section 6.4 identifies the missing cases by checking
whether there exists a corresponding property for every value of s id. The comments
section of this property shows an example of a failing determination test for a sequence
element, where this statement states that the value of ”uart’write#4” could be either 0 or
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property l i n t e s t C I D 0 ;
prove :
uart ’ w r i t e #3 == C ID0 ;
endproperty ;
/ / l i v e n e s s property
i n s t 2 : e v e n t u a l l y l i n t e s t C I D 0 ;
Figure 6.11: LIN Liveness
property l i n t e s t s u p p o r t 8 b y t e s ;
prove :
e x i s t s ( uart ’ w r i t e # 1 1 ) ;
endproperty ;
i n s t 3 : e v e n t u a l l y l i n t e s t s u p p o r t 8 b y t e s ;
Figure 6.12: LIN Liveness 2
1. Thus, the value of this variable is not unique: Suppose that ”uart’write#4” is a Boolean
variable. Then the expression in the statement evaluates to true. Hence, the property
proves nothing about this variable.
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Summary
Nowadays, simulation is still the dominant technique applied to verify System-on-Chip
designs. A testbench is responsible for generating test patterns for the design under ver-
ification. Such test patterns must be carefully selected so that as many of the design’s
functional aspects as possible are simulated. In order to evaluate the quality of test pat-
terns, several coverage criteria are used. In contrast, formal property checking takes care
of every possible input of a design, and it proves the properties of the design. Usually
every property describes one aspect of the overall functionality of the design. Hence,
for property checking, the coverage criteria from simulation are no longer applicable.
However, a verification engineer still wants to know how many functionalities have been
covered by the properties he/she wrote. In order to evaluate the coverage of properties,
this dissertation adopted the coverage criterion from [80], which proves that a property
set is complete, i.e., a complete property set uniquely covers every input sequence and
every output sequence of the DuV. In general, checking the completeness of a property
set for a DuV is as complex as the problem of checking the sequential equivalence of
two circuits. The work of [41] considers an abstract state machine of the DuV and splits
this overall proof into several subproofs by only considering a pair of properties at once.
Every pair of properties indicates two possible consecutive transitions in the abstract state
machine of the DuV. The limitation of this approach is that one has to manually extract
the abstract state machine, and to make sure that the DuV contains exactly only one such
state machine.
Divide-and-Conquer is one of the most intuitive ways to handle design complexity
and to overcome the limitation of design/verification methodologies like the example pre-
sented above. Usually a system is divided into serval modules. Every module is de-
signed/verified separately. However, for today’s SoC systems, a module never works
standalone, it works correctly under the assumption that its environment behaves cor-
rectly. When a design engineer implements such a module, he/she makes an implicit
assumption about the correct input sequences for the module. For example, for a module
in a communication protocol, the engineer assumes that the inputs of the module obey
the protocol. For verifying such a module and to save time and resources of verification,
environment constraints are needed that restrict the inputs of the DuV to only have the
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values that are produced by the DuV’s environment. Since the SoC modules are mostly
reactive, the environment constraints applied to verify every module are also mostly re-
active. For modules related to communication protocols, the reactive constraints can be
obtained from the specifications of the protocols. For other modules, the verification en-
gineers have to contact the design engineer or analyze the implementation code to get
the environment constraints. Environment constraints are important for coverage analysis
too, and save writing unnecessary and redundant test cases or properties for simulation or
for property checking respectively.
On these grounds, selecting and formalizing environment constraints must be done
very carefully, because any errors in the environment constraints could overconstrain the
DuV, which could lead to an invalid verification result. In industry, the environment con-
straints are inspected manually, which is tedious and error-prone, especially for reactive
constraints that specify sophisticated interactions between modules. On the other hand,
since the correctness of a reactive constraint is dependent on the DuV itself, to validate
reactive environment constraints, this cycle reasoning must be broken. Assume-guarantee
reasoning is a formal method for validating environment constraints. This work presented
a new assume-guarantee reasoning rule that can be applied to systems modeled as Mealy
machines, and it addresses the problem of circular reasoning coming from the reactive
constraints which are formulated in a property specification language such as PSL or SVA.
For this purpose, two plausibility checks for reactive constraints have been introduced,
which can identify the potential errors in the constraints when verifying the individual
modules of a system. The presented implementability check aims to check whether there
exists an implementation for a constraint. Obviously if a constraint is not implementable,
then the constraint itself must be invalid. The vacuity check, that checks whether a con-
straint is always false, is only a special case of the implementability check presented in
this dissertation. Since the oscillatory behavior caused by combinational loops can not
be handled by a property checker, another plausibility check “Loop-free composibility”
checks whether an implementation of the constraint builds a combinational loop with the
DuV. The presented method makes an over-approximation analysis by doing a syntactic
analysis, which may have false negative counterexamples due to false loops.
In addition, in this dissertation, some compositional rules for compositional coverage
analysis have been derived from the presented novel assume-guarantee rule. By applying
these rules, verification engineers can automatically validate the used reactive constraints
for property checking and coverage analysis. On the other hand, obeying these rules
guarantees that the property sets for individual modules are also valid for the system,
and the composition of the complete property sets for individual modules also completely
verifies the entire system. Although the compositional rules and the assume-guarantee
rule are presented in a setting of SAT-based property checking, they can be applied to
simulation based verification too.
The correctness of hardware-dependent software is critical for embedded systems,
because other software layers, such as the application software and the operating sys-
tems, are highly dependent upon the hardware-dependent software. Testing hardware-
dependent software is especially difficult, because one needs to verify the highly complex
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interactions between the software and the hardware. This is a good reason to apply for-
mal property checking to verify hardware-dependent software, and it is necessary to have
a complete set of properties too. Also one faces the same above mentioned problem as
with hardware if the divide-and-conquer approach is used to verify software systems.
Hardware-dependent software is similar to reactive hardware systems, which assume
sequences of inputs and generate sequences of outputs. Therefore, the methods presented
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 can be adopted for guaranteeing the completeness of the
software properties, and can be used for compositional software verification. This can
not be realized without a software property language that supports formulating the tem-
poral reactive behavior between the software and hardware. Unfortunately, there has
been very little research on property languages for software, not to mention for hardware-
dependent software. In Chapter 6, a new reactive software property language RSPL was
presented. RSPL facilitates the access of input/output interfaces; it simplifies specify-
ing the input/output sequences between the hardware and software; and it is easy to use.
Furthermore, Chapter 6 also presented a method to prove the completeness of the prop-
erty sets written in RSPL. The presented method checks the completeness of the software
property sets by proving that every input sequence and every output sequence are covered
by the property sets. Such a completeness check is of particular importance for software
property sets because a complete set of properties can, at least in principle, fully replace
classical software tests. A typical source of errors when writing software is that the pro-
grammer simply forgets to treat certain input sequences in the program, causing undefined
behavior when these inputs occur at runtime. Also, a verification engineer may forget to
specify tests (or, in our case, properties) for such missing input sequences so that bugs can
escape verification. The completeness check presented in this dissertation removes such
verification gaps. Chapter 6 presented the fundamental framework of the RSPL, which
contains the basic building block of a software property language. Based on them, by
extending the syntax, the method for compositional verification as presented in Chapter 5
can be adopted for software verification. In addition, Chapter 6 presented an approach to
combining the property logic with the software model, which was then further analyzed
by a SAT-based model checker.
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Zusammenfassung
Im heutigem Verifikationsablauf fu¨r System-on-Chip(SoC) Designs spielen auf Simulati-
on basierte Methoden immer noch eine große Rolle. Fu¨r die Simulation wird normalweise
eine Testbench aufgestellt, die zusta¨ndig fu¨r das Erzeugen von Eingabestimuli fu¨r das De-
sign unter Beweis ist. Solche Eingabestimuli mu¨ssen sorgfa¨ltig ausgewa¨hlt werden, damit
mo¨glichst viele Aspekte der gesamten Funktionalita¨t des Designs simuliert werden. Um
die Qualita¨t der Eingabestimuli einzuscha¨tzen, werden verschiedene Arten von Coverage-
kriterien fu¨r den Abdeckungstest (Engl. coverage analysis) verwendet. Coveragekriterien
sind u¨blicherweise eine Menge von Regeln, welche durch Eingabestimuli erfu¨llt werden
sollen. Eine Coverage von 100% bedeutet aber nicht, dass ein Design fehlerfrei ist, son-
dern gibt dem Verifikationsingenieuren mehr Vertrauen bzgl. der Fehlerfreiheit des De-
signs. Der Grund dafu¨r ist, dass es fast unmo¨glich ist, alle Eingabestimuli eines Designs
durchzusimulieren. Außerdem verlangen die modernen Coveragekriterien,
1. dass jedes Statement des HDL-Codes simuliert wird,
2. dass jedes Signal hin und her geschaltet wird,
3. dass jede Transition eines Zustandsautomaten durch Eingabestimuli u¨berdeckt wird.
Solche Coveragekriterien sind leider ungenu¨gend fu¨r die Hardwareverifikation. Beispiel-
weise ist ein Fehler, der durch ein Verhalten verursacht wird, welches sich u¨ber viele
Transitionen eines Automaten erstreckt, schwer zu u¨berdecken. Formale Verifikation ist
eine mathematische Methode um die funktionale Korrektheit eines Designs zu verifizie-
ren. In der formalen Verifikation wird keine Testbench beno¨tigt, da die formale Verifika-
tion verifiziert, ob eine Implementierung eines Designs die sogenannten “Eigenschaften”
(Engl. properties) des Designs erfu¨llt. Eine Eigenschaft, die u¨blicherweise in einer Be-
schreibungssprache fu¨r Eigenschaften (Engl. property specification language) formuliert
wird, ist eine formale Beschreibung des Verhaltens eines Designs. Da formale Verifika-
tion alle Eingabestimuli beru¨cksichtigt, sind die Coveragekriterien der Simulation nicht
mehr verwendbar. Im Allgemeinen beschreibt eine Eigenschaft nur Teile der gesamten
Funktionalita¨t eines Designs. Deshalb ist es fu¨r einen Verifikationsingenieur sehr wichtig,
wann er keine weiteren Eigenschaften zu schreiben braucht.
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Daher u¨bernimmt diese Dissertation das in [80] eingefu¨hrte Coveragekriterium, wel-
ches die Vollsta¨ndigkeit eines Eigenschaftensatzes u¨berpru¨ft. Eine vollsta¨ndige Menge
von Eigenschaften muss jede Eingabefolge des Designs abdecken und jede Ausgabe-
folge des Designs eindeutig determinieren. Die Komplexita¨t fu¨r die U¨berpru¨fung der
Vollsta¨ndigkeit eines Eigenschaftensatzes ist prinzipiell gleich der Pru¨fung der sequen-
ziellen A¨quivalenz zweier Schaltungen. Die Methode von [41] verwendet einen abstrak-
ten Automaten eines Designs und zerlegt damit die komplexe Pru¨fung der Vollsta¨ndigkeit
in mehrere kleine Tests. Jeder kleiner Test wird auf einem Paar Eigenschaften durch-
gefu¨hrt anstatt auf allen Eigenschaften gleichzeitig. Das Paar von Eigenschaften sind zwei
mo¨gliche Transitionen in einem abstrakten Automaten eines Designs. Die Einschra¨nkung
der Methode von [41] ist, dass ein Verifikationsingenieur den abstrakten Automaten aus
dem Design von Hand extrahieren muss. Weiterhin muss er in der Lage sein ein kom-
plexes System so zu spalten, dass jedes Modul nur genau einen derartigen abstrakten
Automaten beinhaltet. Außerdem gibt es leider keine systematische Herangehensweise,
den abstrakten Automaten eines Designs zu ermitteln.
“Teile und Herrsche” (Engl. Divide-and-Conquer) ist einer der einfachsten Ansa¨tze,
um die Komplexita¨t eines Designs und die Einschra¨nkungen der Methodik fu¨r den Ent-
wurf und die Verifikation zu u¨berwinden. Generell wird ein SoC-System in viele kleinere
Module aufgeteilt. Jedes Modul wird separat entworfen und verifiziert. Allerdings sind
einzelne Module eines heutigen SoC-Systems nicht alleine fu¨r sich lauffa¨hig. Diese arbei-
ten nur unter der Annahme richtig, dass ihre Umgebung ebenfalls richtig arbeitet. Beim
Entwurf eines solchen Moduls wird angenommen, dass das Modul nur gu¨ltige Eingabe-
folgen aus seiner Umwelt erha¨lt. Zum Beispiel setzt ein Ingenieur wa¨hrend der Implemen-
tierung eines Moduls eines Kommunikationsprotokolls immer voraus, dass die Eingabe
des Moduls mit dem Protokoll u¨bereinstimmt. Zur Verifikation dieses Moduls werden oft
sogenannte “(Environment) Constraints” benutzt, um die Verifikation nur auf die relevan-
ten Szenarien zu beschra¨nken. Dadurch ko¨nnen Kosten und Ressourcen zur Verifikation
eingespart werden. Solche Constraints, welche mit Hilfe einer Verifikationssprache wie
SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA) formuliert werden, beschreiben das korrekte Verhalten
der Umgebung eines Moduls. Weil die Module eines SoC-Designs miteinander wirken,
sind die Constraints der Module meistens auch reaktiv. Fu¨r die Module eines Kommunika-
tionsbusses ko¨nnen reaktive Constraints einfach aus der Spezifikation des Kommunikati-
onsprotokolls bezogen werden. Andererseits ist fu¨r andere Arten von Designs ha¨ufig eine
Zusammenarbeit zwischen Designingenieuren und Verifikationsingenieuren erforderlich,
um die korrekten Constraints der Module zu formulieren. Constraints sind auch bedeut-
sam fu¨r den Abdeckungstest, denn die Anwendung der Constraints spart die Zeit fu¨r das
Schreiben von u¨berflu¨ssigen Testfa¨llen der Simulation beziehungsweise von u¨berflu¨ssigen
Eigenschaften der formalen Verifikation.
Aus diesen Gru¨nden ist es besonders wichtig sicherzustellen, dass die Constraints
fehlerfrei sind. Irrtu¨mliche Constraints ko¨nnen das Designverhalten mehr als erwartet be-
schra¨nken, sodass es zu falschen Ergebnissen der Verifikation fu¨hren kann. In der Halblei-
terindustrie werden solche Constraints manuell gepru¨ft. Das ist mu¨hsam und fehleranfa¨llig
insbesonders fu¨r reaktive Constraints, die komplexe Interaktionen zwischen Modulen spe-
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zifizieren. Da die Korrektheit der Constraints fu¨r das Design unter Verifikation (DuV)
auch vom DuV selbst abha¨ngt, muss dieser Zirkelschluss unterbrochen werden, um die
Constraints formal zu validieren.
“Assume-Guarantee Reasoning” ist eine formale Methode fu¨r die Validierung von
Constraints. Diese Dissertation pra¨sentiert eine neue Regel fu¨r Assume-Guarantee Rea-
soning, welche auf Systeme angewendet werden kann, die als Mealy-Automat modelliert
werden. Der neue Beitrag dieser Regel ist, dass man sie auf reaktive Constraints, die in
einer Beschreibungssprache fu¨r Eigenschaften, wie SVA, formuliert sind, einsetzen kann.
Dazu werden zwei Plausibilita¨tstests eingefu¨hrt. Einer davon, Implementierbarkeitstest
genannt, pru¨ft ob ein Constraint als Schaltung implementiert werden kann. Offensichtlich
gilt, dass wenn ein Constraint nicht implementierbar ist, es falsch sein muss. Der ande-
re Test garantiert, dass keine kombinatorische Schleifen zwischen den Constraints und
dem DuV gebaut werden. Wie in Kapitel 4 erla¨utet, kann eine kombinatorische Schleife
unerwartet zu starke Constraints verursachen. Dies kann zu Lu¨cken in der Verifikation
fu¨hren.
Außerdem wird im Rahmen dieser Dissertation eine neue Methodik fu¨r komposi-
tionale Verifikation erforscht. Die pra¨sentierten kompositionalen Regeln, hergeleitet von
der in Kapitel 4 neu vorgestellten Regel fu¨r Assume-Guarantee-Reasoning, ermo¨glichen,
die Validierung der Constraints automatisch durchzufu¨hren. Weiterhin kann man unter
Verwendung dieser Regeln folgern, dass das gesamte System vollsta¨ndig verifiziert ist,
wenn jedes einzelne Modul vollsta¨ndig verifiziert ist. (Daher wird ein Modell des ge-
samten Systems zur Verifikation nicht beno¨tigt.) Obwohl die neue Regel fu¨r Assume-
Guarantee-Reasoning und die kompositionale Regeln im Rahmen des SAT-basierten Pro-
perty Checking vorgestellt wurden, ko¨nnen sie trotzdem fu¨r simulationsbasierte Verifika-
tion eingesetzt werden.
Ein Trend beim Entwurf von heutigen SoC-Designs ist, dass immer mehr Funktio-
nalita¨t, die fru¨her in Hardware implementiert wurde, jetzt in Software, insbesondere in
hardwarenaher Software, realisiert wird. Eine Garantie der Korrektheit solcher hardwa-
renahen Softwareprogramme ist a¨ußerst wichtig, da diese die Grundlage aller anderen
Ebenen von Software, wie z.B. Anwendungssoftware und Betriebssysteme, ist. Allein
mit Softwaretests ist es sehr schwer, Fehler in hardwarenahe Software zu erkennen, da
diese mit der Hardware zusammenspielt. Dieses Zusammenspiel ist ein reaktives Verhal-
ten der Schnittstelle zwischen der Hardware (HW) und der Software (SW). Deswegen ist
es sehr bedeutsam, die Fehlerfreiheit der Kommunikation bei HW/SW Schnittstellen si-
cherzustellen. Normalerweise wird das Verhalten der HW/SW Schnittstelle wie auch bei
Hardwaremodulen durch Sequenzen von Signalen der HW/SW Schnittstelle repra¨sentiert.
Deshalb sind die in Kapitel 4 und Kapitel 5 pra¨sentierten Methoden sehr interessant und
ko¨nnen leicht angepasst werden fu¨r die Verifikation hardwarenaher Software, besonders
fu¨r die Validierung deren HW/SW Schnittstelle. Die Methoden in Kapitel 4 und in Kapi-
tel 5 verlangen eine formale Beschreibung des Verhaltens der Schnittstelle zwischen den
Modulen. Diese Beschreibung wird in einer Beschreibungssprache fu¨r Eigenschaften, wie
SVA oder PSL, formuliert. Zum Spezifizieren hardwarenaher Softwareprogramme sind
SVA und PSL nicht verwendbar, weil die beiden Sprachen fu¨r die Verifikation von Hard-
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Chapter 8. Zusammenfassung
ware gedacht sind. “Run-time Assertions” von einer Programmiersprache ko¨nnen nur
“non-temporal” Verhalten beschreiben. Daher sind sie ungenu¨gend fu¨r das Spezifizieren
von hardwarenaher Software, deren Verhalten auch “temporal” sein ko¨nnte. Traditionel-
le temporale Sprachen wie “Computation Tree Logic” (CTL) und “Linear Time Logic”
(LTL) sind fu¨r die Verifikation der hardwarenahen Software nicht leicht zu verwenden.
Demzufolge pra¨sentiert Kapitel 6 eine Beschreibungssprache, “Reactive Property Speci-
fication Language (RSPL)” genannt, fu¨r hardwarenahe Software. Mit dieser Sprache kann
das Verhalten der HW/SW Schnittstelle leicht definiert werden. Ferner erlaubt die Spra-
che die Anwendung der in Kapitel 4 und in Kapitel 5 pra¨sentierten Methoden fu¨r kom-
positionale Verifikation. Weiterhin wird in Kapitel 6 eine Methode fu¨r die Pru¨fung der
Vollsta¨ndigkeit einer Menge von RSPL-Eingenschaften vorgestellt. Dieser Ansatz la¨sst
sich in der Softwareverifikation leichter umsetzen als in der Hardwareverifikation. Die
Gru¨nde dafu¨r sind:
1. Mit RSPL kann man das globale Verhalten einer hardwarenahen Software u¨ber die
HW/SW Schnittstelle spezifizieren.
2. Das benutzte Modell fu¨r hardwarenahe Software kann nur terminierende Software
modellieren. Anders formuliert, die modellierte Software kann nur endlich lange
Eingabesequenzen bearbeiten, welche nur endlich lange Ausgabesequenzen erzeu-
gen ko¨nnen.
Deshalb sind als Vollsta¨ndigkeitskriterium fu¨r RSPL-Eigenschaften nur “determination
test” und “case split test” notwendig. Sie garantieren, dass alle Eingabefolgen und al-
le Ausgabefolgen eines Softwareprogrammes eindeutig determiniert sind. Eine solche
Vollsta¨ndigkeitpru¨fung fu¨r Software ist auch sehr interessant fu¨r Softwaretester, weil ein
ha¨ufiger Fehler beim Schreiben der Testcases ist, dass einfach ein Testcase vergessen
wird, was eine Verifikationslu¨cke verursacht. Die vorgeschlagenen Vollsta¨ndigkeitskriterien
ko¨nnen diese Verifikationslu¨cke schließen.
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Appendix A
Backus-Naur-Form for Reactive
Software Property Language
〈PropertyDefinition〉 ::= ‘property’ 〈PropertyIdentifier〉 ‘;’
〈PropertyBody〉
‘endproperty’ ‘;’
〈PropertyIdentifier〉 ::= 〈Identifier〉
〈Identifier〉 ::= 〈Letter〉, {〈Letter〉|〈Digit〉|‘ ’}
〈Letter〉 ::= 〈UppercaseLetter〉|〈LowercaseLetter〉
〈Digit〉 ::= 〈DigitwithoutZero〉|‘0’
〈PropertyBody〉 ::= [〈AssumePart〉], 〈ProvePart〉, [〈ExecutionOrderPart〉]
〈AssumePart〉 ::= ‘assume’ ‘:’ 〈BooleanExpressions〉 ‘;’
〈BooleanExpressions〉 ::= 〈BooleanExpression〉, {‘;’ , 〈BooleanExpression〉}
〈BooleanExpression〉 ::= 〈AndBooleanExpression〉
| 〈BooleanExpression〉 ‘||’ 〈AndBooleanExpression〉
〈AndBooleanExpression〉 ::= 〈AtomicBooleanExpression〉
| 〈AndBooleanExpression〉 ‘&&’ 〈AtomicBooleanExpression〉
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Appendix A. Backus-Naur-Form for Reactive Software Property Language
〈AtomicBooleanExpression〉 ::= ‘(’〈BooleanExpression〉‘)’
| ‘!’ ‘(’ 〈BooleanExpression〉 ‘)’
| 〈EqualExpression〉
〈EqualExpression〉 ::= 〈RelationalExpression〉
| 〈EqualExpression〉 ‘==’ 〈RelationalExpression〉
| 〈EqualExpression〉 ‘!=’ 〈RelationalExpression〉
〈RelationalExpression〉 ::= 〈NumericalExpression〉
| 〈RelationalExpression〉 ‘>=’ 〈NumericalExpression〉
| 〈RelationalExpression〉 ‘<=’ 〈NumericalExpression〉
| 〈RelationalExpression〉 ‘>’ 〈NumericalExpression〉
| 〈RelationalExpression〉 ‘<’ 〈NumericalExpression〉
〈NumericalExpression〉 ::= 〈BitwiseXOR〉
| 〈NumericalExpression〉 ‘|’ 〈BitwiseXOR〉
〈BitwiseXOR〉 ::= 〈BitwiseAND〉
| 〈BitwiseXOR〉 ‘ˆ’ 〈BitwiseAND〉
〈BitwiseAND〉 ::= 〈ShiftOperation〉
| 〈BitwiseAND〉 ‘&’ 〈ShiftOperation〉
〈ShiftOperation〉 ::= 〈AdditiveExpression〉
| 〈ShiftOperation〉 ‘<<’ 〈AdditiveExpression〉
| 〈ShiftOperation〉 ‘>>’ 〈AdditiveExpression〉
〈AdditiveExpression〉 ::= 〈MultExpression〉
| 〈AdditiveExpression〉 ‘+’ 〈MultExpression〉
| 〈AdditiveExpression〉 ‘-’ 〈MultExpression〉
〈MultExpression〉 ::= 〈UnaryExpression〉
| 〈MultExpression〉 ‘*’ 〈UnaryExpression〉
| 〈MultExpression〉 ‘/’ 〈UnaryExpression〉
| 〈MultExpression〉 ‘%’ 〈UnaryExpression〉
〈UnaryExpression〉 ::= 〈AtomicNumericalExpression〉
| ‘+’ 〈AtomicNumericalExpression〉
| ‘-’ 〈AtomicNumericalExpression〉
106
〈AtomicNumericalExpression〉 ::= ‘(’ 〈NumericalExpression〉 ‘)’
| 〈SequenceElement〉
| 〈Integer〉
〈SequenceElement〉 ::= 〈CIdentifier〉‘’’ 〈WriteReadAttribute〉 ‘#’ 〈NaturalNumber〉
| 〈CIdentifier〉‘’’ 〈StartEndAttribute〉
〈CIdentifier〉 ::= 〈Identifier〉
〈WriteReadAttribute〉 ::= ‘read’|‘write’
〈StartEndAttribute〉 ::= ‘start’|‘end’
〈NaturalNumber〉 ::= 〈DigitwithoutZero〉, {〈Digit〉}
〈Integer〉 ::= [‘-’], 〈DigitwithoutZero〉, {〈Digit〉} | ‘0’
〈ProvePart〉 ::= ‘prove’ ‘:’ 〈BooleanExpressions〉 ‘;’
〈ExecutionOrderPart〉 ::= ‘execution order’ ‘:’ 〈ExecutionOrders〉 ‘;’
〈ExecutionOrders〉 ::= 〈ExecutionOrder〉, {‘;’, 〈ExecutionOrder〉}
〈ExecutionOrder〉 ::= 〈SequenceElement〉 ‘>’ 〈SequenceElement〉
〈PropertyFile〉 ::= 〈PropertyDefinitions〉
| 〈Directives〉
〈PropertyDefinitions〉 ::= 〈PropertyDefinition〉, {〈PropertyDefinition〉}
〈Directives〉 ::= {〈Directive〉}
〈Directive〉 ::= 〈Identifier〉‘:’〈SafetyLiveness〉 〈PropertyIdentifier〉‘;’
〈SafetyLiveness〉 ::= ‘always’ | ‘eventually’
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〈DigitwithoutZero〉 ::= ‘1’ | ‘2’ | ‘3’ | ‘4’ | ‘5’ | ‘6’ | ‘7’ | ‘8’ | ‘9’
〈UppercaseLetter〉 ::= ‘A’ | ‘B’ | ‘C’ | ‘D’ | ‘E’ | ‘F’ | ‘G’ | ‘H’ | ‘I’ | ‘J’ | ‘K’ | ‘L’ | ‘M’ | ‘N’ | ‘O’
| ‘P’ | ‘Q’ | ‘R’ | ‘S’ | ‘T’ | ‘U’ | ‘V’ | ‘W’ | ‘X’ | ‘Y’ | ‘Z’
〈LowercaseLetter〉 ::= ‘a’ | ‘b’ | ‘c’ | ‘d’ | ‘e’ | ‘f’ | ‘g’ | ‘h’ | ‘i’ | ‘j’ | ‘k’ | ‘l’ | ‘m’ | ‘n’ | ‘o’
| ‘p’ | ‘q’ | ‘r’ | ‘s’ | ‘t’ | ‘u’ | ‘v’ | ‘w’ | ‘x’ | ‘y’ | ‘z’
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